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Abstract 
Employing critical race theory as a theoretical and analytical framework, this 
thesis explores the nature, structure and purpose of Islamophobic discourse, and 
offers two central contributions to the scholarly debate on Islamophobia. First, it 
contributes to the literature on the nature of Islamophobia by analysing the form 
and structure of discourse that seeks to represent Muslims and Islam in a 
number of social and political sites. Second, the thesis addresses a significant gap 
identified in the scholarly literature, which has largely overlooked the purpose 
that Islamophobic discourse serves for those employing it. 
    In order to address the nature and structure of Islamophobic discourse, the 
thesis analyses representations of Muslims and Islam in dominant national 
community cohesion and counterterrorism discourses; rearticulation of these 
discourses at the local level in the West Midlands town of Dudley; the use of 
Islamophobic discourse by the English Defence League; and the ways in which 
Islamophobic narratives were used to mark national boundaries in Switzerland, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and France.  
    I explain the convergence of narratives across these levels by extending 
Ghassan Hage’s theoretical formulation of racism as nationalist practices to 
Islamophobic discourse and argue that, as a cultural racism, Islamophobia can be 
conceptualised as upholding a system of Eurocentric supremacy, where Western 
subjects receive a better social, economic and political ‘racial contract’ and seek 
to defend these privileges against real and imagined Muslim demands.  Whether 
employed for local, national or civilisational purposes, Islamophobia relies on the 
notion that space has been culturally compromised by Muslims and must be 
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restored to authenticity by legitimate non-Muslim cultural managers. 
Islamophobia operates through a three-stage ideological process, and restores 
fantasised power to those who perceive Muslim cultural difference to be 
unacceptably changing the spaces in which they reside by representing Muslims 
as making incongruous demands of a territory, singling out a particular timeless 
value that is under threat, and reifying this value to an absolute. Through this 
process Muslims are put back in their place, while those employing this discourse 
experience a restoration of their cultural power to decide the values of a space. 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of Islamophobia in Britain through 
an analysis of its form and content and a theoretical exploration of its function. 
The research has two aims, first to understand the nature and character of 
Islamophobic discourse in Britain since 2001, and second to theorise its purpose; 
why do individuals and groups employ this discourse at diverging social and 
political sites? And what benefits does this mode of representation offer its 
proponents? 
    In the last decade or so there has been burgeoning scholarly interest in 
Islamophobia and a number of approaches have sought to conceptualise and 
explain the phenomenon. The merits and weaknesses of these approaches are 
discussed in chapter two, however, this increased attention to Islamophobia has 
served to illustrate the diverse social and political sites at which it is employed by 
individuals and groups to explain the world as it is and as it should be. It is this 
ideological operation of Islamophobia that the present thesis is concerned with.  
    Each chapter of this thesis has a different analytical focus, and the methods 
used to apprehend and understand Islamophobic discourse are therefore 
discussed in each respectively. Nevertheless, a broad theoretical understanding 
of how to approach the phenomena underpins them all. The present chapter sets 
out the theoretical framework in which the research is situated, considering first 
the implications of conceptualising Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism, and 
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second, the theoretical contributions that a critical race theory framework offers 
to the understanding of Islamophobic discourse. I discuss the assumptions and 
limitations of these perspectives in order to synthesis and explicate the 
theoretical framework for the thesis, and conclude with a brief outline of the 
following chapters.  
 
A conceptual framework for Islamophobia 
I conceptualise Islamophobia in this study as a form of cultural racism. This is 
hardly controversial, and the ways in which scholars have employed this 
understanding is discussed further in the literature review. At this stage I wish to 
foreground the theoretical consequences of approaching Islamophobia from this 
perspective and the research questions that present themselves as a result of this 
conceptualisation.  
    The understanding of Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism is based on 
the new racism thesis developed by scholars in the 1970s and 80s. This 
perspective holds that new, unlike ‘old fashioned’ or ‘blatant’, racism is ostensibly 
non-racial and turns on the emphasis of cultural signifiers that are believed to 
condition human behaviour.1  Although the language of biological or genetic race 
                                                            
1 New racism has variously been conceptualised as: ‘subtle’ (Thomas F. Pettigrew, “Reactions 
Toward the New Minorities of Western Europe,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 77–103; 
Thomas F. Pettigrew and R.W. Meertens, “Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western Europe,” 
European Journal of Social Psychology 25 (1995): 57–75.); ‘covert’ (M. Augoustinos, K. Tuffin, 
and M. Rapley, “Genocide or a Failure to Gel? Racism, History and Nationalism in Australian Talk,” 
Discourse & Society 10 (1999): 351–378; Kevin Durrheim and John Dixon, “Theories of Culture in 
Racist Discourse,” Race and Society 3, no. 2 (2000): 93–109; Michael Omi and Howard Winant, 
Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 1994).); ‘symbolic’ (John B McConahay and Joseph C Hough, “Symbolic Racism,” 
Journal of Social Issues 32, no. 2 (1976): 23–45; Brent Berry and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, “‘They 
Should Hire the One with the Best Score’: White Sensitivity to Qualification Differences in 
Affirmative Action Hiring Decisions,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, no. 2 (February 2008): 217.); 
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recedes, a particular pseudo-biological understanding of culture comes to take its 
place, which maintains group boundaries by essentialising people as products of 
the cultures to which they belong.2 New racism holds that human behaviour and 
aptitudes are determined by belonging to particular historical cultures,3 and social 
tensions emerge when group frontiers are abolished and intermixing of cultural 
groups occurs, particularly when national boundaries are weakened by mass 
immigration.  
    The insights of the new racism thesis thus ground the study of Islamophobia 
in the process of racialization. For those employing new racist understandings, 
Muslims are the living bearers of an immutable ‘Islamic culture’, which conditions 
their psychology, behaviour and actions in a fundamentally different way to 
members of other cultures. This essentialisation of culture not only provides an 
explanatory framework for human difference, but also theorises that tension will 
be a natural result if cultures are mixed. To regulate social tension, members of 
differing cultural groups are thus required to renounce their cultural belonging 
and assimilate into the (culturally different) societies in which they reside in order 
to forestall the inevitable backlash and social strife that will occur.  
    A perspective endorsed by new racism theorists is that, although new racism 
shares with its ‘old’ counterpart the essentialisation of human groups (through 
sociological rather than biological signifiers), there is no necessity within new 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
and ‘differentialist’ (Ali Rattansi, “‘Western’ Racisms, Ethnicities and Identities in a ‘Postmodern’ 
Frame,” in Racism, Modernity and Identity: On the Western Front, ed. Ali Rattansi and Sallie 
Westwood (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), 15–88; Pierre-Andre Taguieff, The Force of Prejudice: 
On Racism and Its Doubles, ed. Hassan Melehy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2001), 4–5.) 
2 Martin Barker, The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe (Maryland: 
University Publications of America, Inc., 1981), 20–23; Etienne Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-
Racism’?,” in Race and Racialisation: Essential Readings, ed. Tanya Das Gupta (Toronto: 
Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc, 2007), 85. 
3 Ibid., 84; J. Solomos and Les Back, “Conceptualising Racisms: Social Theory, Politics and 
Research,” Sociology 28, no. 1 (1994): 151. 
8 
 
racism for the inferiorisation of culturally different groups. Both Etienne Balibar 
and Ali Rattansi have argued, for instance, that there need be no explicit 
reference to hierarchy within new racist boundary formation, and phrases like 
‘separate but equal’ underline this apparent move away from overt assertions of 
superiority.4 It is this distinction that allows the new cultural form to separate 
itself from the ‘old racism’, primarily by attempts to de-racialize situations that 
appear racial and are discriminatory in effect.5 From this perspective, 
Islamophobia is not necessarily dependent on the notion that non-Muslim 
cultures are better, but turns rather on the proposition that cultural mixing leads 
to social tension and it is thus in the interests of Muslims to assimilate in order to 
avoid discrimination or violence. 
    Conceptualising Islamophobia as a form of new cultural racism thus directs 
attention to the ways in which Muslims are racialized in the present period as 
culturally conditioned. The discourse of Islamophobia must be interrogated to 
draw out the assumptions of essentialised cultural difference and trace the 
racialization of group members as unalterably other. Understanding Muslims as 
culturally different, however, does not necessarily imply that Muslim culture is 
inferior or antithetical. This requires discursive work, and it is this construction 
that the present study investigates – what is Islamophobic discourse? How does 
it work to racialize Muslims as culturally determined?  
    The new racism thesis is not without its detractors, and a number of criticisms 
require attending to. First, Colin Wayne Leach has argued that it is not ‘new’ at 
                                                            
4 Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?,” 86; Rattansi, “‘Western’ Racisms, Ethnicities and Identities 
in a ‘Postmodern’ Frame,” 58. 
5 Frank Reeves, British Racial Discourse: A Study of British Political Discourse about Race and 
Race-Related Matters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 11. 
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all, and covert and indirect expressions of racism were the norm even prior to de 
jure racial equality.6 Second, some scholars have argued that cultural difference 
has always been implicitly tied up with racial discourse even when biological 
racism enjoyed widespread scientific support.7 Third, as Coenders et al have 
demonstrated, categories of subtle, indirect or covert are difficult to 
operationalise in empirical research. Perceptions of cultural difference by research 
subjects, often coded by researchers as indicators of prejudice, may be neutral 
understandings of social reality.8 These points have implications for the study of 
contemporary Islamophobia. Although the new racism thesis suggests that covert 
and subtle racialized expression will be more prominent, historical biological 
racism towards Muslims (particularly based on national or ethnic origins) has not 
disappeared and any study of Islamophobia must consider how these ‘old’ 
racisms are rearticulated within culturally racist discourse. The perception of 
cultural difference by actors should not be taken a priori as evidence of 
prejudicial attitudes. Although it does imply that differences are to some extent 
naturalised and essentialised, it is important to interrogate such expressions in 
their contextual settings in order to draw out the structure, form and purpose of 
these articulations before labelling them Islamophobic.  
                                                            
6 Colin Wayne Leach, “Against the Notion of a ‘new Racism,’” Journal of Community & Applied 
Social Psychology 15, no. 6 (November 2005): 434. 
7 The classic example of this is anti-Semitism. Nasar Meer, “Racialisation and Religion: Race, 
Culture and Difference in the Study of Antisemitism and Islamophobia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 
36, no. 3 (2013): 390; S. Schiffer and C. Wagner, “Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia - New 
Enemies, Old Patterns,” Race & Class 52, no. 3 (2011): 77–84. 
8 Coenders et al  in their replication of Pettigrew and Meertens’ (Pettigrew and Meertens, “Subtle 
and Blatant Prejudice in Western Europe.”) research on new racism, highlighted the problematic 
nature of the categories utilised, arguing that ‘perceived cultural difference’ did not necessarily 
mean prejudice, but may rather reflect (neutral) cognitive perceptions of social reality Marcel 
Coenders et al., “Blatant and Subtle Prejudice: Dimensions, Determinants, and Consequences; 
Some Comments on Pettigrew and Meertens,” European Journal of Social Psychology 31, no. May 
1999 (2001): 281–297. 
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    Conceptualising Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism implies a number of 
theoretical assumptions. First, Islamophobia is more likely to be expressed in 
covert and subtle ways that are rationalized and legitimated by claims of cultural 
incompatibility. Second, cultural difference within Islamophobic discourse will 
likely be ascribed an essentialised and naturalised quality, presenting Muslims as 
culturally conditioned to behave in the ways that they do. Third, cultural 
difference may, but not necessarily, be presented hierarchically. Within 
Islamophobic discourse we would expect to see non-Muslim cultures valorised as 
positive while Muslim culture will be more likely to be pathologised as 
dysfunctional and represented in disparaging negative terms. 
    The conceptualisation of Islamophobia as cultural racism suggests that old 
forms of understanding the world as structured by discrete human groups have 
found a new articulation, where culture is represented as a determining and 
relevant human classification. This thesis seeks to understand why the discourse 
of Islamophobia, expressed at a number of social and political sites, has such 
traction and appeal at the present historical moment by considering what 
benefits it provides its adherents. Although the new racism thesis alerts us to the 
subtle ways race takes on cultural inflections, its ambiguity on hierarchy leaves 
open the question of why actors choose racist representations of the world. In 
order to understanding why Islamophobia has such widespread appeal, its 
purpose must be interrogated. The insights of critical race theory and whiteness 
studies help to situate the phenomenon by foregrounding racism as a central 
organising principle of society. The next section considers how these perspectives 
can aid our understanding of Islamophobia’s function as an explanatory discourse 
and ideology, and the reasons why individuals and groups might employ it. 
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Theoretical framework: Critical race theory and Islamophobia 
The contribution of critical race theory (CRT) to the theoretical position I am 
developing here lies in its understanding of social relations as centrally 
constituted by racism and the distributed group privileges and benefits that this 
gives rise to.  
    Although its status as a theory has been questioned and its perspectives are 
far from universally accepted,9 CRT nevertheless rests on several central tenets, 
insights and thematic elements. As Solórzano, Ceja and Yosso have argued, 
critical race theorists broadly agree on the centrality of racism in social 
organisation and its intersectionality with other forms of subordination (class, 
gender, etc.), and seek to challenge dominant ideology and its claims to 
neutrality through a commitment to social justice, a transdisciplinary perspective 
and the centring of the experiential knowledge of those subordinated by 
racism.10 There are three insights of CRT that are particularly pertinent for the 
theoretical position of this thesis, which concern the nature of race, the character 
of racism, and the purpose it serves. 
 
                                                            
9 As Treviño, Harris, & Wallace have argued, CRT cannot really be considered a theory  as such, 
because its concepts and methods are not integrated in the coherent, systematically structured 
way that is required of social theory. Rather than a unified theory, they argue that CRT is an 
intellectual movement made up of a loose association of scholars who employ a mix of analytical 
tools, united broadly on the tenets I have discussed above.A. Javier Treviño, Michelle A. Harris, 
and Derron Wallace, “What’s so Critical about Critical Race Theory?,” Contemporary Justice 
Review 11, no. 1 (March 2008): 8–9. 
10 Daniel Solórzano, Miguel Ceja, and Tara Yosso, “Critical Race Theory , Racial Microaggressions, 
and Campus Racial Climate : The Experiences of African American College Students,” The Journal 
of Negro Education, 2000, 63; David Gillborn, Racism and Education: Coincidence or Conspiracy? 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 26–30; Zeus Leonardo, “The Color of Supremacy: Beyond the 
Discourse of ‘white Privilege,’” Educational Philosophy and Theory 36, no. 2 (2004): 137–152. 
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The nature of race 
Critical race theory rests on the social constructionist position that the concept of 
race has no objective, material or fixed reality, and should be approached as a 
complex and shifting social construction that that changes over time according to 
the needs of certain historical and political moments.11 As products of human 
thought and relations, races are never fixed categories, but are always subject to 
change when it is politically convenient to do so.12 This perspective incorporates 
the observations of the new racism thesis, that dominant society racializes 
different groups at different times in response to shifting needs.13 As Delgado 
and Stefancic point out, understanding the ebb and flow of racism and racial 
progress requires a careful consideration of the conditions prevailing at different 
times and the collective attitudes developed to justify the subjugation and 
dominance of one group over another.14 Critical race theorists hold that the 
essentialisation of racism must be combatted through an understanding and 
assertion of the intersectionality of overlapping and potentially conflicting 
identifications and allegiances.15  
    CRT offers an understanding of race that attends to its socially constructed 
nature. Ian Haney Lopez has defined a race as a vast group of people loosely 
bound together by historically contingent socially significant elements of their 
                                                            
11 Gillborn points to the whitening of the Irish as a good example of this Gillborn, Racism and 
Education: Coincidence or Conspiracy?, 28; Leonardo, “The Color of Supremacy: Beyond the 
Discourse of ‘white Privilege,’” 42. 
12 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (New York: New 
York University Press, 2012), 8. 
13 Ibid., 9.  
14 Ibid., 21–22. 
15 Ibid., 9–10. Chapter three, which places the central dominant discourses on Muslims in context, 
discusses in detail how particular representations have worked to flatten the identity of Muslims 
by emphasising religious attachments and identifications over other important markers of group 
belonging such as gender, class, nation and ethnicity.  
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morphology or ancestry.16 This definition highlights the need to apprehend the 
historical and social elements of racialization in order to understand what is 
socially significant at a particular time and why it would be so. Haney Lopez 
outlines four facets of the social construction of race: first, that humans rather 
than abstract social forces produce races, second, that as human constructs, 
races constitute an integral part of the whole social fabric that includes gender 
and class relations, third, that meaning systems surrounding race change quickly 
rather than slowly, and fourth that races are constructed relationally against one 
another rather than in isolation.17 This understanding of how races are formed in 
the social mind guides analytical attention to processes of racialization and is 
essential for understanding how Muslims are created as cultural others in the 
contemporary period. 
    CRT’s understanding of races as socially constructed implies a broader focus 
than most understandings of racism allow. Borrowing from whiteness studies, 
CRT holds that any analysis of racism must take into account not only the 
representation of minorities, but also the ways in which whiteness is constructed 
through racist discourse. Henry Giroux has formulated this imperative as the 
necessity to ‘unveil the rhetorical, political, cultural and social mechanisms 
through which whiteness is both invented and used to mask its power and 
privilege.'18 This foregrounds the invisible character of dominant (white) racial 
identities. As David Gillborn has argued, one of the most powerful and dangerous 
aspects of whiteness is its deep rooted almost invisible status, which erases its 
                                                            
16 Ian F. Haney Lopez, “The Social Construction of Race,” in Critical Race Theory: The Cutting 
Edge (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000), 194. 
17 Ibid., 196. 
18 Henry A. Giroux, “White Squall: Resistance and the Pedagogy of Whiteness,” Cultural Studies 
11, no. 3 (1997): 382. 
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existence as a racialized and socially constructed identity that requires constant 
iteration.19  
   This observation corresponds with the ambiguity around hierarchy within the 
new racism thesis, and the position that contemporary expressions of racist 
ideology do not explicitly or necessarily assert the dominance or superiority of 
one race over another, rather covert and subtle expressions of power are 
articulated and often expressed in de-racialized ways.20 It also points to the need 
to dismantle these often invisible power relations by considering how they 
ideologically play out, through critical methodology, which teases out the 
ideological assumptions and the power relations that discursive expressions of 
‘subtle’ racisms imply.  
 
The character of racism  
    In its focus on the racialized actors within a social system, CRT draws our 
attention to the character of racism. Zeus Leonardo has clarified the difference 
between white people, a socially constructed identity, and whiteness, a racial 
discourse.21 This distinction between actors and system is important in that it 
moves analytical focus away from the utterances and attitudes of individuals to 
an understanding of dominance. The character of racism is not necessarily overt 
and hierarchical. Rather, dominance within the racialized social system is enacted 
                                                            
19 David Gillborn, “Education Policy as an Act of White Supremacy: Whiteness, Critical Race 
Theory and Education Reform” (2005): 9. 
20 Reeves, British Racial Discourse: A Study of British Political Discourse about Race and Race-
Related Matters, 11. 
21 Zeus Leonardo, “The Souls of White Folk: Critical Pedagogy, Whiteness Studies, and 
Globalizaton Discourse,” Race, Ethnicity and Education 5, no. 1 (2002): 31–32. 
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through the collective routine actions which rearticulate crystallised practices and 
relations that shape the life chances of various races.22  
    The importance of this conceptualisation of the mundane character of racism 
lies in its foregrounding of the covert and invisible structures and actions that 
reproduce it. For critical race theorists, analytical attention should focus not on 
the actions of a few racists, but on the way in which actors belonging to the 
dominant racial group utilise and articulate social representations that seek to 
explain and justify the racialized world as it is or ought to be.23 The concept of 
white supremacy is of paramount importance here, and is understood by CRT 
scholars as an all-encompassing system in which white-identified people receive 
benefits, while those constructed as non-white do not.24  
    For critical race scholars, white supremacy is not limited to the actions of 
extremist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan and the British National Party, who 
mobilise on the basis of hatred. As Frances Lee Ansley has defined it, white 
supremacy represents:  
… a political, economic and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly 
control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of 
white superiority and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white 
                                                            
22 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Amanda Lewis, and David G. Embrick, “‘I Did Not Get That Job Because 
of a Black Man...’: The Story Lines and Testimonies of Color-Blind Racism,” Sociological Forum 19, 
no. 4 (2004): 558–559. 
23 Ibid., 561. 
24 Leonardo, “The Souls of White Folk: Critical Pedagogy, Whiteness Studies, and Globalizaton 
Discourse,” 31–32. 
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dominance and non-white subordination are daily re-enacted across a broad 
array of institutions and social settings.25 
What is important here is that white supremacy does not require an overt 
articulation of racial superiority, rather CRT scholars emphasise the ordinary and 
everyday character of a system of racial domination. White supremacy is viewed 
as a patterned and enduring treatment of social groups that is secured through a 
series of actions whose meaning may be obscured. This understanding focuses 
analytical attention on the ideological understandings that particular 
representations secure, and the mundane actions that shape the world in the 
interests of the dominant racial group.26  
    In its focus on the racialized system, CRT directs attention not only to ways in 
which people of colour are constructed as racialized actors, but also how 
whiteness is reproduced through everyday practices that constitute white people 
as dominant. It is important here to reiterate the central observation of both CRT 
and the new racism thesis that races are constructed and therefore whiteness is 
neither an essence nor a reality, rather it is something that can be accumulated 
by identifying with white interests.27 
 
The purpose of racism 
                                                            
25 Frances Lee Ansley, quoted in Charles W. Mills, “White Supremcy as a Sociopolitical System: A 
Philosophical Perspective,” in White Out: The Continuing Significance of Racism, ed. Ashley Doane 
and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (London: Routledge, 2003), 37. 
26 Gillborn, Racism and Education: Coincidence or Conspiracy?, 35. 
27 Krista Melanie Riley, “How to Accumulate National Capital: The Case of the ‘Good’ Muslim,” 
Global Media Journal - Canadian Edition 2, no. 2 (2009): 58; Ghassan Hage, White Nation: 
Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society (New York: Routledge, 2000), 52–53. 
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This conceptualisation of a system of racial dominance brings us closer to an 
understanding of the purpose of racism. Because of the theoretical understanding 
of whiteness outlined above, CRT offers a broader perspective on white 
supremacy than the limited understanding normally denoted by the term. Chiefly, 
it highlights the investment that white identified people have in the system of 
white supremacy, which implicates all white people as benefitting from the 
advantages bequeathed to them by the racialized system. The notion that whites 
accrue unearned advantages in the current racial structure has been theorised as 
white privilege,28 but it is important when employing the language of privilege to 
foreground the processes by which these privileges are secured. As Leonardo has 
argued, any understanding of privilege is incomplete without an analysis of white 
supremacy – the system that secures the privileges enjoyed by white people 
because they have created a structure of domination under which they can 
thrive.29 
    The notion that white people universally benefit from a system of racial 
domination has been the subject of much controversy. Perhaps the most 
sustained criticisms of CRT’s understanding of the way racism functions have 
been presented by Marxist scholars, particularly Mike Cole, who has argued that 
there are two problems with the use of the term white supremacy: first that it 
homogenises white people in positions of power and privilege and second that 
the term itself has the effect of equating far right racist movements with 
                                                            
28 Leonardo, “The Color of Supremacy: Beyond the Discourse of ‘white Privilege,’” 137; Joe R. 
Feagin, Hernan Vera, and Pinar Batur, White Racism (New York: Routledge, 2001), 5–7; Steve 
Garner, “The Uses of Whiteness: What European Sociologists Can Do with the Instrument of 
‘whiteness,’” Sociology 40, no. 2 (2006): 257–275.  
29 Leonardo, “The Color of Supremacy: Beyond the Discourse of ‘white Privilege,’” 148; 138. As 
Leonardo notes, the discourse of privilege obscures the subject and agent relationship central to 
domination by focusing on the advantages that dominant racial actors receive and obscuring the 
process of appropriation.  
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institutional racism, preventing a rational analysis of racism.30 In addressing 
these criticisms it is important to keep in mind the understanding of white 
supremacy as a scale of domination, in which the mobilisation on the basis of 
race hatred is at the most extreme and visible end, while everyday practices 
which uphold white supremacy (discrimination, institutional racism) are at a less 
extreme end and often invisible. All of these activities, however, contribute to the 
exclusion and marginalisation of non-whites, and uphold a system which benefits 
white identified people.  
    In conceptualising the function of racism as such, David Gillborn has 
emphasised CRT’s concern with the dominance of white interests. Not all white 
people benefit in the same way, but they do all benefit:  
… even with the most extreme forms of poverty and exclusion, Whiteness 
matters. CRT does not assume that all White people are the same - that 
would be ludicrous; but CRT does argue that all White people are implicated 
in White Supremacy. 31 
This position draws upon the understanding that while some white people receive 
material benefits in their monopolisation of economic, social and state resources, 
even those on the margins are rewarded a social-psychological wage that grants 
them social status and deference from non-whites.32  
                                                            
30 Mike Cole and Alpesh Maisuria, “‘Shut the F*** Up’, ‘You Have No Rights Here’: Critical Race 
Theory and Racialisation in Post-7/7 Racist Britain,” Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies, 
2007, http://www.jceps.com/index.php?pageID=article&articleID=85 [Retrieved 5 August 2012]. 
31 Gillborn, Racism and Education: Coincidence or Conspiracy?, 34. 
32 France Winddance Twine and Charles Gallagher, “The Future of Whiteness: A Map of the ‘third 
Wave,’” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, no. 1 (2008): 8–9. This perspective is based heavily on 
W.E.B. Du Bois’s argument that white workers in the reconstructed American South received 
psychological benefits in the racialised system as a result of their racial identities. As Du Bois puts 
it: ‘It must be remembered that the white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, 
were compensated in part by a sort of public and psychological wage.’ Quoted in Eric Arnesen, 
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    Understanding the racial privilege and benefits of whites as secured through 
white supremacy is important for our understanding of why differently situated 
actors might invest in this ideology. It draws attention not only to the intersection 
of all racialized identities with other identities, of class, gender, ethnicity, etc., but 
also to the fact that, as a social construction, whiteness is something that can be 
accumulated, through identifying and articulating the norms of white society. 
 
CRT and Islamophobia 
What does all this mean for the study of Islamophobia? First, the insights of the 
new racism thesis and CRT on the nature of racism draw attention to the 
constructed nature of all racialized identities. If race has no objective or fixed 
meaning, but is rather a category subject to constant change, then sociological 
signifiers can have as much importance as biological signifiers. From this position 
Muslims can be conceptualised as culturally racialized through Islamophobic 
discourses which represent them as behaviourally conditioned by their belonging 
to a particular culture. The understanding and analysis of Islamophobia thus 
requires a consideration of the signifiers that come to have meaning when 
individuals and groups discuss Muslims, and a tracing of the ways in which 
Muslims are racialized through repetition and emphasis of those signifiers that 
are believed to mark their essential difference. 
    Second, the CRT conceptualisation of racism draws attention to its role as a 
central organising principle of society and its routine, unremarkable and 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
“Whiteness and the Historians’ Imagination,” International Labor and Working-Class History 60, 
no. Fall (2001): 9. 
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unrecognised character.33 This observation foregrounds the invisible and 
unnoticed aspects of Islamophobia, as the ‘business as usual’ discourses and 
social relations that structure society. Analytical attention therefore must be 
centred on the way in which certain representations come to have a ‘common 
sense’ character and the way these narratives are drawn upon and rearticulated 
in everyday and mundane ways that serve to present Muslims as culturally 
different to non-Muslims. It also requires close attention to the way these 
discourses are re-articulated and built upon by speakers and writers in order to 
maintain and re-affirm shared social narratives that sustain these racialized 
understandings.  
    The final contribution of CRT, and most important to this thesis, is its 
understanding that racism serves an important purpose for actors in 
contemporary society, sustaining a hierarchy of benefits and serving important 
psychic and material functions for the dominant group.34  As Delgado points out, 
understanding the ebb and flow of racism and racial progress requires a careful 
look at the conditions prevailing at different times and the collective attitudes 
developed to justify subjugation and the dominance of one group over another.35 
This highlights the necessity of considering not only what Islamophobia is, but 
also the ideological effects of its articulation. The notion of racism as a human 
construct that distributes privileges draws our attention to the function it serves 
for those employing it, and contrary to the ambiguity of the ‘new racism’ 
scholars, centres the notion of hierarchy. This focus on the hierarchical 
distribution of material and psychic goods relies on an understanding that 
                                                            
33 Gillborn, Racism and Education: Coincidence or Conspiracy?, 27. 
34 Delgado and Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction, 7. 
35 Ibid., 21–22. 
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racialized social systems require an ideology of dominance which functions to 
distribute these privileges. Analysing Islamophobic articulation thus necessitates 
attention to both the social system that it sustains and the purpose it serves. 
    Building on the insights discussed so far, the theoretical framework that this 
thesis employs considers Muslims as subjected to both overt and covert racialized 
discourse, that have a historical genealogy in previously racialized forms which 
may continue to be applied to Muslim groups (understood as nationally, 
ethnically or racially different). Given the increasingly socially illegitimate nature 
of such expressions, however, these are contemporarily articulated in a more 
covert form. For this reason, Islamophobic discourse is likely to incorporate a 
narrative that seeks to distinguish itself from these older forms of racism by 
presenting itself as a legitimate reaction to cultural difference.  
    The social construction of races, the character of racism and the purpose it 
serves all lead to an emphasis on the importance of discourse as the vehicle 
through which racist ideology and practices are transmitted. In order to 
understand and challenge cultural racism, we must approach it at the level of 
discourse, while keeping in mind the fact that racialized discourses have real 
social effects and are the means by which societal privileges, status and 
resources are allocated. 
 
Discourse and ideology 
Discourse is a notoriously slippery concept with a number of theoretical 
inflections that condition its analytical use. Teun A van Dijk has argued that new 
racism is primarily discursive; enacted through text and talk and having a central 
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role in the reproduction (and challenge) of dominance.36 As a racist discourse, I 
understand Islamophobia as the means by which ideological understandings of 
Muslims and their position in society are transmitted, shared, and resisted by 
individuals acting as group members. It is the nature of these ideological 
understandings that the present study seeks to determine, through an analysis of 
the content and structure of Islamophobic utterances.  
    The racialized understandings of Muslims that are central to Islamophobic 
discourse can be understood, following Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s CRT 
conceptualisation of ideology, as the broad mental frameworks that social groups 
use to make sense of the world.37 Since these frameworks are a sum of the 
ideas, prejudices and myths that are used by individuals to understand and 
justify the way the world is, they can be interrogated for representations of the 
races.38 The approaches to analysing these frameworks vary slightly in each 
chapter of this thesis, however the methodology is guided by the understanding 
that, as a culturally racist discourse, Islamophobia involves the marking of 
boundaries of identity, where Muslims are represented as different and discursive 
work serves to construct them as antithetical to local, national and civilisational 
identities.39  
    From this perspective, understanding the ideology of Islamophobia requires 
careful attention to the content of text and talk identified as (potentially) 
                                                            
36 T. A. van Dijk, “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis,” Discourse & Society 4, no. 2 (1993): 
249. 
37 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era (London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001), 62. 
38 Ibid., 64. 
39 Since each chapter of this thesis has a different focus and seeks to answer differing research 
questions, there is no single methodology used across the thesis. I discuss methods in each 
chapter, however the theoretical framework outlined here guides the research and analysis 
throughout the thesis, in terms of the conceptualisation of Islamophobia and approaches to its 
analysis that follow from this understanding of the way racist discourses operate in society.  
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Islamophobic. Predicate analysis is employed throughout this thesis, and seeks to 
isolate representations of Muslims and Islam by focusing on collocates of these 
nouns. Predicates establish what sort of thing a subject is, and direct analytical 
attention to particular representations and the ways they come to have social 
significance.40 The nature of Islamophobia is revealed through an analysis of the 
discourse’s content and the common topics and frames that recur, the style and 
rhetorical structure of the discourse, and the regularly occurring narratives that 
seek to explain the different positions of Muslims and non-Muslims in 
contemporary society.41  
    The critical method explicitly links discourse with broader social forces, and is 
employed throughout this thesis. Foregrounding the inherent instability of all 
ideological discourse, critical methodology aims first to uncover the internal 
contradictions and myths drawn upon to sustain particular ideological 
understandings, and second to make explicit the ideological effects of employing 
particular representations. Critical methodology makes clear the relationship 
between discursive choices and their social consequences, and maintains a 
broader critical project which aims to equip individuals and groups for resistance 
to these discourses. 
    Discourses of interest in this thesis are identified through the use of 
construction moments: events or occurrences that bring forth particular 
representations and crystallise them in the social realm. Construction moments 
help us delineate the way that particular understandings are sedimented, by 
                                                            
40 Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
Methods,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2 (1999): 232–234; Jennifer K. 
Lobasz, “The Woman in Peril and the Ruined Woman: Representations of Female Soldiers in the 
Iraq War,” Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 29, no. 3 (2008): 313–314. 
41 Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 66–70. 
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tracing how representations emerge and discursively construct new realities, and 
the ways in which these representations mould understandings of events through 
the recycling and re-articulation of older discourses. By providing a pinpoint 
moment at which particular representations come to have salience, the social 
understanding of these events through particular ideological prisms can be 
determined and understood.42 
 
Research aims 
This thesis has three central research aims, based on the theoretical insights of 
new racism and critical race theory. First, I want to understand what 
Islamophobic discourse is. This concerns the nature of Islamophobia, the 
representations that are central to it and the way in which Muslims are socially 
constructed as having cultural aptitudes that guide their behaviour. By focusing 
analytical attention on the discursive work undertaken to construct Muslim 
identity as discrete, culturally determined and essentially different, a greater 
understanding may be attained of what constitutes Islamophobia. 
    Second, I want to understand how Islamophobia constructs boundaries. This 
is related to the observation above that, understood as a racist discourse, 
analytical attention must focus on the way in which particular representations of 
Muslims serve to construct and maintain group boundaries of inside and outside.  
                                                            
42 Henri C Nickels et al., “Working Paper 13: A Comparative Study of the Representations of 
‘Suspect’ Communities in Multi-Ethnic Britain and of Their Impact on Irish Communities and 
Muslim Communities - Mapping Newspaper Content,” Institute for the Study of European 
Transformations August (2009): 5–6, 
http://intrweb.org/fms/MRSite/Research/iset/_fms_recycle_WP13 H Nickels 21.pdf [Retrieved 7 
January 2011].; Yasmin Hussain and Paul Bagguley, “Securitized Citizens: Islamophobia, Racism 
and the 7/7 London Bombings,” The Sociological Review 60, no. 4 (2012): 731. 
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    Finally, I want to understand the purpose of Islamophobia. Understood as a 
racial ideology and through the conceptual and theoretical frameworks I have 
discussed, Islamophobia must perform some function for its adherents. In order 
to understand why Islamophobia has such salience at the present historical 
moment, the benefits that this racialized understanding of the world offers to 
those employing it must be considered. As the literature review demonstrates, 
this is a question that has been largely ignored by scholars seeking to understand 
Islamophobia, either because Islamophobia is conceptualised as merely a 
continuation of older colonial, imperial and/or orientalist discourse, whose 
purpose is domination, or because Islamophobia is theorised as racism, which is 
considered to have clear hierarchical purposes for its proponents. Although both 
of these propositions offer partial explanation of why Islamophobia is drawn upon 
by social actors, they fail to fully comprehend the reality of contemporary 
Islamophobia.  
    On the first point, although historical antecedents mark its contemporary 
configuration, conceptualising Islamophobia as merely a continuation of these 
discourses does not fully explain the current form of the discourse. Why would 
ordinary British people invest in propagating colonial and imperial interests at a 
time when these things are a distant memory? Similarly, if Islamophobia is 
merely neo-orientalism then why are Muslims represented almost exclusively in 
negative terms? Where is the exoticism and fascination that marks orientalist 
thought? On the second point, how can the understanding of racism as 
propagating hierarchy be reconciled with the ambiguity on hierarchy put forth by 
new racism theorists? The literature review addresses these questions in more 
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detail, but this brief discussion serves to indicate that current theories of the 
purpose of Islamophobia are lacking in explanatory power.  
    In order to understand the widespread appeal of contemporary Islamophobia I 
am primarily concerned with the British context. However, even a cursory glance 
at British Islamophobia reveals that it is deeply entwined with more widely 
shared social narratives that situate Britain within ‘the West’ as a bearer of 
Enlightenment rationality and sharing in a history of civilisational glory. These 
narratives are essential to British Islamophobia’s story of itself and of the dangers 
and threats Muslims are believed to pose. For this reason the analysis, although 
primarily focused on Britain, does not ignore the importance of broader 
discourses with European and global resonance.   
    To sum up, the conceptual framework adopted in this thesis conceives of 
Islamophobia as a culturally racist discourse and employs the insights of critical 
race theory in order to guide methodology and interpretation. I understand 
discourse as social representation, enacted and interpreted through text, talk, 
and visual symbols. For this reason predicate analysis and construction moments 
are analytical tools central to this thesis, but I am also interested in the 
ideological effects of such representations and the ways in which particular 
representations advantage some groups over others. Critical methodology is 
employed to determine this, by applying first and second order critiques to the 
particular narratives and the identity constructions and boundaries they create. 
Finally, I am centrally concerned with why Islamophobic discourse appears across 
diverse social and political sites, and employ the theoretical insights of CRT in 
order to understand how identities are created relationally through racialized 
discourse and the ways in which invisible racial identities may be brought to 
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visibility through critical approaches to racialized discourse.  The study aims to 
answer three central research questions that attend to the nature, character and 
function of islamophobia: What is Islamophobic discourse? How does it work to 
mark boundaries of identity? What is its purpose for those employing it?   
    Chapter Two (Literature Review) situates the current study in a wider scholarly 
context and makes the case for the necessity of this research by considering how 
Islamophobia has been approached in previous works. Considering historical and 
comparative approaches to Islamophobia I argue that each of these provides 
partial explanation of the nature of the phenomena by attending to where it 
comes from, what it is and how it works. I outline the space into which my 
research fits by foregrounding the importance of the function and purpose of 
Islamophobia.  
    In order to understand Islamophobic discourse, careful attention must be 
given to the contextual settings in which it is articulated. Chapter three sets the 
context for the thesis by considering discourses of national prominence that have 
constructed Muslim identity in Britain since 2001. In this chapter, I trace the way 
that key construction moments (the Northern Uprisings of summer 2001 and the 
September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005 terrorist attacks) opened up space for new 
conceptualisations of Muslim identity and argue that the discourses which 
emerged provided the central frames through which British Muslims were 
understood and represented.  Considering the community cohesion and 
counterterrorism discourses, this chapter traces the social construction of a 
racialized Muslim identity, by foregrounding the central discursive frame of 
good/bad Muslims and the way in which dominant discourses de-emphasised 
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salient aspects of Muslim identity in such a way that culture became the primary 
prism through which Muslims in Britain were understood in the post-2001 period. 
   Chapters Four and Five are concerned with the frames and themes of 
Islamophobic representation and employ predicate analysis, which attends to 
collocates of the nouns ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’, in order to draw out the 
representations employed. Having identified the ways Muslims are represented 
and the central narratives that make up Islamophobic discourse, these are 
subjected to the critical method in order to highlight the internal inconsistencies 
in the discourses as well as the ideological effects of such representations. These 
case studies highlight the ways in which Islamophobic understandings created 
group boundaries.  
    Chapter Four analyses Islamophobia at the local level in order to trace how 
particular representations of Muslims were employed to argue against 
construction of a mosque in the West Midlands town of Dudley. By considering 
the argumentative strategies used by correspondents to local newspaper Dudley 
News this chapter analyses the predicates of the nouns ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ in 
letters to the Editor in order to identify how Muslims were constructed, and 
foregrounds the way dominant national representations were recycled and 
rearticulated in a local context to prevent Muslim action and change to the 
locality.  
    Chapter five considers the way group boundaries were created and maintained 
through Islamophobia by considering the discourse of overtly ‘anti-Islamist’ 
group, the English Defence League. Concentrating on the group’s central 
assertion that it is not racist, this chapter demonstrates how Islamophobia 
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functions stylistically, through an analysis of the way Muslims and Islam were 
represented in articles on the EDL’s website EDL News. This chapter is concerned 
with both the narratives and the discursive strategies of Islamophobia, and 
considers the way (culturally) racist discourse is constructed, focusing on the role 
of denials, diminutives, and positive self and negative other representations have 
in legitimizing and rationalizing Islamophobic discourse. 
    Chapter six considers how Islamophobia was used to draw national boundaries 
in four European states. By considering construction moments in Switzerland, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and France, I argue that Islamophobic representations 
created and maintained national boundaries by presenting Muslims as antithetical 
to a particular cherished national value. A content analysis of the types of 
discourses brought to fore during these controversies highlights the similarities in 
the ways actors in a number of European states utilised Islamophobic narratives 
in order to construct national boundaries which implicitly excluded Muslims as 
national subjects. This chapter also considers how Islamophobic discourse is 
reliant on appeals to a larger discourse of civilisation. 
    Chapter seven draws together all of these analyses to interpret and explain 
the reasons why such constructions might have salience and relevance in such 
varied social spaces and for differently situated people. If Islamophobia is socially 
constructed, what is it socially constructed for? By demonstrating how 
Islamophobia relies on the idea of spatial management I draw upon the work of 
Ghassan Hage in order to theorise Islamophobia as a form of spatial dominance 
that attempts to construct stable identities as a way to resolve identity crises 
brought on by the perception that Muslims are trying to change Europe. By 
considering both inclusive Islamophobia and exclusionary discourses, this chapter 
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demonstrates how they rely on the same identity constructions. I argue in this 
chapter that the varied articulations and assertions of Islamophobia are best 
understood as Eurocentric discourse in which a shared social narrative of the 
west attempts to control the Muslims in its midst by constructing them as 
antithetical and requiring management before Islamic will gets out of control.  
    Critical race theory focuses our attention on race as a central organising 
principle of society, and therefore all social and geographical spaces as racialized. 
CRT also highlights invisible white racialized identities and the importance for 
individuals of continually rearticulating and reconstructing these identities. 
Understanding Islamophobia as a racialized discourse requires us to consider its 
purpose and function to those employing it. I argue in this thesis that 
Islamophobia relies on the notion that space has been culturally compromised by 
Muslims and must be restored to authenticity by legitimate non-Muslim cultural 
managers. Islamophobia operates through a three-stage ideological process, and 
restores fantasised power to those who perceive Muslim cultural difference to be 
unacceptably changing the spaces in which they reside by representing Muslims 
as making incongruous demands of a territory, singling out a particular timeless 
value that is under threat, and reifying this value to an absolute. Through this 
process not only are Muslims are put back in their place, but those employing 
Islamophobia experience a restoration of their cultural power to decide the 
values of a space. 
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Chapter Two - Islamophobia: A literature Review 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘Islamophobia’ has become a central concept in academic analyses of 
the political and social struggles that mark the contemporary world. Yet, as a 
contested concept, its definition, social meaning and operational analytic use is 
fraught with conflict. Everyday conversational use of the term ranges from 
uncritical acceptance to virulent denial, making the lack of an agreed upon 
definition a central controversy. But the issue is not merely semantic. The debate 
over whether there is such a thing as Islamophobia and what it might comprise is 
a political struggle, over the recognition, articulation and protection of identities, 
and the incorporation, and limits, of difference.  
    Although the definitional debate is wide ranging and significant, it is by no 
means the only disagreement that the term generates. A review of the vast and 
growing literature which takes Islamophobia as its object of research reveals a 
breadth of approaches to the phenomenon and its analysis. Any 
compartmentalisation of such research is necessarily artificial. Islamophobia has 
become an object of investigation relatively recently, chiefly because of the 
perceived increase in Islamophobic sentiment and incidents after the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.43 It is a fledgling subject, and scholars have borrowed 
                                                            
43 This is not to say that Islamophobia ‘began’ on 11 September, 2001, merely that the apparent 
increase in Islamophobia following the attacks led to a greater receptivity among the public and 
within academia that such a phenomenon existed and needed to be explained.   
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from other disciplines in order to isolate and explain the phenomenon. Definitions 
and explanations of Islamophobia therefore incorporate a number of approaches, 
each of which aid our understanding by focusing on a particular aspect of the 
phenomenon, but often at the cost of de-emphasising other, important, 
characteristics. 
    It is useful to analytically divide the literature into two groups, historical 
approaches and comparative analyses. Each of these approaches generates its 
own particular understanding of the term, prioritises particular aspects of the 
phenomenon, and directs analytical attention to specific manifestations and 
expressions of Islamophobia.  
    The first approach identifies contemporary Islamophobia as rooted in imperial 
and colonial discourses, particularly Orientalism. Scholars adopting this 
understanding have foregrounded the historical antecedents of Islamophobia, 
and argued that its manifestation today involves the contemporary recycling and 
re-articulation of older tropes for similar exclusionary purposes and with 
analogous effects. The second approach considers that Islamophobia can be 
most usefully understood through comparison with similar exclusionary 
discourses. Proponents of this position have made use of the vast theoretical 
literature on racism and anti-Semitism as useful analogies to aid our 
understanding of the contemporary situation of Muslims. A crude summation of 
the different analytical commitments of these approaches highlights that the 
historical approach foregrounds where Islamophobia comes from, while the 
comparative approach attempts to explain what it is and how it works. Each of 
these approaches tells us something about Islamophobia, but, naturally, each has 
its own weaknesses and shortcomings. 
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    The following chapter considers these approaches in turn, appraising the 
contribution of each to our understanding of the contemporary situation of British 
Muslims. Although my focus is on Britain, it is impossible to ignore the fact that 
British Islamophobia operationalises a global discourse and a shared 
European/Western history in its articulation of themes and tropes. For reasons 
that become starkly apparent once any analysis of Islamophobia is undertaken, it 
is imprudent to discount the vast literature that has studied Islamophobia outside 
of the British context. Having said that, I do not include studies whose focus is 
outside ‘the West’. This is because British Islamophobia, conceptualised within a 
critical race theory paradigm, depends upon an unequal power relationship 
between a majority (non-Muslim) and a minority Muslim population, the latter of 
which has fewer economic, social and discursive resources, due to a history of 
colonial and imperial domination and post-war immigration patterns. This 
situation is shared by many other Western nations, which demonstrate 
remarkably similar sedimented narratives and understandings of Muslim 
populations. Non-Western nations, however, have different histories and patterns 
of Islamophobia, and are thus not so directly comparable to the British situation.  
    ‘The West’ is used throughout this review to refer to those capitalist nations of 
Europe and North America which consider themselves to have a shared history 
and (largely Christian) tradition. There is a large amount of controversy 
associated with use of this term. As Fred Halliday has noted, ‘the West’ is not a 
valid aggregate of the vastly different societies it seeks to describe.44 I agree 
with Halliday’s criticism, however, as the empirical chapters in this thesis 
demonstrate, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that ’the West’ does have 
                                                            
44 Fred Halliday, “‘Islamophobia’ Reconsidered,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 5 (1999): 893. 
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some validity for speakers who invoke it for political purposes. For them, it 
describes a shared history and a mutual future, based on the notion that those 
societies believed to belong to the West draw upon the same traditions in order 
to face similar contemporary challenges. Regardless of its empirical reality, the 
idea of the West operates as an imagined community for those who invoke it, 
and this is the sense in which the term is used throughout this thesis.45 
    Before turning to the approaches described, it is necessary to take a brief 
detour around the definitional debate that has so marred the short life of 
Islamophobia studies. Centred on the popularisation of the term by the 
Runnymede Trust’s report on Islamophobia,46 this dispute serves to focus 
attention on important aspects of the phenomenon that are critically considered 
by scholars approaching Islamophobia from the perspectives I have outlined 
above.  
 
Defining Islamophobia: A challenge for us all 
The Runnymede Trust’s 1997 report, Islamophobia: A challenge for us all, has 
come to form the starting point for all other attempts to conceptualise and 
understand Islamophobia. Authored by the Commission on British Muslims and 
Islamophobia, it was the first source to systematically define the concept and has 
become the point of departure from which contemporary understandings of the 
phenomenon have flowed. 
                                                            
45 Farhat Shahzad, “Forging the Nation as an Imagined Community,” Nations and Nationalism 18, 
no. 1 (2012): 21–38; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983). 
46 Commission on British Muslims and Islamphobia, “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All,” 1997, 
http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/17/32.html [Retrieveed 20 June 2011]. 
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    Defined as a shorthand way of referring to the dread or hatred of Islam and 
therefore the fear or dislike of Muslims,47 Islamophobia was conceptualised as 
unfounded hostility towards Islam, and the practical consequences of this for 
Muslims in terms of discrimination and social exclusion.48 Foreseeing potential 
objection to such a definition, the Commission attempted to disambiguate it by 
clarifying the point at which legitimate criticism ended and unfounded hostility 
began. To this end a list of eight views about Islam and Muslims was submitted, 
with ‘closed’ and ‘open’ positions attached to them, comprising whether Islam is: 
monolithic or diverse, separate or interacting, inferior or different; whether 
Muslims are considered enemies or partners, manipulative or sincere; whether 
Muslim criticisms of the West are rejected or considered; whether discrimination 
against Muslims is defended or criticised; and whether Islamophobia is seen as 
natural or problematic.49 Legitimate criticism, the Commission claimed, was the 
province of open views, while Islamophobia was ‘the recurring characteristic of 
closed views’.50 
    As the first attempt to comprehensively define Islamophobia,51 the report was 
ground breaking in its assertion that Muslims were experiencing a specific 
                                                            
47 Ibid., 1. 
48 Ibid., 4. 
49 Ibid., 5. 
50 Ibid., 4. 
51 There is some dispute about when the term ‘Islamophobia’ was first used in English. 
AbdoolKarim Vakil has noted that Edward Said used the term in his article ‘Orientalism 
reconsidered’, published in three different print contexts in 1985, and thus reaching both an 
academic and a wider activist readership. AbdoolKarim Vakil, “Is the Islam in Islamophobia the 
Same as the Islam in Anti-Islam; Or, When Is It Islamophobia Time?,” in Thinking Thru’ 
Islamophobia, Symposium Papers, ed. Bobby S. Sayyid and Abdoolkarim Vakil (Leeds: University 
of Leeds, March, 2008), 43. Most other scholars date the term to the early 1990s. Chris Allen 
places the first usage around December 1991, when it appeared in both the American journal 
Insight, and Tariq Modood’s book review in The Independent. Chris Allen, “Islamophobia and Its 
Consequences,” in European Islam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy, ed. Samir Amghar, 
Amel Boubekeur, and Michael Emerson (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2007), 
148–149. Hopkins and Kahani-Hopkins date the first usage in the UK media in 1994, which 
indicates that the term was gaining popular traction. Nick Hopkins and Vered Kahani-Hopkins, 
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targeting on the basis of their faith or their identification as Muslim. It has also 
been hugely influential on the conceptualisation of Islamophobia for policy 
makers, and a number of organisations have incorporated similar definitions of 
the phenomenon that focus on the fear of Islam and Muslims.52 The Runnymede 
conceptualisation, however, has been subject to two central criticisms: first, of its 
procedural definition, and second, of its essentialisation of identities. These pave 
the way to more general problems with the term and its understanding. 
    The first criticism foregrounds the procedural manner in which Islamophobia 
was defined. This argument holds that because the report was intended as 
guidelines for equalities and anti-racist practitioners, it overemphasised a 
checklist style approach, which gave rise to a reductionist and dualistic 
conceptualisation of the phenomenon. This is embodied in the central focus on 
Islamophobia as the recurrence of ‘closed views’.53 As David Tyrer has noted, this 
approach may be useful to discern routine cases of Islamophobia, but it is 
severely limited when considering more complex articulations.54 ‘Closed views’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
“Minority Group Members’ Theories of Intergroup Contact: A Case Study of British Muslims' 
Conceptualizations of ‘Islamophobia’ and Social Change.,” The British Journal of Social Psychology 
45, no. Pt 2 (June 2006): 249. As Mike Cole has noted this coincided with the first Gulf War and 
increasing perceptions of Muslims as targeted on the basis of their religious identity in both global 
and local contexts. Mike Cole, “A Plethora of ‘Suitable Enemies’: British Racism at the Dawn of the 
Twenty-First Century,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32, no. 9 (November 2009): 1681.  The 
Runnymede Report notes in its forward that the Commission did not coin the term, and it was 
already in use by some sections of the Muslim community. Commission on British Muslims and 
Islamphobia, “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All,” iii. 
52 The Council of Europe, for example, operationalises a similar definition: ‘Islamophobia can be 
defined as the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam Muslims and matters pertaining to 
them.’ Ingrid Ramberg, “Islamophobia and Its Consequences on Young People: European Youth 
Centre Budapest,” in European Youth Centre Budapest, vol. 1–6 June (Council of Europe, 2004), 
6. 
53 A focus that Chris Allen notes took on a life of its own, becoming so central to the definition of 
Islamophobia that the immediately preceding definition given was changed a page later, from 
fear or hostility towards Muslims and Islam, to the recurring characteristic of closed views and 
nothing more. Chris Allen, “K.I.S.S. Islamophobia (Keeping It Simple and Stupid),” in Thinking 
Thru’ Islamophobia, Symposium Papers, ed. Bobby S. Sayyid and Abdoolkarim Vakil (Leeds: 
University of Leeds, March, 2008), 31. 
54 David Tyrer, “Institutionalised Islamophobia in British Universities,” Social Research (PhD 
Thesis (Sociology), University of Salford, 2003), 56. 
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imply that Islamophobia can be reduced to ignorance and refusing to open one’s 
mind, leaving more subtle (and potentially more dangerous) forms of 
Islamophobic discourse unscrutinised while focusing on blatant and easily 
discernible forms.55  
    This reductionist dualistic approach to Islamophobia was exacerbated by the 
report’s suggestion that closed views could be challenged by the proliferation of 
open views, a position that might be termed Islamophilia.56  If Islamophobia is 
an abnormal and pathological dislike of Muslims and Islam, then Islamophilia is 
the equally abnormal love of Muslims and Islam, and is no less reductionist or 
essentialist with regard to Muslim identities. Chris Allen has argued that this 
dualism ignores not only all the grey areas between excessive fear and hostility 
and excessive love, but also the reality of Muslims as real people in real 
environments.57 The operationalization of a checklist of open and closed views, 
with the latter conceived as erroneous misunderstandings, encouraged an 
instrumental understanding of Islamophobia as a phenomenon which could be 
tackled through a programme of perception correction.  
    Defending the neologism ‘Islamophobia’, the report stated that the coining of 
a new word and the identification of a growing danger could 'play a valuable part 
in the long endeavour of correcting perceptions and improving relationships’.58 
The very terms used in this passage point to a profound problem with the way 
the Runnymede Trust conceived Muslim identities and the status of 
Islamophobia. To correct a perception implies an essence that can be uncovered 
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and an idea of what the correct perception should be. The intergroup contact and 
dialogue proposed by the Commission represented a means of bringing all actors 
in line with this ‘correct’ perception, and in pursuing this logic it eschewed the 
power dynamics embedded in Islamophobic articulations.59 As Allen has 
convincingly argued, the strategy that flows from the Runnymede conception was 
flawed from the outset; challenging binaries by merely imposing positive over 
negative images is no challenge at all. The binaries remain in place and meaning 
continues to be shaped by them.60 Such a conceptualisation and strategy fails to 
recognise the ideological aspects of Islamophobia. 
    The second criticism directed at Runnymede’s conceptualisation follows from 
the first. If there exists a correct Islam that may be grasped by endorsing open 
views and correcting erroneous perceptions, then there must equally be an 
incorrect Islam that individuals mistakenly promote and draw upon. What makes 
this notion so deeply problematic is its assumption of some form of collective 
responsibility among Muslims for the circulation of this ‘incorrect Islam’. Reliance 
on the notion of a right way to be Muslim restricts identities and, again, 
reinforces existing power relations. Fred Halliday has argued that social 
engineering of this type tends to lead to the acceptance of particular, and often 
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conservative, versions of Muslim tradition as the one true Islam.61 Such 
essentialising, especially when backed up by the power of the state to legitimise 
particular versions of Islam, leads to the silencing and delegitimising of 
individuals outside of these traditions. This dualism rears itself again in the form 
of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims; those who conform to the correct Islam and those 
who do not.  
    The promotion of such essentialism implies that those ‘bad’ Muslims who step 
outside the boundaries laid down for them by the dualistic conceptualisations of 
their identities bear some responsibility for the Islamophobia directed towards 
them. The logic of the Runnymede conceptualisation implies collective Muslim 
responsibility for Islamophobic sentiment because of its essentialist and dualistic 
thrust. The homogenisation of Muslim as a category, what Tyrer has described as 
their radical differentiation as ‘other’ from the ‘rest’, and their de-differentiation in 
dualistic terms as ‘good’/’bad’, ‘moderate’/’extremist’ and subsequently subject to 
‘open’/’closed’ views, reifies the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
criticism.62 The implication is that Islamophobia is illegitimate when directed at 
‘good’, ‘moderate’ Muslims, while ‘bad’, ‘extremist’ Muslims bear some 
responsibility for Islamophobic sentiment and may therefore be legitimately 
targeted with ‘closed’ views.63  As Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazer 
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have pointed out, this would be inconceivable for any other racialized group.64 
Allen makes the same point, stating that in the post-Macpherson political and 
social culture there is no credibility in suggesting that the murder of Stephen 
Lawrence was in any way legitimised because some black males exacerbated 
racist stereotypes.65 Yet it is precisely this type of thinking that the Runnymede 
Report encourages. Until ‘bad’ Muslims stop saying and doing what ‘bad’ Muslims 
say and do, Islamophobia is (at least when addressed to these Muslims) in some 
sense legitimate, and ‘closed’ views justified.  
    The problems with the Runnymede conceptualisation of Islamophobia are 
profound. Its reductionist approach means that Islamophobic expression is 
dualistically sorted into categories of legitimate and illegitimate, and Muslims are 
subsequently reduced to ‘good’ and ‘bad’, undeserving or deserving of 
Islamophobic sentiment. What is most troubling about the Runnymede 
conceptualisation, however, is its failure to recognise the power dynamics 
inherent in Islamophobia. Its reductionist definition of Islamophobia as the 
recurrence of closed views diminishes it to a procedural checklist of incorrect 
perceptions that may be corrected, its proponents cured. This understanding not 
only upholds essentialist understandings of Muslim identities but fails to 
significantly challenge most Islamophobic discourse and practice, which is 
predicated not on closed minded ‘views’, as the report contends, but ideological 
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currents and shared social narratives that have a great deal of explanatory power 
for its proponents. 
    The problematic nature of the Runnymede definition focuses attention on the 
necessity of employing more sophisticated understandings of the concept. In 
order to avoid the essentialising of identities and gain an understanding of 
Islamophobia that encompasses both its overt and covert expressions, scholars 
have focused on the phenomenon as an ideological concept that bears 
comparison to other discourses of exclusion, including historical understandings 
of Muslims, racism and anti-Semitism. These comparisons illuminate the way 
Islamophobia operates structurally and provide a more nuanced understanding of 
its function in contemporary society.  
 
Imperialism, colonialism and Orientalism  
Tracing the historical antecedents of Islamophobia, scholars have drawn 
attention to the way in which imperial, colonial and Orientalist discourses are 
rearticulated for the social and political needs of the present period. Such a 
consideration foregrounds the constitutive role that Islam and Muslims have 
played as the other against which European and Western identity has defined 
itself. 
    As several scholars have noted, imperialistic understandings of Islam have 
shaped and formed the identity of Europeans since the 15th century. Walter D. 
Mignolo, for example, has argued that the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from 
Spain at the same historical moment as the discovery of the Americas involved a 
confrontation with (and eventually a conquest of) both the religious internal 
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others of Europe and the racial external ‘others’ of the New World.66 In this new 
geo-political environment, Christian European identity increasingly defined itself 
in contrast to rival civilisations, the most imposing of which were the Islamic 
empires of the East.67 Imperialistic understandings constructed Muslims as one 
unified imperial other, linked by adherence to a rival religion, which could not be 
colonised like American Indians but had to be confronted in the case of the 
Turks, or expelled in the case of the Moors.68 This position informs Ziauddin 
Sardar’s claim that Islamophobia ‘records the historic memory of Islam as a 
competitor and inimical civilization’.69  
    As Europeans conquered Muslim territory, these imperial conceptualisations of 
Muslims as religious and geopolitical rivals gave way to colonial management 
strategies, which viewed Islam as a dying civilisation. The colonising European 
powers sought not to eradicate Islam, but to impose western forms of control in 
order to replace theological power with the European secularised nationalism.70 
Predicated on the understanding that Islam represented the foundation of life for 
these populations, colonial strategies of governance aimed to discipline 
populations by harnessing religious authority to repress rebellion and keep 
order.71 The proliferation of colonialist understandings of the centrality of Islamic 
religious authority has led some scholars to argue that contemporary 
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Islamophobia is a neo-colonial discourse. As Tariq Ramadan has noted, literature 
produced during the colonial era was explicit in its organisation of Muslims into 
categories of ‘good’ Muslims who collaborated and ‘bad’ Muslims who resisted the 
colonial enterprise.72 This idea has been developed by Jonathan Birt, who has 
conceptualised the British government’s post-2001 efforts to nurture a ‘moderate’ 
and acceptable British Islam as a neo-colonial strategy designed to divide Muslim 
religious leaders into those who could be depended upon to support the 
rhetorical needs of the British security state, and those who required surveillance 
and coercion.73 
    Deeply connected to imperialism and colonialism is Orientalism, perhaps the 
most widely known and debated historical antecedent to Islamophobia. 
Orientalism, as Edward Said conceptualised it, is a cultural discourse of power 
that posits a unified ‘West’ against an imagined ‘Orient’ that is dehumanised and 
sensualised as barbaric, despotic and exotic.74 Orientalism aimed to manage 
subjects of colonial and imperial power through an ontological and 
epistemological distinction between East and West.75 Through its representation 
of Islam as a timelessly static, despotic civilisation that was resistant to change 
and rationalism, Orientalism legitimised domination by Western powers, and in 
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turn produced a mirror image representation of the ‘West’ as superior.76 
Understanding Islamophobia as neo-Orientalism, several scholars have pointed to 
the way images of barbarism, primitive violence, and fundamental threat have 
become the mainstay of contemporary Islamophobic discourse, and highlight that 
the notion of Muslims as centrally constituted by their (timeless) Islamic identity 
encourages the understanding that people’s politics can be read from their 
religion, hence the  tendency to look to the Qur’an in order to understand 
contemporary political and social struggles.77 Such a perspective is central to 
Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilisations narrative, which rejuvenated 
Orientalism for the contemporary international relations environment, 
constructing Muslim societies (or civilisations in Huntington’s parlance) as weak 
and primitive, and thus requiring Western intervention.78     
    What has made Islam such a perennial enemy-outsider in this process has 
been its effortless transformation from religious rival, to imperial contender, to 
rival superpower, depending on the social realities and necessities of any given 
historical moment. As Vincent Geisser has noted, while anti-Muhammadism 
played a cohesive role in a medieval Europe divided by war, the 15th century saw 
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the religious threat to Christianity represented by Islam re-articulated into a geo-
political danger, in which rival non-Christian societies were increasingly viewed as 
temporal, rather than spiritual, threats.79 Understanding Islamophobia as the 
historical heir to these discourses centres the constitutive centrality of imperial, 
colonial and Orientalist worldviews that have historically constructed Muslims as 
antithetically other to Western subjects and legitimised the domination of the 
former by the latter.  
    The tendency to see contemporary Islamophobia as merely a ‘neo’ form of 
these discourses, however, obscures important characteristics. In contrast to the 
historical discourses discussed above, which were directed at imperial or colonial 
subjects, and thus outsiders, contemporary European Islamophobia is a discourse 
directed specifically at European Muslims; residents or citizens of European 
states. Yahya Birt has argued from this perspective that Orientalism (including its 
‘neo’ forms) should be contrasted with Islamophobia, since the former represents 
the management of external populations through discourses which construct 
Muslims as ‘other’, while the latter is primarily an assimilative state discourse 
which aims to manage and domesticate internal Muslim populations.80 As Yasmin 
Hussain and Paul Bagguley have noted, Orientalism is usually identified with the 
Middle East and the racialization of Arabs, while the majority of British Muslims, 
and certainly those considered the most ‘troublesome’, have heritage in the 
Indian subcontinent.81 While this position draws attention to the different 
historical and political contexts that have produced these discourses, as Liz 
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Fekete has argued, the contemporary period has produced its own internal 
Orientalism directed at European Muslims and developed according to the 
political and social needs of the ‘War on Terror’.82 The Orient, in the present 
period, is not treated as a separate geographical region, but as an essence 
located within Europe’s Muslim population.  
    Perhaps a more pressing concern with focusing on these historical discourses 
is the possibility of reifying Islamophobia as something ancient, naturalised and 
thus ineradicable. The danger of considering it an atavistic tendency within 
European populations risks blinding scholars to the contingency and uses that 
such discourses have for the contemporary period. Fred Halliday, for example, 
has cautioned against this tendency, arguing that viewing Islamophobia as 
embedded in a collective western psyche or national character obscures these 
local differences and at the same time suggests that such attitudes are 
unchanging, when in fact they are demonstrably affected by contingent factors.83 
Although historical representations of Muslims and their contemporary re-
articulation are important to note, manifestations of Islamophobia in the present 
period are clearly shaped by contemporary events and the novel discourses that 
have sought to explain them.  
    The historical approach discussed here is a partial explanation of 
Islamophobia. Although the connotations of earlier formations are essential to 
understanding many of the discourses that currently circulate about Muslims, 
they are not the whole story. The challenge for this approach is to explain why 
these discourses remain coherent and important for explaining Muslim behaviour 
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in the current period. Islamophobia is not just the modern incarnation of these 
old discourses. It has very specific instrumental uses for those employing this 
mode of understanding and explanation, and the focus on Islamophobia as a 
transcendent discourse whose incarnations are merely reformulations of older 
dominations runs the risk of submerging important aspects under an umbrella 
explanation that posits European societies as inescapably Occidentalist without 
explaining why and how Islamophobia today performs the role that was 
historically accomplished by these older discourses. In order to attend to these 
concerns, some of the most useful studies of Islamophobia have approached the 
phenomenon through a comparison with the discourses and strategies of racism.   
 
Islamophobia and racism 
As Erik Love has noted, comparing Islamophobia with racism has the analytical 
advantage of allowing scholars to draw upon the wealth of theoretical knowledge 
about race and ethnicity in order to explain how Islamophobia takes on a familiar 
pattern of racial scapegoating.84 A key debate underpins this approach regarding 
how far theories of racism are comparable to Islamophobia. On one side of this 
debate stand scholars who argue that Islamophobia is analytically distinct from 
racism, with its own specificities that cannot be collapsed into the category of 
racism. This perspective contends that Islamophobia targets Muslims, a 
heterogeneous racial group, because of their religious identification, and that 
employing racism as an explanatory model conflates categories beyond their 
empirical referents.  
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    On the other side, a second approach holds that since Islamophobia includes 
fear, prejudice and discrimination towards an out-group demarcated largely by 
physical appearance, it should be considered a particular type of racism and 
racist discourse. Using the concepts of new racism, cultural racism and 
racialization, proponents of this position argue that Muslims have come to occupy 
the position of racialized other in the contemporary period. The example of anti-
Semitism has been used by scholars to demonstrate how religious identities can 
be and have been racialized according to the needs of particular historical, 
political and cultural contexts. A key argument against this perspective centres 
the possibility that the specificity of Islamophobia may be lost as it becomes 
merely another racism among many. Since scholars putting forward this position 
have argued that the term is both semantically and legally covered by 
understandings of racism, it begs the question of why a neologism like 
‘Islamophobia’ is required at all.  
 
Islamophobia as analytically distinct 
The argument that Islamophobia is a separate concept, distinct from racism, is 
usually derived from Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown. In the second edition of 
their classic study of racism, Miles and Brown considered Islamophobia and 
argued that although Islamophobia and racism do interact, since the alleged 
distinctiveness of the Muslim is not biological it should not be considered a form 
of racism.85  
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    This distinction between biological and religious difference is one of the most 
important debates surrounding the conceptualisation of Islamophobia. The most 
well-rehearsed argument to justify the analytical distinctiveness of Islamophobia 
is that concepts derived from the study of racism are inapplicable to a racially 
heterogeneous group whose only common denominator may be (perceived to 
be) religion.  
    The contention that Islam is a religion, not a race, has become fundamental to 
this position as articulated by the populist right and various ‘muscular liberal’ 
commentators. The English Defence League, for example, have regularly used 
this formula to deflect accusations of racism,86 as have others who have criticised 
Islam and Muslims in hostile and disparaging terms.87 Such arguments are 
usually based on the establishment of a fundamental difference between religion 
and race, where the former is constructed as something voluntary while the latter 
is considered innate. Employing this perspective, Kenan Malik has argued: ‘you 
can’t choose your skin colour; you can choose your beliefs. Religion is a set of 
beliefs. I can be hateful about other beliefs, such as conservatism or 
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communism. So why can't I be hateful about religion too?’88 This position has 
become central to the arguments of those who reserve the right to criticise Islam 
and Muslims, and may be seen to operate within Islamophobic discourse in the 
same way as the ‘disclaimer’ in racist discourse.89 
    The position that Islam is not a race also has some academic credibility. Henk 
Dekker and Jvander Noll, for example, have argued that Islamophobia is only a 
form of racism if it is believed that Islam is in the blood of Muslims and cannot be 
removed. In the absence of this biological determinism, and if it is believed that 
assimilation is a possibility, they argue that Islamophobia cannot be considered 
racism.90 There are two problems with this position. First, that the race concept 
has always been intermingled with religion, and second, that the distinction 
between religious identities as voluntary and chosen, and racial identities as 
involuntary and externally assigned, is largely illusory and fails to take into 
account processes of racialization. 
    Contrary to the contemporary position that racial and religious differences are 
separate and distinct, there has been a recent increase in scholarship that seeks 
to demonstrate how religion intrinsically formed part of the race concept from its 
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birth. Ramón Grosfoguel and Eric Mielants have argued along these lines that 
religious difference formed the first mark of ‘Otherness’ in the modern world, 
differentiating Europeans from the people they expelled and conquered.91 Jumaid 
Rana has also considered how religion and race co-mingled in the formation of 
modernity, and has argued that the secularisation of the race concept in the 18th 
and 19th centuries through scientific racism privileged biological difference as 
natural difference without including religion.92 The important point here is that 
religion has historically been essential to the race concept, and the contemporary 
understanding of race as a purely somatic and biological category is a relatively 
recent historical development.93 
    On the second point, the idea that Islamophobia should not be analytically 
treated as a form of racism draws upon the recognition of a Muslim’s choice to be 
Muslim.94 This position - that Muslims may voluntarily relinquish their religious 
identity – is what Islamophobic commentators, such as those discussed above, 
depend upon in order to claim they are not racist whilst simultaneously 
disparaging Muslims on the basis of cultural belonging.  
    The ‘voluntary’ nature of religious identity has been discussed in detail by 
Nasar Meer, who argues that relying on this supposed (voluntary 
religious/involuntary racial) dichotomy leads logically to the position that only 
involuntary identities deserve protection from discrimination or hostility. As Meer 
                                                            
91 Grosfoguel and Mielants, “The Long-Durée Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in 
the Modern / Colonial Capitalist / Patriarchal World-System: An Introduction,” 2–3. 
92 Junaid Rana, “The Story of Islamophobia,” Souls 9, no. 2 (2007): 153. 
93 Grosfoguel and Mielants, “The Long-Durée Entanglement Between Islamophobia and Racism in 
the Modern / Colonial Capitalist / Patriarchal World-System: An Introduction,” 2; Raymond Taras, 
“‘Islamophobia Never Stands Still’: Race, Religion, and Culture,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 36, no. 
3 (2013): 423. 
94 Arzu Merali and Massoud Shadjareh, “Islamophobia – The New Crusade,” Islamic Human Rights 
Commission May (2002), http://www.ihrc.org.uk/file/ISLAMOPHOBIAthenewcrusade.pdf 
[Retrieved 12 January 2011]. 
52 
 
points out, even if an individual could distance herself from a racialized identity 
(by passing for a non-Muslim) in order to avoid racial stereotyping, hostility or 
discrimination, this would not destabilise the racialization of such identities.95 
Avoiding racial targeting by changing one’s identity does not make the racial 
targeting any less real, it merely protects one against its immediate effects while 
the racialized system remains in place. As Arun Kundnani has argued, 
Islamophobia relies on a rationalisation and justification that claims that it is 
nothing more than criticism of a belief system, but this is undermined by the fact 
that religious belonging has come to act as a symbol of racial difference.96 
    The symbolic nature of racialized belonging, and the role of perception, is 
fundamental. Since racialized assignment is usually something allocated from 
outside on to the racialized body of the ‘other’, the actual Muslimness of any 
individual targeted with Islamophobic discourse and practice is largely irrelevant. 
For example, it has been noted by several scholars that the anti-Muslim backlash 
that followed the September 11, 2001 hijackings saw Sikhs attacked because 
their assailants believed them to be Muslim.97 In the contemporary climate of 
Islamophobic hostility the possession of a ‘Muslim sounding’ name, a particular 
ethnic or national heritage (particularly, in the British context, Pakistani), or 
clothes that are identified as ‘Islamic’, is enough to assign individuals a ‘Muslim’ 
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identity, and religiosity, or lack thereof, has little to do with perceived belonging 
in a racialized group.98  
 
Islamophobia as a form of (new, cultural) racism 
These arguments lead to the second major position within the comparative 
approach, which holds that there is nothing analytically distinct about 
Islamophobia that has not already been covered by the concept of racism. This 
positon relies on the notion of racialization and cultural racism, and 
fundamentally argues that race has always been a flexible social construction, 
historically adapted according to the particular needs of specific social, political, 
economic and historical conditions.99 
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    Racialization refers to the process by which ‘others’ are created that can 
contain the economic and social fears of a society by acting as a body onto which 
these fears may be projected. This concept helps us to understand how a 
plethora of others have historically filled the role of out-group. For the study of 
Islamophobia it also bridges the arguments of the two positions described above, 
by detailing the way in which phenotypical and cultural signifiers have come to 
have racial meaning. In this sense it provides a rejoinder to the argument that 
Islam is not a race, by showing how Muslims have been and are contemporarily 
racialized.  
   As those who are uncomfortable with the concept of Islamophobia have 
pointed out, Muslims are neither racially nor culturally homogenous.100 
Islamophobia, which implies that Muslims are racialized and ‘othered’ as a group, 
is therefore controversial. To the charge that Islam is not a race, and that the 
analytical tools of racism are not appropriate, scholars have responded that 
Muslim culture has been racialized to the extent that it is now widely considered 
to be innate, something from which Muslims cannot escape. This position holds 
that Islamophobia should be understood as an instance of new racism.101  
    Within the new racism thesis, religion is not viewed as a matter of private 
contemplation but is considered a public, externally assigned identity that cannot 
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be simply disengaged from.102 New racism focuses on the challenge that 
difference presents to ‘our way of life’, and Islamophobia exemplifies this in its 
unrelenting focus on the unacceptable and incompatible nature of Muslims’ 
cultural difference. It is the cultural turn of new racism that has allowed overtly 
Islamophobic groups to explicitly reject traditional racism, whilst at the same time 
using its frames and discourses in order to exclude culturally defined out-
groups.103 
    The concept of cultural racism has become especially useful in explaining 
Islamophobia within the paradigms of the new racism. From this perspective, 
scholars have argued that individuals are racialized through the biologised and 
naturalised understanding of culture as determinative. Drawing on national 
belonging and national identity, proponents of this position argue that biological 
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notions of race have been replaced by cultural definitions, which perceive 
threatening value differences emerging from religion, tradition or lifestyle rather 
than nature or biology.104 These differences are essentialised within Islamophobic 
ideology through a construction of Muslim culture as primordial and pre-modern, 
given to fundamentalism, irrationality, despotism and patriarchal relations, and 
therefore incompatible with Western democratic societies.105 This essentialisation 
of culture presents the racialized group as absolutely determined by their culture 
in such a way that it is naturalised and biologised.106 The construction of Muslims 
within culturally racist ideological frames leads not only to their ‘othering’ and 
relegation to out-group status, but, as Zuhal Yesilyurt Gündüz has noted, the 
consistent representation of Muslims as threatening leads discrimination against 
them to be seen as rational, reasonable and justified.107  
    Perhaps the midway point between the two positions identified here is the 
notion that Islamophobia is a mix of old and new racisms, an independent 
ideological construct that nevertheless incorporates and reframes biological and 
cultural racisms on an ad hoc basis.108 For those who argue from this perspective 
it is important to refrain from classifying Islamophobia only as cultural racism, 
because that would deny the obviously biological frames that are employed at 
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times. By the same token, considering it as merely biological racism denies the 
specificity of Islamophobia, particularly the theological hatred of Islam that is 
regularly articulated in Islamophobic discourse. To illustrate the importance of 
this difference, the example of Islamophobic hate crimes is instructive. Such 
crimes usually incorporate a violence against the body of the racialized Muslim 
subject, a phenomenon that is typical of racist violence, however, empirical 
studies suggest that individuals are not targeted on the basis of their race. 
Rather, perpetrators are moved to act against symbolic somatic features such as 
headscarves, turbans, or ‘Islamic clothing’.109 That symbols of Islam have come 
to have racial significance is a central tenet of racialization and the new racism 
thesis, but it is important not to lose sight of the fact that, as Grosfoguel and 
Mielants have argued, ‘the tropes are a repetition of old biological racist 
discourses and the people who are the target of Islamophobic discourses are the 
traditional colonial subjects of the Western Empires, that is, the “usual 
suspects.”’110  
    Chris Allen has cautioned against the unreflective use of the concept of 
cultural racism in understanding Islamophobia. The danger of this approach, for 
Allen, is that it is essentialising in itself, potentially denying processes of self-
identification, the inherency of diversity and the embodiment of difference with 
Muslim communities in the UK and across the world.111 The cultural racism thesis 
also potentially binds us to the disparate reasons people have for their hostility 
towards Muslims, which may be religious, cultural, xenophobic or racist. The 
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point here is that Islamophobia cannot be a priori theorised as a particular form 
of racism, since its articulations are complex and variable and stem from differing 
histories across national contexts.112 The construction of Muslims as outside and 
other in the European imagination is contingent, and as Bobby Sayyid has 
argued, cultural and biological racisms are not as distinct as often presented. 
Races were never entirely biologically determined but have always been socially 
and politically produced ideologies, whereby bodies are marked with distinctions 
comprising biological, religious, cultural, historical and geographical 
differences.113 
 
Anti-Semitism 
Within the comparative perspective, one of the most useful analogies for 
understanding contemporary Islamophobia is anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism 
provides a comparable example of how religious and cultural differences have 
been historically racialized to designate a specific religiously defined group as a 
racial other.  
    Pnina Werbner, in examining the debates around the racialization of religion, 
has presented a typology of three anthropological racial folk devils in order to 
explain how different racial subjects occupy varied spaces in the social 
imagination.114 The first, the slave, contains the fear of the physically powerful 
and out of control, as is represented by the black street mugger. Those groups 
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who are assimilated, successful and wealthy come to be represented by the 
second folk devil, the witch, who crystallises fears of the disguised malevolent 
stranger, a breakdown of trust and a nation divided against itself. Werbner 
considers this role to have been filled archetypally by Jews, within anti-Semitic 
discourse. Finally, the most frightening folk devil for contemporary society, 
Werbner contends, is the Grand Inquisitor. This position is filled in the social 
imagination by the Muslim, who invokes images of puritanical Christianity and the 
attack on permissive society, and is neither disguised nor assimilated, but 
‘upfront, morally superior, openly aggressive, denying the validity of other 
cultures.’115  
    There is certainly something recognisable in Werbner’s cast of racial folk 
devils, particularly in the distinguishing of biological from culturally racist 
stereotypes and the fears they represent.116 However, the different contextual 
roles these racial others play should not blind us to cross-category movement 
and the way that Muslims have been placed in a number of threatening positions 
according to the historical needs of any given period.117 Meer and Noorani have 
demonstrated that contrary to the contemporary image of assimilated Jews (the 
witch), European anti-Semitic thought has historically constructed ‘the Jew’ as an 
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unassimilable racial other, not only inherently different, but deliberately aloof, 
self-segregating and loyal to a nation outside the one in which they resided.118 
Such characterisations are directly comparable to contemporary discourses which 
represent Muslims as self-segregating and loyal to a global ummah above their 
nation. Schiffer and Wagner have similarly argued that the contemporary 
racialization of Muslims bears direct comparison to discourses of anti-Semitism in 
Europe’s recent history. Represented as an internal enemy, targeted with 
accusations that they are a camouflaged fifth column and presumed to be 
primarily loyal to their own religious group, Muslims are targeted with the same 
tropes that were the mainstay of classical anti-Semitism.119  
    The mixture of racial, religious and ethnic prejudices that form anti-Semitism 
have been highlighted by several scholars as providing evidence for the latter as 
a useful concept to aid understanding of Islamophobia.120 In this schema, anti-
Semitism’s focus on the danger that Jews posed to the unity and cohesion of the 
national community bears direct comparison with contemporary national 
questioning of Muslims across Europe.121 Additionally, as both Arun Kundnani and 
Nathan Lean have highlighted, conspiracy theories have played an important role 
in both of these discourses. The ‘Sharia conspiracy’ and the ‘Eurabia thesis’ have 
come to dominate right-wing Islamophobic discourse, and hold that through 
stealth jihad and demographic challenges to democracy in Europe, Muslim 
political activity represents a secret plan to impose a totalitarian government on 
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the world.122  What both anti-Semitic and Islamophobic conspiracy theories have 
in common is the fantasy that a group with little power has the ability to impose 
its (unified) will onto society, and the corresponding rationalisation and 
justification of discrimination and hostility as a means to protect the institutions 
that the nation holds dear. 
    Criticisms of the comparison between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism have 
ranged from the denial that anti-Semitism is a form of racism (cultural or 
otherwise)123 to the assertion that there exist important differences in the 
racialization of Muslims and Jews that render the comparison problematic.124 
Much of the confusion that mars this comparison results from differences in the 
role that anti-Semitism has played historically to the one it plays today. As Chris 
Allen has argued, Islamophobia, in contrast to contemporary anti-Semitism, is 
perceived to be caused to some extent by the actions and words of radical 
Muslims. Muslims are therefore considered to be responsible for challenging 
Islamophobic views by distancing themselves from such articulations.125 That 
Jews are not considered responsible for anti-Semitism is undoubtedly true in 
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post-holocaust Europe, however, it has not always been this way, and it is 
important to differentiate between the pre- and post- Second World War 
narratives that have constructed Jews as cultural, religious and racial others.  
    In doing this, Matti Bunzl has drawn attention to the different function that 
discourses of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia play in contemporary Europe. He 
argues that traditional 19th and early 20th century anti-Semitism was designed to 
exclude Jews from the national body, based on the notion that Jews represented 
a racial threat to a nation that was ethnically pure.126 Such thinking eventually 
culminated in the genocidal exclusion of Jews from European nation states, 
however contemporary anti-Semitism (which is usually attributed to Europe’s 
Muslim populations), has no comparable agenda.127 As Bunzl has argued, there is 
simply no contemporary debate on the legitimacy of the Jewish presence in 
Europe.128 While calls for Jewish exclusion were pervasive in European politics 
during the interwar period, today this goal is not on any public agenda. In 
contrast, Islamophobia is a genuine political issue in Europe.129 Bunzl concludes 
that as a phenomenon of the current age, Islamophobia is not mobilised to 
protect the ethnic purity of the nation, as was interwar anti-Semitism, but to 
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safeguard European civilisation.130 Foregrounding both the historical and 
contemporary role played by Muslims and Jews in the conception of European 
identity, this position holds that while Jews threatened the nation, Muslims 
threaten the civilisation of Europe.  This argument, underlining the differences 
between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in order to grasp their specificities, is 
one of the most significant contributions of those, like Bunzl, who challenge the 
comparison between the two.  
    The understanding of Islamophobia through comparison with other discourses 
of exclusion brings to the fore the specificities of this particular phenomenon.  
The main advantage of the comparative approach rests in its appropriation of the 
vast theoretical work that has been undertaken with regard to understanding 
racism and anti-Semitism in the second half of the 20th century. By comparing 
Islamophobia with similar strategies of exclusion a much deeper understanding is 
attained of the mechanisms by which out-groups are formed. Concepts such as 
new racism, cultural racism, and racialization are hugely important in order to 
understand contemporary Islamophobia. Similarly, strategies of religio-cultural 
othering, highlighted by work on anti-Semitism, has a great deal of applicability if 
we are to understand the ways in which religious and cultural signifiers come to 
have racial meaning. Further, and important to the current thesis, comparison 
with racisms helps to illuminate not only what Islamophobia is but also why it 
exists. By considering the usefulness of racisms for particular human societies at 
particular historical moments, theories of racism potentially provide an 
explanation for why Islamophobia should have traction and resonance at this 
particular moment. 
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    Notwithstanding the advantages of this approach, there remain reasons to be 
cautious about its usefulness in understanding Islamophobia. First, by 
conceptualising Islamophobia as a form of racism, its specificities may be lost and 
subsumed within a larger, more universal explanation. Should Islamophobia 
become just another racism, the uses and purposes of this specifically religio-
cultural form of othering may be obscured and buried in an analytical framework 
whose concepts derive from a very specific history. The extent to which these 
concepts, emerging from a dualistic black/white racial structure, can be stretched 
to include more covert, subtle and cultural racial forms requires more than mere 
conceptual borrowing. As the discussion of historical antecedents of Islamophobia 
demonstrated, specific histories and contexts must be considered in order to 
understand the particular tropes that make up Islamophobic expression. 
    A corollary to this argument encompasses the fear that should Islamophobia 
be treated as a racism, legislation that tackles hate speech may be extended to 
repress criticism of religion and thus endanger free expression. This is an 
important point, and the freedom to criticise religious ideas must always remain 
apart from the freedom to denigrate and harass people based on their real or 
perceived group membership. However, it should not draw attention from the 
very real comparison between racism (including anti-Semitism) and 
Islamophobia. 
    Second, understanding Islamophobia as a form of racism risks flattening the 
concept as constant, unchanging and one dimensional. This raises an important 
issue central to the debate on Islamophobia: namely, whether there is such a 
thing as ‘Islamophobia’ and whether it is more analytically correct to consider 
‘Islamophobias’. The latter concept draws analytical attention to the different 
65 
 
uses differently situated speakers and societies make of the concept, and points 
to the need to consider each instance individually, in its particular social, 
historical and discursive context. While there is growing sympathy with this 
position,131 owing to the sheer complexity of Islamophobia and the contingent 
nature of each Islamophobic utterance, analyses that compartmentalise in such a 
way may lose sight of the bigger picture. And this bigger picture is clearly 
important. Islamophobia is always expressed in a local context, but it draws upon 
and adds to a larger collection of narratives that are both temporally and spatially 
formed: historical narratives that cherry pick from older discourses of exclusion, 
and geographical contexts that place certain racialized ‘others’ in an adversarial 
relationship with national, European and Western social collectives. While there 
are certainly differences between and within the contemporary expressions of 
Islamophobia it is important not to lose sight of what binds them together and 
makes them coherent for a large proportion of the contemporary population of 
the vast aggregate we call the contemporary ‘West’. 
    Both of these critiques point to the importance of foregrounding the concept 
of racialization. This concept alerts us not only to the way in which certain group 
characteristics come to be seen as essential racial signifiers which mark their 
bearers with the status of ‘other’, but also how particular historical and political 
contexts condition the forms they take and the purposes for which they are 
wielded. By exploring the strategies of racist discourse construction, comparative 
analyses of racism and Islamophobia help us understand Islamophobia in a 
larger, more global context.  
                                                            
131 Zafar Iqbal, “Understanding Islamophobia : Conceptualizing and Measuring the Construct,” 
European Journal of Social Sciences 13, no. 4 (2010): 174; Sajid, “Islamophobia: A New Word for 
an Old Fear,” 2; Miles and Brown, Racism, 165; Allen, Islamophobia, 34. 
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Conclusion 
What is clear from any study of the literature dealing with Islamophobia is that, 
although there is a burgeoning interest in the phenomenon, there is little 
agreement on the best way to approach it. This is part of the reason why 
defining Islamophobia causes so much controversy. The pervasive inability to 
succinctly define the phenomenon is one of Islamophobia studies’ greatest 
weaknesses. Yet, it may also be a source of strength for the field. The large and 
growing debate over what constitutes Islamophobia means that there are a 
number of positions being fought over. The very definition of the term is just one 
of the areas subject to profound debate and analysis that can only enrich our 
understanding. 
    Islamophobia is, centrally, a political phenomenon. Acceptance of any one 
definition therefore necessarily involves the acceptance of certain truth claims, it 
involves political acceptance of the social relations that are described by that 
definition, and it points to particular courses of social action. When scholars make 
a choice between definitions of Islamophobia they reveal material commitments 
to particular world views, from a particularly privileged social and political 
vantage point (the academy). The struggle over the definition of Islamophobia is 
thus a central issue in majority and minority community recognition and relations 
in Britain, and any academic analysis of the phenomenon must critically consider 
these discursive choices and their effects.  
   This is also revealed by an inquiry into the various approaches to analysing the 
phenomenon.  Historical and comparative approaches take differing positions on 
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what Islamophobia is, and therefore focus on different objects of analysis and aid 
our understanding of the phenomenon in different ways. While historical 
approaches tend to help us understand where it comes from, comparative 
approaches help us apprehend what it is. Yet neither, on their own or together, 
really explain why it is. What is it about Islamophobia that makes it an attractive 
discourse? Why do people employ narratives and strategies that work to form 
Muslims as an out-group? What benefits do individuals and groups gain from the 
discursive work that constructs Muslims as fundamentally different?  
    On the whole, I find the insights of the comparative approach to be most 
useful in explaining Islamophobia and the mechanisms by which it works. By 
encompassing both theological and cultural hostility, explanations that 
conceptualise Islamophobia as cultural racism attend to those Islamophobic 
expressions that straddle both. Also, by highlighting the ways Muslims have been 
racialized as a group, this explanation centres essentialising strategies that work 
to biologised culture. Yet without the insights of the historical perspective and the 
work contributed by scholars who have sought to centre the civilisational 
discourses that have historically and contemporarily formed identities in Europe 
and the West, the understanding of Islamophobia as a form of racism tends to 
focus inordinately on nationalistic concerns and may cause us to lose sight of the 
universalising thrust of Islamophobia.  
    Although Islamophobia undoubtedly plays a role in constructing national 
boundaries and social collectivities along insider/outsider status, even a cursory 
glance at British Islamophobic discourse reveals that there are larger shared 
narratives being employed, which incorporate continental and civilizational 
imagined communities. Even when instrumentalised for very specific purposes, 
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for example, the building of a mosque in a small post-industrial town, 
Islamophobia draws upon extra-national social and cultural discourses and 
identities that are believed to be pertinent. The civilisational thrust of the 
discourse is indisputable, yet has been only sparsely addressed in the literature. 
This is one of the many layers of Islamophobia that must be considered. And this 
leads back to the why question. Why does Islamophobia so often address itself to 
existential angst about the imagined civilizational community of the West? And 
why do local and national discourses of Islamophobia so readily incorporate the 
idea of the West even when they are specifically directed towards local or 
national issues?  
    This chapter has highlighted the necessity of considering Islamophobia from 
several analytical perspectives in order to gain greater understanding of its form 
and content. Islamophobia has many layers; historical antecedents that are 
recycled, theories of ‘otherness’ that draw boundaries between in-groups and 
out-groups, and strategies of essentialisation and exclusion that mark Muslims 
out as ’them’, intrinsically different to ‘us’. Without considering how all of these 
interplay within contemporary Islamophobic articulations, analysis of the 
phenomena is partial and incomplete. In order to understand Islamophobia, then, 
it is essential to consider the intersection of these levels of analysis. The 
analytical contribution of both historical explorations and wide ranging theoretical 
accounts which foreground broad social narratives can be brought together. The 
present thesis aims to synthesis these perspectives in order to analyse 
Islamophobia through a consideration of several levels of context.  
    I have argued in this review that the approaches outlined must all be 
considered if we are to understand the contemporary relevance of Islamophobia. 
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Without an understanding of the historical context, the tropes that are recycled 
and the identities that are incorporated are meaningless. Similarly, a theoretical 
understanding of what Islamophobia might be is essential in order to consider 
the discursive strategies employed by actors. The present analysis thus considers 
each of these levels by asking: What is British Islamophobia? What is its 
structure? And what discursive strategies are used to construct and represent 
Muslims and Islam in contemporary Britain?  
    However, the proliferation of Islamophobic discourse in the contemporary 
period is not just confined to Britain. At the present historical moment there is 
widespread acceptance that there is something different about Muslims that 
accounts for many of the social problems and issues confronting Western 
societies. For a large segment of the contemporary West, Islamophobia explains 
the world and provides an ideological blueprint of how to fix it. Social narratives 
of such power do not materialise spontaneously. The question that scholars have 
failed to adequately address is the central consideration of the present thesis: 
Why is Islamophobia increasingly seen to have explanatory potential for the 
social world? And, more importantly, why now?   
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Chapter Three - British Muslims and the construction of British 
national identity after 2001: The community cohesion and 
counterterrorism discourses 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that Islamophobic articulations must be placed in 
their social and political context in order to understand the tropes and narratives 
that are drawn upon. This chapter provides the context for the empirical chapters 
that follow, and argues that after 2001 British national identity was increasingly 
defined against a discursively constructed Muslim identity that served to delineate 
the contours of national belonging.  
    Two government sanctioned discourses were central to this process, and 
entwined with one another to produce Muslims as both domestically and 
internationally threatening. The first, engendered by the Northern uprisings in the 
summer of 2001, was community cohesion discourse, which posited that 
domestic unrest had been caused by the proliferation of self-segregating, 
culturally defined communities who lived parallel lives with little contact or 
understanding. The second was counterterrorism discourse, which sought to 
respond to terrorist attacks by dismantling the ideology believed to underpin 
them. Both discourses proffered values as the solution to violence. For the 
former, British values were the uniting concept into which problematic 
communities were expected to integrate. For the latter, a state-sanctioned and 
value driven British Islam was put forward as the solution to imported foreign 
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extremism. Both discourses relied on a culturalized explanation of violence and 
unrest, in which Islam was singled out as determining, dangerous and 
threatening.  
    By considering the representations that were gathered around these central 
discourses, this chapter demonstrates how Muslims were constructed after 2001 
as oppositional and antithetical to British national identity. This construction 
pivoted on the splitting of the category ‘Muslim’ into good and bad, marginalising 
other important identifications such as class, race, ethnicity and gender in order 
to produce a good Muslim subject who could be integrated and a bad Muslim 
who represented everything the nation was not. 
   Community cohesion discourse performed this function by producing a bad un-
integratable Muslim subject whose tendency toward self-segregation threatened 
British values and social cohesion. Community cohesion discourse targeted bad 
Muslims through initiatives which admonished them for speaking native 
languages at home, tightened immigration controls to make transnational 
marriages (and thus the importation of foreign cultures) more difficult, and 
citizenship courses for established migrants, all of which sought to coerce them in 
to being ‘good’. At the same time, counterterrorism discourse constructed ‘bad’ 
Muslims as those who existentially threatened the nation through their adherence 
to violent jihadist ideology. The ‘home-grown’ nature of the July 2005 London 
transport bombings and the understanding that terrorism required tacit support 
from communities led to a reorientation towards the domestic Muslim population, 
whereby Muslims were presumed ‘bad’ until proven otherwise. Counterterrorism 
discourse and practice sought to prevent terrorism through the promotion of 
Islamic organisations whose values were endorsed by the state. 
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        Although the discourses of community cohesion and counterterrorism are 
analytically separated in order to isolate the central representations gathered 
around each, it is important to state from the outset that this separation is 
artificial. The discourses emerged at a similar time, were reinforced and 
supported by one another, and were nourished by and consolidated an 
overarching anti-Muslim sentiment that relied on the construction of Muslims as 
the bearers of threat and blame. 
    Community cohesion and counterterrorism discourse performed two 
interrelated functions. First, in the post-2001 British context bad Muslims were 
blamed for the central problems of the day, exteriorising and othering threats of 
social unrest and terrorism. Second, by blaming these problems on ‘others’ the 
solution was considered to lie in re-stating ‘our’ values. These twin 
understandings within the central discourses served to bolster British nationalism 
through a focus on the articulation of national identity as a solution to the 
problems thought to be created by excessive Muslim cultural diversity.  The 
analysis first traces the discursive construction of the bad Muslim within these 
discourses, before considering the way in which British identity was reinforced 
through the articulation of Muslim cultural dysfunction.  
 
The Northern uprisings and the community cohesion discourse  
The summer of 2001 saw widespread and sustained confrontations between 
youths and police in former mill towns of the North West of England. Oldham, 
Burnley and Bradford had in common huge levels of long-term unemployment, 
social deprivation and low educational achievement, and all contained large Asian 
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communities residentially segregated from white areas and in fierce competition 
for scarce resources.  
    In Oldham, heightened tensions were generated by several local incidents, 
including skirmishes between visiting football supporters and local Asian youths 
and the framing by local and national newspapers of an attack on an elderly 
white war veteran, who was mugged and beaten by three Asians, as racially 
motivated. In response to this, the far-right National Front (NF) marched on 
Oldham in May, triggering three nights of confrontation between riot-gear clad 
police and Asian youths determined to defend their neighbourhoods.132 Similar 
scenes played out in Burnley that June and Bradford a month later. Hearsay and 
rumour that racist gangs were planning to march led hundreds of young Asian 
men on to the streets to defend their communities, and the heavy handed tactics 
of the authorities led to escalation and prolonged confrontation between youths 
and the police.  
    Despite the significance of the socio-economic problems of the affected areas 
and the immediate threat from racist gangs that had triggered the uprisings, the 
popular press, community leaders, and official government inquiries all chose to 
highlight culture, and specifically Muslim culture, as the essential cause of the 
Northern disturbances.  
    The scale and intensity of the uprising in Bradford, as well as its construction 
in the national imaginary as the ‘archetypal polarised city’, meant that this area 
came to be the focus of much of the post-uprising discussion. The disturbances 
in Bradford were officially categorised as a riot, resulting in an estimated £27 
                                                            
132 M. Jan-Khan, “The Right to Riot?,” Community Development Journal 38, no. 1 (2003): 36–37. 
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million worth of damage and injuring more than 300 police officers.133 The shock 
engendered by the images of the Bradford riot played a large part in cementing 
the representations that later gained currency. Amongst a British public used to 
seeing Asians as placid, the spectacle of burned out cars and buildings, and 
young Asian men hurling missiles at police for hours was incredibly powerful and 
frightening.134  This very visible apparently racial aspect of the disturbances led 
to them being categorised in the media as ‘race riots’,135 yet this initial 
interpretation was swiftly overtaken by a culturalized understanding of the causes 
of the violence. 
    The Bradford District Race Review136 (BDRR), known as the Ouseley Report, 
was commissioned prior to the riots, although its publication coincided with the 
uprising and its central conclusions were therefore taken to provide some 
explanation for the violence. Despite its title, the language of the Review focused 
on ‘cultural communities’, indicating that a culturalization of political issues in 
Bradford was taking place before violence broke out. The Ouseley Report 
highlighted as its key concern the notion that cultural communities were 
fragmenting and relationships deteriorating along racial, ethnic and faith lines: 
                                                            
133 Derek McGhee, “Moving to ‘our’ Common Ground - a Critical Examination of Community 
Cohesion Discourse in Twenty-First Century Britain,” The Sociological Review 51, no. 3 (2003): 
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Rather than seeing the emergence of a confident multi-cultural District, 
where people are respectful and have understanding and tolerance for 
differences, people's attitudes appear to be hardening and intolerance 
towards differences is growing. This situation is hindering people's 
understanding of each other and preventing positive contact between 
people from different cultural communities.137  
The Ouseley Report’s concern with respect, understanding and tolerance of 
cultural difference gives an important insight into the ideological underpinnings of 
the community cohesion agenda. The BDRR team seized upon and emphasised 
culture to the detriment of other explanations, and this was mirrored in the later 
reports that specifically aimed to explain the uprisings. 
    The Cantle Report, Community Cohesion: Report of the Independent Review 
Team,138 analysed the causes of the disturbances by comparing the conditions 
and relationships in those towns and cities affected with similar areas with large 
multicultural populations that had not experienced violent uprisings. Highlighting 
cross-community suspicion and distrust as the tinder box conditions for riot, the 
Cantle Report arrived at similar conclusions to the BDRR, arguing that the thing 
most lacking in those areas that had experienced violence was pride in the 
community and a positive approach to diversity.139 
    Although the Cantle Report was nuanced in its understanding of the varied 
social conditions governing the lives of people in differing multicultural contexts 
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across the UK, its emphasis on segregated communities retreating into 
themselves at the expense of meaningful cross-cultural contact echoed the 
conclusions of the Ouseley Report. This understanding of life in the Northern 
towns and cities that experienced unrest as taking place in the context of ‘parallel 
lives’ was seized upon by the government and the media as the starting point for 
addressing the causes of the uprisings.140  
    The Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion (chaired by 
John Denham) was convened to identify what help the government could offer to 
communities to begin addressing the problems manifested by the uprisings, and 
its conclusions followed a similar logic.  The Denham Report, Building Cohesive 
Communities, aimed to identify the issues that had created the conditions for the 
disturbances, and, building on the work of Cantle and Ouseley, noted amongst its 
most important contributory factors the lack of a strong civic identity or shared 
social values and ‘the fragmentation and polarisation of communities – on 
economic, geographical, racial and cultural lines - on a scale which amounts to 
segregation, albeit to an extent by choice.’ (Emphasis added).141  
    The culturalization of the causal factors that led to the uprisings can be seen 
in the Reports’ concentration on cross-community communication and values at 
the expense of other important causal factors. The two most important of these 
are arguably the deteriorated socio-economic conditions of the areas affected 
and the immediate racist contexts in which the disturbances took place. In 
emphasising community cohesion as the solution to the problems of the areas 
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affected, these contexts were de-emphasised and as a consequence the class 
and racial identities attendant to these were subordinated to a culturalized 
understanding of subjectivity which considered diverse cultures problematic 
unless contained by an overarching set of common (British) values. As the Cantle 
report put it: 
It is easy to focus on systems, processes and institutions and to forget that 
community cohesion fundamentally depends on people and their values. 
Indeed, many of the present problems seem to owe a great deal to the 
failure to communicate and agree a set of clear values that can govern 
behaviour.142 
    The community cohesion discourse, then, focused on preventing further 
outbreaks of violence by promoting understanding and communication between 
disparate communities and articulating a clear set of values to unite them. In 
2002, the Local Government Association report, Guidance on Community 
Cohesion, defined a cohesive community as one where:  
there is a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities; the 
diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated 
and positively valued; those from different backgrounds have similar life 
opportunities; and strong and positive relationships are being developed 
between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and 
within neighbourhoods.143  
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Community cohesion became the central strand of the government’s approach to 
preventing violent disorder and social unrest. 
    Taken together, the Reports and the community cohesion discourse that 
emerged worked to culturalize the problem of the uprisings, and through a focus 
on the cultural practices of problematic communities, Muslims came to be seen 
as particularly difficult to integrate and requiring of state intervention. Through 
casting the violence as resulting from ignorance, fear, suspicion and hostility 
amongst culturally defined communities who had little meaningful contact with 
one another, other essential contributory factors were overlooked. By presenting 
community cohesion as the solution, class and racial identities were de-
emphasised and subordinated to an understanding that stressed cultural 
subjectivity. The following section demonstrates how this focus led to the 
accentuation of Muslim culture as particularly problematic. 
 
Community cohesion discourse and the culturalization of social problems  
By emphasizing culture as the single most important feature of the communities 
at the centre of the 2001 uprisings, community cohesion discourse played a 
fundamental role in the racialization of British Muslims in the early 21st century. 
From this discourse emerged a ‘bad’ Muslim subject who threatened British 
values and cohesive communities, and whose influence and power could be 
tempered by the vociferous articulation of those values that united the nation, as 
well state support of ‘good’ Muslim identifications. 
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    This dual Muslim subject was produced through a culturalization of the 
uprisings, that later found support in the burgeoning community cohesion 
discourse and was used to explain social and political problems across the nation. 
By de-emphasising class, race and ethnic identities, Muslim culture was singled 
out as uniquely problematic and the uprisings were interpreted as symptomatic of 
a larger, nation-wide problem caused by excessive Muslim cultural diversity and 
the multicultural policies that were increasingly portrayed as having failed to 
articulate uniting values. The following section considers how media, popular and 
government discourse discounted socio-economic explanations for the uprisings 
by focusing on a cultural account of behaviour. 
 
Culturalizing class 
All three of the summer 2001 disturbances took place in economically 
deteriorated areas of multiple deprivation,144 previously dominated by thriving 
textile industries, which had experienced dramatic decline. Although the material 
disadvantage that followed from deindustrialization impacted on all communities, 
inner city areas populated largely by Muslims of Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
descent were particularly affected and working class Muslims suffered 
disproportionately from the deprivation that followed. In the case of Bradford, for 
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example, 53.2% of Pakistanis and 81.0% of Bangladeshi residents lived in 
multiple stress areas, compared to 19.5% of the general population.145  
    As Ash Amin has noted, the collapse of industry in the areas affected had 
removed an important site of integration between these ‘divided communities’, 
which had met frequently in the labour market, but in a socio-economic climate 
of decline found fewer opportunities for contact.146 Working class frustration, as a 
contributory factor to the disturbances, however, was racialized as these issues 
were enfolded into a discourse of blame. 
    Cultural explanations laid the socio-economic condition of working class 
Muslims at Islam’s door, blaming low educational achievement on the time spent 
at mosques and praying, which was believed to lead Muslim children to neglect 
their homework, perform poorly in exams and thus perpetuate the problem of 
unemployment.147 In this way, low educational attainment and high levels of 
unemployment were accounted for via a focus on culture.148 This was taken to 
extremes by some. Neil Darbyshire, writing in The Telegraph, contrasted the 
acceptable socio-economic frustrations of the youth involved in the 1981 Brixton 
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riots with the unacceptable participation in the 2001 Bradford riots, disregarding 
the specifically local economic conditions of the areas affected by claiming that 
the 2001 riots were ‘set against a relatively healthy economy, low 
unemployment, low inflation and low interest rates’.149 By discounting local 
conditions and uneven regional development, the frustrations of participants 
excluded by local circumstances from the benefits of a healthy national economy 
were allowed no claim to socio-economic marginalisation as an explanatory 
factor. Discourses of cultural blame were sustained through a deliberate de-
emphasising of the working class identities of those involved in the uprisings. 
    Community cohesion discourse further subordinated class to culture in its 
emphasis on parallel lives and segregation as driven by values rather than socio-
economic factors. Driven by the implicit understanding that divided, morally 
fragmented communities were characterised by structural economic deprivation 
and required government intervention to force change, community cohesion 
problematized only working class communities.150 Working class Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi descent Muslims were those for whom community cohesion was 
considered necessary as an instrument of social control. The professional, middle 
class Egyptians of the Southeast of England, for instance, were not targeted with 
state intervention to ensure their integration. Similarly, as Deborah Phillips has 
noted, wealth-social exclusion was not a state concern, despite the fact that 
integration may be just as hampered by residential and social self-segregation 
along class lines, the epitome of which is the gated community.151  
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    Class played an important part in how the riots, and the subsequent 
community cohesion discourse was constructed, but this was culturalized (and 
racialized) by the reports and particularly by the media. White participants in the 
violence were presented as being justifiably angry about perceived unfair 
government hand-outs to Asian communities. Contrastingly, young Asian Muslim 
participants were consistently aligned with criminality, drug dealing and gangs.152 
The cultural racialization of the riots ensured that while working class whites 
were granted a socio-economic explanation for their anger, working class 
Muslims were assigned a cultural explanation for their socio-economic position. 
 
The de-emphasis of race 
An initial separation was made in the media between those white and Asian 
youths that participated in the uprisings. Where white perpetrators of violence 
were represented as exceptional extremists, Asian youths were considered 
representative of a generation of discontent. Yet, as the uprisings were 
increasingly portrayed as the violent expression of inherently dangerous alien 
culture, this ‘Asian’ subject was culturalized and de-racialized. As the 
conceptualisation of Muslims came to be shaped by the discourses emerging in 
the context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Asian rioters were a posteriori 
cast within the terms of a good/bad dichotomy. As their identities shifted from 
‘Asian’, to ‘Muslim’, participants were presented as trapped between the values of 
the (good) law abiding Asian community, rooted in tradition, and a new 
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generation of (bad) macho, masculine defiance fed by Muslim culture’s 
tendencies towards isolation, segregation and violence.153 
    A series of articles by Amit Roy in The Telegraph illustrates how Muslims were 
isolated as the root of unrest in Britain. Reporting on the response to the Oldham 
uprisings, Roy described Manchester’s Asian community as growing increasingly 
uneasy with the term ‘Asian’, because it placed them ‘in the same category as 
rioting Muslim youths of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origin in nearby Oldham.’154 
Discussing the reaction of non-Muslim Asians to the Bradford riots, Roy reported 
local understandings of the violence, which emphasised the lack of control of 
Pakistani parents over their children, a culture of criminality and drug dealing, the 
radicalisation of Muslim youth over international issues like Kashmir, and the 
mosques; described as ‘… less religious centres, more like training grounds for 
the Taliban.’155 
    Having isolated out of control Muslim youth as the instigators of violence, local 
non-Muslim Asians went on to dismiss the notion that the riots were reactions to 
socio-economic exclusion:  
They talk of economic deprivation, complain of the police and 
discrimination, but these are excuses. When Indians came to Britain, they 
suffered from the same conditions. They had a level playing field. Because 
of our hard work, perseverance and keeping our youth under control, 
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Indian children are leading in the field of education today. The responsibility 
for taking control of Pakistani youths lies with their parents and community 
leaders.156  
The need to dissociate Indians from ‘Muslim violence’ represents an example of 
what Krista Melanie Riley has identified as national capital accumulation.157  By 
presenting all Asians as starting from the same deprived position, the explanation 
for Muslims’ comparative lack of success was culturalized as resulting from 
feckless Pakistani parenting. Through associating with values of hard work and 
good parenting, Indians identified with the nation while dispelling and isolating 
Muslims as possessing culturally determined values that impeded their 
integration. These extracts illustrate how the category of Asian was split following 
the uprisings, in order that non-Muslims could align themselves with British 
values, while Muslims were further problematized as culturally dysfunctional. 
 
The problematisation of transnational identities 
One of the central concerns of the community cohesion agenda was to redefine 
and rearticulate an inclusive Britishness which would unite disparate communities 
across the nation. The focus on the need to speak English, the ’Britishness test’ 
and concurrent tightening of immigration laws to make marriage to foreign 
spouses more difficult underlined a concern with the transnational loyalties of 
targeted communities.  
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    Marta Bolognani has traced the shifting focus of policy makers and the public 
with regard to culture in Bradford. Celebrated as the city’s essence during its 
2008 European capital of culture bid, this cultural diversity was nonetheless 
pathologised and proclaimed excessive through community cohesion discourse, 
which considered it responsible for the riots.158 Central to this process was the 
problematisation of transnational identities which aimed to strengthen Britishness 
by diluting transnational attachments, particularly of Muslim communities.  
    The communities perceived to be most in need of civic re-education were 
never explicitly named, but the cultural practices thought to exemplify failed 
integration made clear that Muslims were the community that most lacked 
Britishness and required state intervention. The debate on the need to speak 
English, for example, focused on non-economically active Muslim mothers who 
disadvantaged their children educationally and contributed to intergenerational 
schizophrenia by not speaking English at home.159 Attention was not merely 
restricted to first generation immigrant mothers, but also the language skills of 
those spouses from Pakistan and Bangladesh who married via transnational 
networks of clan and caste, and through which Muslims in Britain were perceived 
to be importing foreign cultures intent on remaining isolated.160  
    The focus on intolerable cultural practices further emphasised that Muslims 
were the focus of community cohesion. Gender relations were articulated as one 
of the most important indicators of integration and were central to community 
cohesion discourse’s articulation of the values which defined Britishness. Home 
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Secretary David Blunkett, highlighting the publication of the government reports 
into the disturbances, spoke of the need to “…protect the rights and duties of all 
citizens, and confront practices and beliefs that hold them back, particularly 
women.”161 The cultural practices held up as exemplifying non-British values 
were those associated with Muslim communities.162 Blunkett argued that British 
‘norms of acceptability’ meant that practices of female genital mutilation and 
forced marriages could not be tolerated.163 Michael Wills, minister responsible for 
defining Britishness in the context of the newly formed community cohesion 
discourse, similarly cited supposedly Islamic cultural practices to draw the line of 
tolerance: ‘…some things are absolutely clear. We don't accept forced marriages, 
genital mutilation or discrimination on any grounds.’164  
    The enunciation of intolerable ‘Islamic’ cultural practices as the values against 
which British identity was articulated emphasised Muslim masculinities as deeply 
problematic. A gendered good/bad division emerged through community 
cohesion discourse, where Muslim women were portrayed as victims in need of 
state intervention and men’s adherence to such practices became a litmus test of 
Britishness. As Blunkett stated in 2002: 
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Respect for cultural difference has limits, marked out by fundamental 
human rights and duties. Some of these boundaries are very clear, such as 
in the examples of forced marriage or female circumcision (more accurately 
described as female genital mutilation, for that is what it is). These 
practices are clearly incompatible with our basic values.165 
It should be noted that these unacceptable practices were already illegal at 
this time, and thus were not ‘accepted’. The oppressive patriarchy of Muslim 
culture had, however, taken on a larger significance. Intertwined with 
discourses surrounding the invasion of Afghanistan, which relied heavily on the 
rescuing of Muslim women from the tyranny of the Taliban, the community 
cohesion’s reliance on this dichotomy of good oppressed women and bad 
patriarchal men, and the necessity of state intervention to correct it, found a 
great deal of support.  
    Emerging in the context of home office reports into the riots, it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that these community cohesion measures were primarily 
aimed at Britain’s Muslim communities. David Blunkett’s announcement of a 
test of national allegiance while discussing the uprisings served to link 
domestic civil disorder with excesses of cultural diversity and transnational 
attachments.166 Blunkett emphasised that lack of English language skills were 
not the cause of 2001 riots, but nevertheless pathologised those who did not 
speak English at home, claiming that fluency helped ‘overcome the 
schizophrenia which bedevils generational relationships.’167 Legislation which 
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tightened immigration controls and impeded family reunification, announced in 
the context of press conferences about the riots, further emphasised the 
conviction that foreign spouses and imported cultures were thought to 
endanger British social cohesion.168  
    The debate engendered by the Northern uprisings led to an attempt to 
reaffirm the values that bound the national community. Multiculturalism, with its 
celebration of diversity, was problematized as creating segregated communities 
and failing to provide a unifying social vision and community cohesion aimed to 
repair this damage through an explicit celebration of Britishness. Yet the 
culturalization of communities and their problems helped to give this discourse a 
decidedly anti-Muslim spin. Through the de-emphasis of class and race, and the 
emphasis on problematic transnational attachments, a bad Muslim subject was 
produced, detached from other salient identifications, pathologised as culturally 
dysfunctional and held up as marking the limits of British tolerance. 
    At the same time as community cohesion discourse was carving out this bad 
Muslim subject as responsible for domestic unrest and social strife, a global 
discourse was emerging which held Muslims responsible for violence and tyranny 
on an international scale. As noted above it is impossible to artificially separate 
the anti-Muslim elements of community cohesion from the pernicious influence of 
the ‘war on terror’ and the counterterrorism discourse which was being 
formulated and articulated simultaneously. The following section considers how 
the representation of Muslims in counterterrorism discourse contributed to the 
construction of the ‘bad Muslim’. 
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British counterterrorism discourse 
While community cohesion discourse culturalized politics to produce a bad Muslim 
subject against which British identity could be articulated, counterterrorism 
discourse performed a similar function by constructing an ‘Islamic terrorist’ 
enemy as a foreign threat that endangered the integrity and existence of the 
nation. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, this discourse of foreign threat 
was employed relatively un-problematically. Britain was portrayed by Prime 
Minister Tony Blair as one of the US’s staunchest allies, sharing in its mourning 
and loss, and committed to freedom, increasingly represented as the central 
value for which the ‘war on terror’ would be waged. By committing troops to 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, Britain became intimately involved with the 
military aspect of the ‘war on terror,’ and the discourse employed to justify this 
involvement made liberal use of binary logic. British counterterrorism discourse 
focused on the need to dissociate ‘good’ patriotic British Muslims from their ‘bad’ 
foreign co-religionists.  
    The ‘home-grown’ nature of the 7 July, 2005 London transport bombings and 
the foiled plots a week later, however, dislocated this construction. Following July 
2005, the domestication of the foreign threat led to renewed government focus 
on ‘bad’ British Muslims and an emphasis on the promotion of a British Islam that 
would provide a robust counter-narrative to jihadist doctrine. The following 
section considers the employment of the good/bad Muslim binary in the ‘war on 
terror’ discourse, before moving on to consider how British counterterrorism 
discourse responded to the July 2005 attacks through the Prevent strategy.  
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The September 11, 2001 attacks and the discourse of the ‘war on terror’ 
It has been noted that the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon created a ‘void of meaning’, which was swiftly filled by 
a particular construction of what the terrorist attacks meant; for the US and for 
the world.169 President George W. Bush sought, in numerous speeches, to draw 
the ‘civilised world’ in to America’s pain by representing September 11, 2001 as 
more than localised strikes on the United States, but as attacks on freedom itself 
and thus a global tragedy and the concern of every ‘freedom loving nation’.170  
Splitting the entire global system into a moral order in which a choice between 
good and evil must be made, Bush stated: ‘Every nation in every region now has 
a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.’171  In 
formulating the ‘war on terror’ discourse, he employed the central us/them binary 
to represent the attacks and those responsible. The us/them categorisation, and 
the signifiers attached to each side of the binary, operates as a standard 
relational pair; using one always invokes the other,172 and repetition of this 
binary conditioned both the response to the hijackings and the identities of actors 
in the global terrain carved out by the ‘war on terror’ discourse.  
    Binarism is a useful rhetorical device for leaders because of its simplification of 
complex issues into an easily identifiable cast of heroes and villains, which may 
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be faithfully echoed by mass media.173  President Bush’s early speeches after the 
attacks served to equate the US with positive attributes such as freedom, 
compassion and tolerance, in order to reassure the nation that it was good.174 In 
American discourse, the religious framing of the ‘war on terror’ was 
demonstrated not only in the (swiftly discarded) terminology of ‘crusade’,175 but 
also in Bush’s regular formulation of the attacks as ‘evil’.176 Michael Blain has 
conceptualised this language as part of a global victimage ritual, where political 
events were constructed as ultimate battles of good against evil, demanding that 
actors take sides in an apocalyptic drama where the heroic subjects of positive 
power took on the villainous subjects of negative power.177 Signifiers such as 
‘evil’ had the dual effect of representing the enemy as outside the moral order 
while at the same time representing America and its allies as virtuous, innocent 
and godly, and tapped in to a deeply resonant religious frame that served to link 
Islam with each signifier on the ‘bad’ side of the us/them divide.   
    The construction of the ‘war on terror’ as a battle between good and evil has 
been described by Ivie and Giner as Bush’s ‘rhetorical demonology’178, and the 
religious connotations of this construction, as Andrew Bacevich and Elizabeth 
Prodromov have observed, served as an instrument to provide moral justification 
for a strategy of empire, providing an immediately available cultural frame to 
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make sense of the attacks.179 Despite constant assurances that the ‘war on 
terror’ was not religious war (‘we do not fight Islam, we fight evil’180), the 
invocation of Christian metaphor and terminology contrived to give the opposite 
impression. As a culturally powerful and instantly recognisable narrative, the 
rhetoric of good/evil summoned earlier American victories over ideological ‘evil’ 
such as the Second World War and the Cold War. 
    The fact that the attacks were justified in religious language as Islamic attacks 
by Osama bin Laden,181 and that this was mirrored and echoed by Bush’s rhetoric 
of militant evangelism, meant that from the outset there was a religious 
dimension to the attacks (and thus the subsequent ‘war on terror’) that simply 
could not be denied. The perpetrators of the attacks were Muslim, a fact 
constantly asserted by bin Laden in his communications. Therefore, it followed 
that the enemy was Muslim. The enemy was also ‘evil’, ‘terrorists’, ‘uncivilised’, 
‘barbaric’, etc. Once such a binary has been instituted invocation of any of its 
terms evokes the whole range of subject positions and characteristics attached to 
it.182 By this logic, each description of the enemy conjured up all aspects of his 
identity, and one central aspect was Islam. It is for this reason that the good/bad 
Muslim dichotomy became central to the ‘war on terror’ and the British 
counterterrorism discourse. 
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    Leaders were careful to qualify any reference to Islam in the context of the 
‘war on terror’ with disclaimers that emphasised that the majority of Muslims 
were peaceful and the fight was not with Islam.183 This was based partly on the 
need to dissociate the terrorists’ actions from religion in order to de-legitimise bin 
Laden’s pronunciations of a holy war, as well as the very real need to reassure 
Western Muslims and maintain civil peace by not appearing to give rhetorical 
support to possible retaliations. Bush and Blair therefore divided the category 
‘Muslim’ into ‘good Muslims’, whose faith they respected, and ‘bad Muslims’, who 
were traitors, blasphemers, and hijackers of Islam. Bin Laden’s claim to be acting 
in the name of Islam was thus de-legitimised by assertions that his interpretation 
of Islamic justification for his actions was misguided, cynical, or ‘evil’. However, 
the good/bad divide served further functions. Through proclamations that Islam 
was really peaceful and good, speakers demonstrated their own 
broadmindedness and tolerance, their knowledge of Islam, and, in speaking for 
their country, their nation’s place on the righteous side of the us/them binary. 
  
British counterterrorism discourse 
Prime Minister Tony Blair sought to stake Britain’s place on the virtuous side of 
the conflict from a very early point. Parliament was recalled on 14 September 
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2001, and Britain was entreated to see itself as sharing in the pain and grief 
caused by the attacks: 
I thought it particularly important [to recall Parliament] in view of the fact 
that these attacks were not just attacks upon people and buildings; nor 
even merely upon the USA; these were attacks on the basic democratic 
values in which we all believe so passionately and on the civilised world.184 
Blair drew Britain in to America’s pain (and its subsequent fight) by insisting that 
the civilised world and democratic values had been attacked. The implication was 
obvious: Britain was part of the in-group - the civilised world – and should thus 
consider its own values brutally assailed and itself a direct victim of the attacks. 
    The September 11 attacks required an explanation of both the identity and 
demands of the perpetrators and a reaffirmation of national ideals to reassure 
the public that order would be restored. For this reason Krebs and Lobasz have 
argued that the rhetoric of crisis is the rhetoric of identity; working to render the 
crisis knowable and surmountable by invoking the community’s shared values 
and affirming the elements that bind it.185 Blair’s rhetoric to this effect was not as 
overtly religious as Bush’s and was notable for its attempts to move away from 
the discourse of evil. The religious discourse employed by Bush had relatively 
little purchase in a religiously ambivalent ‘Christian Britain’, meaning that Blair 
could not capitalise on this powerful rhetorical mode to the same extent. His 
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discourse instead concentrated on a civilisational rather than a religious 
dichotomy, and this was readily echoed by other MPs in the Commons debate on 
14 September 2001, as well as the media. Yet, despite Blair’s attempts to 
distance himself from the good/evil binary, the dominant construction of the 
September 11 attacks meant that the articulation of any one of the relational 
pairs that formed the discourse effectively invoked the whole binary. In the 
British context, this necessitated the institution of the good/bad Muslim binary.  
 
Good/bad Muslims in British counterterrorism discourse 
Tony Blair made an early distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims. In his 
speech to the Commons, three days after the September 11 attacks, Blair stated: 
We do not yet know the exact origin of this evil. But, if, as appears likely, it 
is so-called Islamic fundamentalists, we know they do not speak or act for 
the vast majority of decent law-abiding Muslims throughout the world. I say 
to our Arab and Muslim friends: neither you nor Islam is responsible for 
this; on the contrary, we know you share our shock at this terrorism; and 
we ask you as friends to make common cause with us in defeating this 
barbarism that is totally foreign to the true spirit and teachings of Islam. 
[Emphasis added].186 
Blair divided the category of Muslims into those evil, barbaric, terrorist Islamic 
fundamentalists who had been responsible on one side, and the vast majority of 
decent, law-abiding, shocked ‘friends’ on the other. More tellingly, he placed 
those in the former category on the ‘foreign’ side of the inside/outside binary. 
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Several MPs were similarly keen to stress that they did not hold Muslims en 
masse responsible for the attacks: 
…the people in the Muslim community in Bristol, East have been just as 
appalled as anyone else. They feel their Britishness just as strongly as many 
of us and they have been horrified at what has happened. [Jean Corston, 
Bristol, East]. 187 
…the Muslims communities – those who believe in the Koran – in our country 
are settled, integrated and positively horrified by what they have seen on 
television. [Stuart Bell, Middlesbrough]. 188 
The un-Islamic nature of the attacks was emphasised in contrast with the beliefs 
and values of those who truly follow Islam, but it was the Britishness of good 
Muslims that was most forcefully stressed.  
    This emphasis on settled, integrated British Muslims who were ‘like us’, may 
appear contradictory to community cohesion discourse’s emphasis on Muslims’ 
segregated, parallel and un-British lives. Yet despite this apparent reformulation 
of community cohesion discourse, there was continuity in the need to establish 
and nurture a particularly British Islam. By stressing British Muslims’ horror at the 
attacks, counterterrorism discourse reformulated the good/bad binary around 
(good) British and (bad) foreign Muslims. Although the September 11 attacks 
were represented as an assault on civilisation, the danger was exteriorised as 
foreign. Good Muslims were ‘our’ Muslims, and the challenge lay in the need to 
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distinguish between those good, law abiding Muslims who must be protected and 
bad foreign Muslims who were potentially preparing terrorist attacks.  
    The counterterrorism discourse that emerged following the 2005 London 
bombings, however, dislocated this understanding of terrorism, and both 
intensified and focused the good/bad Muslim divide. The bombers were British 
and apparently integrated, dispersing the stable construction of ‘Islamic 
terrorism’ as a largely foreign threat. The ‘goodness’ of British Muslims could no 
longer be assumed, rather, it had to be tirelessly promoted through state 
intervention in Islamic practice itself. The Prevent portion of the CONTEST 
counterterrorism strategy represented the government’s attempt to support and 
promote a British Islam that would counter extremism and radicalism in Muslim 
communities, yet it was predicated on the articulation of Britishness as a remedy 
for terrorism and the notion that Muslims were dangerous, suspicious, and 
particularly susceptible to violent extremism. 
     
The London Bombings and good/bad Muslims in the Prevent strategy 
The London bombings of 7 July 2005, and the attempted bombings two weeks 
later, dislocated the hitherto stable construction of terrorism as an exterior threat 
to Britain. The Britishness of the bombers that lent a new focus to the good/bad 
Muslim discourse, and the realisation that ‘home-grown’ terrorism required a 
circle of tacit support led to a greater emphasis on the domestication of a threat 
that had previously been represented as largely foreign. This increased 
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government focus on prevention strategies and the necessity of disrupting 
sympathy for the objectives and motives of terrorism.189  
    The central policy consequence of the July 2005 attacks was renewed focus on 
the Prevent element of the CONTEST antiterrorism framework. Created in 2003 
and made public in 2006, CONTEST was based on four broad strands: pursuing 
terrorists and those who sponsored them; preventing terrorism by tackling 
radicalisation; protecting the public, key national services and UK interests 
overseas; and preparing for the consequences of terrorist attacks.190 In April 
2005 the government was criticised by the Home Affairs select committee for 
emphasising other parts of CONTEST at the expense of prevention, and the 
London bombings led to renewed focus on community based approaches to 
prevent radicalisation.   
    Prevent represented an attempt to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of Muslims in 
the UK who might be susceptible to violent extremism. Focusing on the 
challenging of extremist ideology and state funding for the voices of ‘moderate 
Islam’,191  it came to form the central pillar of state engagement with Muslim 
communities. What is important about the renewed focus on Prevent for the 
purpose of this chapter is the way in which this strategy internalised and 
reproduced the good/bad Muslim divide. Through a monocultural focus on 
Muslims only, the linking of funding to certain accepted ideas, social engineering 
of Muslim organisations and leaders to align them with state sanctioned doctrinal 
stances, and the targeting of particular Muslim communities (chiefly Salafis and 
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Islamists) as especially susceptible to violent extremism, Prevent internalised the 
good/bad Muslim binary as an integral part of policy.  
 
Prevent 
The announcement of the Prevent programme in October 2006 created the 
impression that it was simply a response to the July 2005 attacks. However, as 
Paul Thomas has noted, the key elements of the strategy had been mapped long 
before, in response to the September 11 attacks, the Northern uprisings of 
summer 2001 and intelligence that indicated British men were present in jihadist 
training camps in Afghanistan.192 
    The first manifestation of this approach emerged from the Preventing 
Extremism Together taskforce in August 2005, which consisted of ministerial 
visits to areas with large Muslim populations and discussions with more than 
1000 Muslims.193 Building on the recommendations of the taskforce, a limited 
scheme, the Preventing Violent Extremism pathfinder fund, was introduced in 
October 2006 with a £6 million budget for priority local authorities (with Muslim 
populations greater than 5 percent). In June 2008 Preventing Violent Extremism 
(PVE) was rolled out nationally as the largest domestic funding strand under 
Prevent with a budget of £45 million.194 The revised Prevent strategy had the 
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overall aim of stopping people becoming violent extremists or supporting 
terrorism, and was comprised of five core strands: to challenge violent extremist 
ideology and support mainstream voices; to disrupt those who promoted violent 
extremism and support the institutions where they were active; to support 
individuals who were being targeted and recruited to violent extremism; to 
increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism; and to address 
grievances being exploited by ideologues; to develop understanding, analysis and 
evaluation; and strategic communications.195 Prevent aimed to tackle support for 
violent extremism at the local level through the funding of mosques, Muslim 
community organisations and initiatives, youth groups, forums against 
extremism, anti-extremism road shows and the training of imams.196 
    From its inception, Prevent focused solely on Muslims as particularly 
susceptible to violent extremism. The government’s 2008 The Prevent Strategy: 
A Guide for Local Partners in England based local funding on the size of Muslim 
communities.197 Paul Thomas has argued that the linking of funding with 
significant Muslim populations was based on the unsubstantiated belief that 
dense Muslim communities were more likely to breed terrorism.198 This 
monocultural focus on Muslims within Prevent served to suggest that only 
‘Islamic extremism’ was dangerous in a national security context, and since 
funding was linked to an explicitly antiterrorism agenda this had blanket 
connotations for the entire faith community, implying that all British Muslim 
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communities potentially had a problem with terrorism and must therefore be held 
to higher standards than other Britons and closely watched by their local 
authorities.  
    These aspects of Prevent would seem to suggest that all Muslims in Britain 
were considered (potentially) ‘bad’. However, a closer analysis of the strategy 
reveals the implementation of binarism through the linking of Prevent funding to 
particular doctrinal understandings of Islam. By sponsoring ‘moderate’ 
organisations in order to create a dominant leadership which would contest 
radical expressions, the government targeted funding towards the influencing of 
religious ideas and practice, and in this way explicitly subsidised ‘good’ Muslims, 
while withdrawing funding for and engagement with ‘bad’ Muslims. 199   
 
The implementation of the good/bad Muslim divide in the Prevent strategy 
Yaya Birt has argued that following the foiled airline bombing plots of August 
2006 British government strategy moved overtly towards a values-based 
approach to preventing violent extremism. Based on the understanding that 
violent Islamist terrorism was best understood as gross theological error, this 
approach held that ideological contestation, theological counter-narrative, and 
the formation of a moderate, modern and progressive British Islam represented 
the best way to tackle terrorism.200  
    Through the funding and promotion of certain organisations as the voice of 
moderation, the Prevent strategy implemented the good/bad Muslim divide based 
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on the values of organisations rather than their effectiveness in reaching ‘at risk’ 
individuals. Government funding was targeted towards organisations that were 
considered to have a robust approach towards tackling extremism, such as the 
Quilliam Foundation, which received more than £1 million, the Radical Middle 
Way (£400,000) and the Sufi Muslim Council (£200,000).201  At the same time as 
promoting ‘good’ Muslim organisations and initiatives, the government 
announced its intention to retract funding and support from organisations whose 
values did not meet its expectations. This change of direction was underlined by 
the withdrawal of government engagement with the Muslim Council of Britain, 
which was not considered to have a sufficiently anti-extremist position, as well as 
the proscription of avowedly non-violent Islamist groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahir.202 
    In October 2006 Ruth Kelly, then Communities Secretary, announced that 
Muslim organisations that refused to defend core British values and failed to take 
a pro-active role in the fight against extremism would lose access to funding. 
Highlighting that grants would be targeted towards those organisations that 
accepted and promoted ‘non-negotiable values’, Kelly stated: ‘It is only by 
defending our values that we will prevent extremists radicalising future 
generations of terrorists’.203 The Prevent Strategy outlined what was expected of 
funded organisations, including the defence and upholding of shared values 
(respect for law, freedom of speech, equality of opportunity), and:  
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The organisation actively condemns and works to tackle violent extremism. 
Factors to consider as part of this criterion include whether the 
organisation: publicly rejects and condemns violent extremism and terrorist 
acts, clearly and consistently; can show evidence of steps taken to tackle 
violent extremism and support for violent extremism; can point to 
preventing violent extremism events it has supported, spoken at or 
attended; can show that its actions are consistent with its public 
statements; and can show that its affiliated members or groups to which it 
is affiliated meet these criteria.204  
Such an over-emphasis on an organisation’s values indicates that the Prevent 
strategy was concerned with shaping the practice of British Islam, rather than 
working with those organisations that were more likely to be effective in 
reaching individuals who were at risk of radicalisation. Linking funding to 
values meant that organisations which potentially had the most credibility with 
such individuals would be side-lined by Prevent. Similarly, the likelihood of 
those individuals committed to violent Islamism attending government-backed 
roadshows and anti-extremism conferences is questionable. As one member of 
a prominent Muslim grassroots organisation, interviewed by Suraj Lakhani, 
stated: ‘…you wouldn’t get Germaine Lindsay [one of the 7 July 2005 
bombers] going to a [Prevent] community day…’205  Through concentrating on 
the values of an organisation, Prevent may have misdirected resources and 
effort away from those groups who shared an interest in preventing violent 
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extremism, yet did not necessarily share the values demanded by 
Government. 
    David Stevens has highlighted that Prevent’s tactic of attempting to reduce the 
influence of radical Islam by funding ‘moderate’ organisations was based on an 
overinflated perception of the importance of Islamic doctrine in motivating 
terrorist acts.206 Stevens’ study has problematized the assumption, underpinning  
Prevent’s values based strategy, that ideological factors represented the prime 
motivation driving individuals to join radical groups. He emphasised that spiritual 
or religious principles are rarely the primary incentives for those who join such 
groups. Rather, complex cost/benefit calculations about the goods provided by 
the group are undertaken by individuals, which focus on social benefits such as 
group solidarity, and have higher value than theological principles.207  
    This values-based approach to engagement with British Muslim organisations 
represents, according to Basia Spalek and Robert Lambert, a form of identity 
building, where ‘moderates’ were seen to be allies in the prevention of terrorism 
while those who did not meet the stringent conditions set by the Government in 
terms of values were viewed as a threat to social cohesion and national 
security.208 The good/bad divide as implemented in the Prevent agenda viewed 
legitimate Muslims as those who engaged with the government on its own terms, 
while those who refused such an engagement, irrespective of their motives, were 
perceived as radical, not sufficiently ‘anti-extremist’, and thus a potential terrorist 
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threat.209 This had implications for recipients of Prevent funding, many of whom 
were uncomfortable with its overt anti-terrorism focus and feared that it could 
cause backlash within Muslim communities and undermine local solidarity.210 This 
was similarly reflected in Lakhani’s interviews with Muslim grassroots groups, 
who were concerned that Prevent funded projects were viewed with suspicion by 
mass society and served to strengthen assumptions that Islam and terrorism 
were intimately associated. As one respondent noted:  
… when the government gives money to other community organisations to 
open up the youth centre... nobody bats an eyelid... [but] if the money 
came from Prevent and the youth centre is geared for Muslims then all of a 
sudden it has different connotations.211  
Lakhani’s data further suggests that Prevent project leaders were viewed with 
suspicion within their communities as government puppets and spies. Around half 
of respondents admitted they either regretted receiving Prevent funding, 
subsequently refused it, or attempted to conceal acceptance from their 
communities, and several were concerned that the negative connotations of the 
strategy would damage their credibility.212 Such studies suggest that Prevent’s 
overt attempt to encourage ‘good’ and disengage from ‘bad’ Muslims actually had 
the effect of fracturing Muslim communities, intensifying the view of wider 
society that Islam was intractably connected with terrorism and increasing 
suspicion and distrust within those communities that Prevent’s work was most 
needed. 
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     There is ample evidence that Prevent created real divisions within Muslim 
communities,213 as well as between Muslim communities and others, including: 
non-Muslim ethnic and faith groups who resented the monocultural focus of 
funding;214 local authorities, who were increasingly viewed with suspicion as 
colluding with the police and security service in the surveillance of their Muslim 
communities;215 and wider society, for whom Prevent funding intensified the 
connection between Islam and terrorism.216 Its work with only Muslims gave the 
impression that religious identification was the only identification and experience 
for Muslims,217 and its concentration on promoting a convivial British Islam that 
would challenge extremist narratives implied that British Muslims had hitherto 
failed to understand their faith or had been practising it incorrectly. Overall, by 
treating Muslims in Britain as a generalised ‘suspect community’, Prevent 
entrenched the good/bad divide that had been instituted by both community 
cohesion and counterterrorism discourse and approached all Muslims as 
potentially ‘bad’. 
 
Conclusion: Good/bad Muslims and British national identity  
Since 2001, identity in Britain has become a central concept. The dominant 
discourses of community cohesion and counterterrorism were pivotal in the 
construction of British Muslim identity. By focusing almost exclusively on Muslims, 
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these discourses subordinated other identifications to religious identity and 
projected a state-sanctioned ‘correct’ way to be Muslim in Britain.  
    This chapter has demonstrated how dominant national discourses consistently 
singled Muslims out as dangerous and threatening. Yet, as the analysis has 
shown, Muslims as the community to be targeted were rarely, if ever, named, 
with speakers relying on cultural practices and common-sense understandings 
which implicitly referred to Muslims without ever explicitly singling them out. 
There are at least two reasons for this. First, racialized discourses in liberal 
democratic societies are bound by convention to not appear to target a particular 
racial, ethnic or cultural group.218 There are strong social injunctions that govern 
the way in which people, and particularly elites such as ministers and the media, 
speak about minority groups. Thus even when Muslims were clearly the 
community being targeted,  linguistic strategies such as hedging, disclaimers and 
diminutives were used by speakers to make clear that they didn’t consider all 
Muslims to be dangerous. These strategies served to present a positive self-
image of speakers as broad-minded, whilst at the same time deflecting 
accusations of the illegitimate targeting of Muslims. Second, the simple self-
evident fact that the vast majority of British Muslims were not engaged in anti-
social activity or terrorism meant that the targeting of Muslims as a group was 
obviously illegitimate.  Sweeping powers which primarily targeted Muslims could 
therefore not be justified under a discourse that overtly constructed them all as 
dangerously other, since most Muslims were clearly peaceful British citizens. This 
tension between the need to single out Muslims as a problematic group and the 
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necessity to avoid charges of Islamophobia goes some way to explaining the 
omnipresence of the good/bad Muslim binary in post-2001 British discourse.  
    The good/bad dichotomy that was central to both community cohesion and 
counterterrorism discourse was crucial to the development of British 
Islamophobia. ‘Good’ Muslims were represented as those who could be drawn in 
to the national community, while ‘bad’ Muslims were to be isolated and 
delegitimized.  Yet, despite their focus on Muslims, these discourses were 
simultaneously instrumental in bolstering British national identity. 
    The discursive work of national identity lies in its need to mark difference in 
order to demarcate an area of belonging. As an imagined community, the nation 
sustains itself by consistently representing ‘others’ who affirm the nation by 
existing as something the community is not. As David Campbell has argued, 
these ‘others’ are integral to the construction of national identity, and are usually 
represented as dangerous to the integrity of the national community.219 National 
identity by necessity induces a dichotomous discourse, whereby the recognition 
of those who belong to the nation is predicated on the construction of those who 
do not. 220 
    British discourse since 2001 has engaged national identity in a way that is 
predicated on the representation of Muslims as the nation’s ‘significant others’. As 
Anna Triandafyllidou has argued, significant national others can be internal or 
external; while the former threaten the unity and authenticity of a nation, the 
latter threaten to wipe it out.221 Community cohesion discourse worked to 
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represent Muslims as this internal significant other, a community inside the 
national community whose excessive cultural diversity was deemed threatening. 
‘Self-segregation’ and ‘parallel lives’ were the watchwords, and served to 
represent Muslims as withdrawing from the nation in a way that increased 
suspicion and mistrust amongst communities, and had the potential to cause 
rioting and violence on the streets. The fact that a remedial programme of civic 
education in British values was posited as the antidote to urban unrest indicates 
the centrality of national identity discourse to the community cohesion agenda. 
By forcefully articulating Britishness, it was believed that Muslims would feel they 
had more of a stake in the national community, and would thus be less likely to 
riot. 
    At the same time, British counterterrorism discourse represented Muslims as 
the nation’s external significant other. Following the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001, Islamist terrorism was identified as a threat to civilisation itself, 
while the London bombings of July 2005 brought terrorism home as an existential 
threat to Britain. National identity discourse was employed to respond to both 
international and domestic terrorist attacks. In the former case, the 
exteriorisation of Islamist terrorism as ‘foreign’ marked British Muslims out as 
‘our’ Muslims, sharing in the nation’s horror and not to be ‘tarred with the same 
brush’ as the hijackers.222 In the latter, the home-grown nature of the attacks led 
to a concerted state effort to shape a nationally defined Islam that would 
promote British values and provide a counter-narrative to radical Islamist 
ideologies. The articulation of national identity was considered a central remedy 
for terrorism and counterterrorism discourse was premised on the idea that if 
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religious authorities could promote Britishness in an Islamic way, extremism 
could be quelled. 
    National identity is an ideological concept that requires constant articulation to 
be meaningful. To sustain the imagined community of the nation, the state must 
consistently articulate what it is, and like all discursive identity work, this requires 
difference. We can only understand what we are by understanding what we are 
not. In this sense, both community cohesion and counterterrorism were 
expressions of national identity discourse. Both considered the national 
community threatened by Muslim difference, and both articulated Britishness as a 
remedy to the problems believed to be caused by excessive Muslim cultural 
diversity.  
    As this chapter has demonstrated, the dichotomy of good/bad Muslims was 
integral to both discourses but was at its heart an expression of national identity. 
The ‘good’ Muslim figure was constructed as secular, liberal, English speaking 
and integrated, and with strong national attachments, while the ‘bad’ Muslim was 
its opposite; overtly religious and foreign in language, dress and ideology, with 
overriding attachment to the ummah, and a strong link with terrorism and 
extremism. Good Muslims were presented as part of the nation, to be embraced 
and nurtured out of their cultural exclusivism, while bad Muslims were deeply 
threatening to national cohesion and national security. The latter figure played 
the role of the national ‘folk devil’ after 2001, threatening the nation internally 
and externally, and thus became the nation’s ‘significant other’. While community 
cohesion discourse and practice aimed to contain the ‘bad’ Muslim internally 
through coercive civic education practices that targeted Muslim communities as 
insufficiently integrated, counterterrorism discourse and practice responded to 
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the external threat by attempting to shape and promote a particularly British 
Islam that would delegitimize violent Islamist extremism at the ideological level. 
Both were sustained by the central premise that a strong articulation of 
Britishness could remedy the problems believed to be caused by excessive 
attachment to Islam, and it is in this way that British national identity crystallised 
as dependent upon, and articulated in opposition to, the ‘bad’ Muslim figure.  
    Yet, a larger narrative was also articulated through this discourse of national 
identity. The post-2001 world was a global landscape of binaries, and the 
invocation of any one implicitly summoned its oppositional other. While ‘we’ 
represented freedom, civilisation, and pluralism, ‘they’ represented despotism, 
barbarism and fanaticism. The community cohesion discourse’s need to integrate 
Muslims into the nation and the counterterrorism discourse’s desire to promote a 
British Islam both produced an archetypal ‘bad’ Muslim figure that frustrated 
these desires and had to be overcome in order to fix national identity, and 
Muslim identity within it. Yet this figure was the same spectre that haunted the 
international order in the guise of the Taliban and al Qaeda. The community 
cohesion’s folk devil was the self-segregating Muslim more attached to 
transnational kinship networks and the international Muslim community than 
Britain. The ‘unacceptable’ patriarchal cultural practices (female genital mutilation 
and forced marriage) of those Muslims targeted by community cohesion were 
immediately recognisable as those of the Taliban regime that Britain was 
bombing. Similarly, the folk devil of counterterrorism discourse was the raging 
Muslim fanatic whose international twin was al Qaeda. Asserting Britishness as a 
remedy to problematic Muslims within the nation was thus analogous to asserting 
global belonging to the ‘right’ side of the international order. 
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    British discourse on Muslims after 2001 was, like nationalist discourse in many 
other European countries, infused with Islamophobic dimensions. In targeting 
Muslims as culturally problematic, the community cohesion and counterterrorism 
discourses reified Islam as the primary identification of Muslims. Yet the 
apparently parochial domestic dimensions of these discourses were saturated 
with an understanding of British values as Western and universal. When Blair 
stated in a 2003 speech to Congress ‘ours are not Western values, they are the 
universal values of the human spirit,’223 he was explicitly stating the Eurocentric 
discourse that was implicit in community cohesion and counterterrorism.  
    As a domestic expression of a global narrative that identified Muslims as the 
West’s cultural ‘other’, post-2001 British discourse articulated Islamophobia 
through consistent use of binarism and the representation of the ‘bad’ Muslim as 
the nation’s ‘significant other’ that threatened both internal cohesion and national 
security. It is little wonder that this discourse, with its easily identifiable cast of 
heroes and villains, was readily consumed and re-articulated by the British public 
in its understanding of Muslims.  
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Chapter Four - British Muslims and the Discourses of Dysfunction: 
The Dudley Mosque Controversy 
 
Introduction 
British discourse since 2001 has represented Muslims as a problematic minority, 
focusing on their perceived lack of integration and the security danger that 
‘Islamic extremism’ was thought to present. As the previous chapter argued, the 
representation of Muslims in Britain in the 2000s came to be dominated by the 
community cohesion and the counterterrorism discourses. Implicating 
multiculturalism in general, and Muslim culture in particular, these discourses ran 
concurrently to represent Muslims as significantly ‘other’ to British society and 
responsible for Britain’s security woes.  
    The narratives central to these discourses worked to represent all Muslims as 
responsible for and dangerous to the internal cohesion and external security of 
British society. Muslim cultural dysfunctionality became an all-encompassing 
explanatory discourse that could account for domestic civil unrest and 
international terrorism without addressing thorny issues of injustice, racism and 
those domestic and foreign policies that served to promote grievances.  
    The discourses of community cohesion and counterterrorism and the practices 
associated with them worked to keep Muslims consistently in the state’s gaze and 
lent ideological support to the notion that Muslim culture was fundamentally 
‘other’ to British societal norms. The previous chapter outlined these dominant 
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discourses, arguing that these representations of Muslims as threatening and 
responsible for social problems formed an oppositional ‘other’ which helped to 
construct a British national identity infused with positive attributes. The present 
chapter is concerned with the consequences of such dominant representations in 
a local context. Taking the case of the long-running Dudley mosque debate, this 
chapter seeks to demonstrate how dominant national discourses were 
internalised and re-articulated by the public for specific local purposes.  
        Throughout most of the last decade the issue of the proposed mosque 
dominated local politics in the West Midlands town of Dudley. From its launch in 
2001, the ‘Pride of Dudley’ project received a huge amount of local media 
attention, became the focus of a 22,000 signature strong oppositional petition,224 
and engendered three protests by the ‘anti-Islamist’ nationalist grassroots group 
the English Defence League (EDL).225 Local debates were heavily infused with 
dominant national discursive themes that focused on the compatibility of Muslims 
with British majority society.  
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    This chapter considers how correspondents to the letters pages of a local 
newspaper, Dudley News, utilised and rearticulated dominant national discursive 
themes in a local context in order to argue against construction of the mosque. 
Community cohesion discourse’s focus on the threat that Muslim failure to 
integrate posed to unified ‘British identity’, and counterterrorism discourse’s 
emphasis on Muslim culture as existentially threatening to the nation’s security, 
were locally rearticulated to represent Muslims as posing integration and security 
threats to Dudley. The chapter first delineates the central representations 
employed by correspondents to Dudley News, before employing a critical 
methodology to analyse these narratives. A first-order critique highlights 
inconsistencies and fallacies in order to destabilise the discourse on its own 
terms, while a second-order critique considers the ideological effects of choosing 
these representations over others.     
    Considering the local representation of Muslims is advantageous for 
understanding what constitutes Islamophobia. When speakers employ such 
discourse, consciously or (more often) not, they are appealing to a set of 
narratives and stereotypes that are considered to have multi-context explanatory 
power. A local case study such as this highlights how national discourses that 
emphasised threat and blame were re-articulated to explain local phenomena, 
and had long-lasting negative effects for Muslims in Dudley and their claims for 
religious and civic rights. National discourses, with their central representations of 
Muslims as unwilling to integrate and prone to violent extremism, found a 
receptive audience in the locality and had enduring consequences. By appealing 
to these discourses, those arguing against Dudley mosque portrayed local 
Muslims as exemplary of this cultural dysfunction in order to prevent change in 
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the area. These discourses thus served an ideological purpose to maintain an 
inequitable and discriminatory status quo. 
    The present chapter takes public discourse as its point of analysis, seeking to 
determine how far the national discourses discussed in the previous chapter were 
internalised and articulated by ordinary people in their understanding of a local 
situation involving Muslims making claims for their religious rights. When the 
narratives of threat and blame central to these discourses were reinterpreted for 
local contexts, group identity boundaries were drawn which have proven difficult 
to demolish.  
 
Dudley and Dudley News 
Dudley  
Dudley is an urban borough in the West Midlands which, according to the 2001 
census, had a Muslim population of 2.45 per cent.226 Dudley Central Mosque has 
been established in the town centre since the 1970s and its congregation had 
traditionally strong relations with other faith groups and the population in 
general. The Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund, which was set up by 
the government in 2007 as part of its counterterrorism strategy, mentioned 
Dudley as an example of good practice in its Guidance Notes, positively citing 
Dudley Muslim Association (DMA) and its work in engaging the local community 
through conferences, seminars, and exhibitions which aimed to discourage the 
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radicalisation of young Muslims and promote community cohesion and 
understanding.227 
     In 1999, after a series of land swaps with the council, Dudley Muslim 
Association acquired derelict land on Hall Street for the purpose of building a 
mosque and community centre, with the agreement stipulating that the building 
must be iconic and of good quality, and that substantial progress towards 
completion must have been made before 2008.228 As a direct result of the 
September 11 attacks, DMA decided to detach the community centre from the 
mosque so that it could be used by all sections of the community in an effort to 
promote integration and understanding, and the plans for the project were 
launched in February 2005.  
    Following a series of consultations with locals that aimed to accommodate 
objections and ensure that the project was in accordance with the character of 
the area, the mosque’s minaret was scaled down to 65 feet and Christian arches 
were incorporated into the design. Khurshid Ahmed, chairman of DMA, stated:  
It is meant to be a celebration of our heritage and Christianity and Judaism 
are part of that heritage. We believe this will be the first mosque in the world 
to have half-Christian and half-Muslim architecture. We are very proud of 
that.229 
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Despite this, the project received escalating local opposition as a result of 
campaigns by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the British 
National Party (BNP), both of whom made the mosque a central issue in local 
election campaigns.  
    The area has historically been a site of far-right activity. Simon Darby, the 
BNP’s former Deputy National Chairman, stood in six elections during the decade 
as a candidate in Dudley’s Castle and Priory war, receiving consistent support, 
and on one occasion polling more than 40% of the vote.230 However, although 
the BNP exploited local concerns in their election literature,231 the initiative was 
seized by the UKIP St James’s ward candidate, Malcolm Davis. Despite having 
initially voted in favour of the land swap with DMA,232 Davis spearheaded the 
anti-mosque campaign, organised the petition against it and was among the first 
to express opposition in a 2006 letter to Dudley News. This letter stressed the 
Christian heritage of Dudley, stated that the mosque was unnecessary given the 
small number of Muslims and suggested that it would attract mass immigration 
into the town, increase racial tension and force public support further to the 
right.233 
    Although some of these themes were taken up by correspondents to Dudley 
News, particularly the notion that Dudley’s heritage would be endangered and, to 
a lesser extent, the idea that the mosque was unnecessary, public discourse 
remained remarkably resistant to the local political agenda of either UKIP or the 
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BNP. Both parties made the increased migration of Muslims to Dudley their main 
focus, a theme that was disregarded by correspondents. Election records show 
that support for these parties dramatically increased during the decade,234 and 
there is little doubt that the mosque issue galvanised this. However, the 
reasoning and justifications used by correspondents to Dudley News in their 
arguments against the mosque reflected mainstream national discourses to a far 
greater extent.  
    Other local issues should also be noted when considering the context of 
community relations in Dudley, particularly in relation to counterterrorism 
discourses. Several events affected the perception of Muslims in the area, 
including the 2001 capture and subsequent internment in Guantanamo Bay of the 
‘Tipton three’, local men caught allegedly fighting against allied troops in 
Afghanistan,235 the arrest of two local men (one of whom was the son of Dudley 
Central Mosque Chairman Ghulam Choudhary) in a December 2003 nationwide 
anti-terrorism sweep,236 and the 2007 revelation of a Birmingham-based plot to 
behead a British soldier.237 These events gave national counterterrorism 
discourses a local focus, and alongside a national context of dramatically 
heightened coverage of Muslim-related issues, served as the backdrop against 
which the mosque was debated. 
 
Dudley News 
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Dudley News is a free weekly regional newspaper with a circulation of more than 
30,000 and a web presence at dudleynews.co.uk.238 The letters pages of the 
newspaper provided an opportunity for locals to voice their concerns about the 
mosque, anonymously if they wished, and were thus a site of discursive 
competition for  correspondents, in which argumentation was used ‘to convince 
readers of the acceptability of a point of view and to provoke them into an 
immediate or future course of action.’239  
    In order to understand the representations of Muslims during the mosque 
controversy, I analysed letters to Dudley News and examined the narratives 
utilised by correspondents in their discussions about the mosque. Employing 
predicate analysis to focus attention on the background information drawn upon 
and rearticulated by correspondents,240 the analysis proceeded as follows: first, a 
preliminary analysis of the nouns ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ was used to determine 
which letters would be analysed in greater detail. Those letters with a high 
frequency of both nouns were subjected to critical discourse analysis, following 
the reasoning that high-frequency letters represented an attempt made by the 
author to define, control or produce a ‘Muslim’ subjectivity. 
    The search term ‘Dudley mosque’ generated more than 160 letters covering 
the period 2006-2010, with 30 of these containing three or more uses of the 
nouns ‘Islam’ and/or ‘Muslim’. These texts were closely examined using an 
inductive approach, which decontextualized the letters in order to draw themes, 
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narratives and argumentative strands from their representations of Muslims and 
Islam, before re-examining them in the context of national discourses addressing 
the same themes of threat and blame. These discursive representations were 
then subjected to a first order critique, which sought to highlight contradictions 
inherent within the discourse, and a second order critique, which aimed to 
expose the ideological effects of the dominant discursive representation of 
Muslims during the mosque controversy.241 
 
The discourses of dysfunction: Threat and blame in Dudley News letters 
This part of the chapter examines the dominant themes used to represent 
Muslims and Islam by correspondents to the letters page of Dudley News. The 
vast majority of the letters analysed were opposed to the mosque (those that 
were not are discussed below), and employed two central discursive themes to 
shore up their arguments against construction: threat and blame. These 
discourses overlapped, intertwined and were used in a circular way to support 
the contentions of one another, culminating in a remarkably hostile and negative 
overall depiction of Muslims in Dudley.  
    For Dudley News correspondents, Muslims represented both a violent and 
particularly a terrorist threat and, due to their antagonistic and inassimilable 
culture, a threat to local and national identity. The discourse of blame similarly 
took two forms. Muslims were considered collectively responsible for the (violent) 
actions of other Muslims, as well as being blamed for not wanting to integrate, 
choosing to self-segregate within their communities and holding themselves apart 
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from the majority Dudley community. These narratives relied on conceptions that 
were pervasive in the dominant national representations of Muslims discussed in 
the previous chapter. The next section of this chapter takes each of these themes 
in turn, locating local representations in the national discourses of community 
cohesion and counterterrorism and critically analysing the underlying 
assumptions that sustain this overarching negative portrayal of Muslims in 
Britain.  
    Despite their prevalence, the dominant discourses are far from unproblematic 
and the assumptions that underpin them are highly contestable. The following 
section identifies the narratives employed by correspondents to represent 
Muslims and Islam and critically analyses the assumptions that underpin them at 
both the national level and the local level of Dudley, before considering the 
ideological effects of these representations for Muslims and non-Muslims in the 
locality.  
 
The threat of violence     
Arguments against the construction of Dudley mosque coalesced centrally around 
the threat of violence that Muslims were perceived to represent. Foregrounding 
Muslim culture, correspondents presented their opposition to the mosque through 
a fear-laden discourse which highlighted the Muslims’ cultural predisposition to 
violence: 
Is it no wonder the people of Dudley do not want this mosque and community 
centre? We are living in an era where so called Muslims will commit mass 
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murder and suicide in order to make this world Islamic using whatever means 
they can get hold of. [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 22 February 2007]. 
The conflation of ‘extremists’ and Muslims in general provided an apparently 
rational reason for opposing the mosque, and the notion that Muslims were 
culturally predisposed to violent behaviour, drew upon common-sense 
background understandings that were repeated across the letters:  
If a church was built in Pakistan it would be bombed the next day. The 
Muslims would go mad before it was even built. [Letter to the Editor, Dudley 
News, 22 February 2007]. 
The narrative that Muslims in Dudley potentially represented a violent threat 
drew upon the counterterrorism discourse’s targeting of Muslim populations as 
particularly prone to violence. In addition, the perceived link between Muslims 
and terrorism, and more crucially terrorism and mosques, was also used to argue 
against construction: 
It could be another breeding ground for Islamic terrorists and the people’s 
concerns need to be heard. [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 22 February 
2007]. 
… some Muslims are indeed bogey men, who use mosques to train and 
indoctrinate less informed Muslims to walk alongside decent members of 
society, including fellow Muslims, and detonate their bombs… [Letter to the 
Editor, Dudley News, 7 March 2007]. 
This uncritical understanding that mosques and terrorism were linked was 
pervasive amongst the letters analysed. Since the link between Muslims and 
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terrorism was well established, the authors had no need to substantiate claims 
such as these. That mosques had been used for breeding terrorism was accepted 
background information, and that all mosques should be suspected as a result 
was considered self-evident.  
    Repetition of these themes helped to cement the idea that Muslims 
represented a danger to Dudley, and the relationship believed to exist between 
Muslims and violence allowed correspondents to present their opposition to the 
mosque as rational and reasonable in the face of such threat.  
    The threat of violence was a central feature of counterterrorism discourse, and 
relied upon the association of Islam with terrorism and extremism. As the 
previous chapter argued, Prevent, the government’s counterterrorism 
programme, fixed its gaze solely on Muslim communities and worked to construct 
Muslims as particularly prone to violent extremism. Several studies have 
demonstrated how government language,242 legislation243 and the media244 drew 
upon and sustained this link of Islam with violence.  
    Mosques were considered particularly dangerous from this perspective as the 
social space where radicalisation into extremist ideas occurred, and this 
relationship was reinforced when Tony Blair, in response to the 7 July 2005 
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attacks, announced plans to close down ‘extremist mosques’.245 The discursive 
relationship between mosques and terrorism had already been well established 
when these plans were abandoned in December 2005 amidst fears that such 
legislation would encourage misidentification of Islam with terrorism. 
Correspondents to Dudley News were particularly receptive to this narrative, and 
used the link between Islam and violence to argue against construction of the 
mosque based on the unidimensionalism of Muslims as potentially extremist and 
the notion that mosques were inherently dangerous as hotbeds of radicalism.  
    Notwithstanding the correspondents’ receptivity to counterterrorism 
discourse’s tendency to target Islam itself as particularly prone to violence, there 
have been numerous studies that problematize this common sense 
understanding. Major empirical studies have repeatedly refuted the perceived link 
between Islam and terrorism, including the analysis of Gallup polling data by 
John Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, representative of more than a billion Muslims, 
which demonstrated that among the 7 per cent of respondents who viewed the 
September 11 attacks as completely justifiable, not a single respondent employed 
religious justification and there was no evidence of correlation between religiosity 
and extremism.246  
    The association between mosques and extremism has also been subjected to 
critical analysis. Marc Sageman’s work on terrorist networks, for example, 
stressed that although a few ‘fundamentalist’ mosques were sites of emergent 
terrorism, the vast majority were conservative institutions with a strong emphasis 
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on the status quo  and much more likely to constrain extremism than facilitate 
it.247 Muslim organisations themselves have stressed this point. As the Muslim 
Council of Britain’s Iqbal Sacranie stated, mosques have been ‘misidentified and 
stereotyped as incubators of violent extremism, while the social reality is that 
they serve as centres of moderation.’248 
    The work of local Muslims in Dudley to discredit links between Islam and 
terrorism was approvingly cited in the government’s Preventing Violent 
Extremism Pathfinder Fund Guidance Notes, which highlight the positive work of 
DMA through conferences, seminars and exhibitions which aimed to discourage 
radicalisation of young Muslims and promote community cohesion and 
understanding.249 Although the fears articulated in Dudley News reflected 
dominant discursive representations of Muslims as linked to violence, national 
and local realities show this relationship to be based on flawed understandings. 
 
The threat to identity 
The consistent focus on a person’s ‘Muslimness’ as their primary identity 
encouraged the portrayal of national and religious identities as mutually 
exclusive. Since Muslims were considered intrinsically ‘other’ to British and Dudley 
culture, they were presented as threatening to national and local identity. 
Religious identity was thought to take precedence over every other, and conflict 
with both local customs and the duty to obey British laws: 
                                                            
247 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004), 143. 
248 Quoted in Alan Travis, “Reprieve for ‘Extremist’ Mosques,” Guardian, 2005, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/dec/16/terrorism.politics [Retrieved 8 October 2011]. 
249 Department for Communities and Local Government, “Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder 
Fund: Guidance Notes for Government Offices and Local Authorities in England,” 12. 
127 
 
… Muslims can only offer selective recognition of British laws which in turn 
means that they might conceivably be expected to break them if the occasion 
arose. [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 22 February 2007]. 
Personal stories served to bolster the claims of correspondents that Muslim 
culture impeded integration in the area:   
My wife, who was recovering from an operation at the time, was refused help 
in unloading crates of wine from a taxi driver’s vehicle because to touch the 
cases would be against his religion… [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 11 
January 2007]. 
This type of personal narration demonstrates the way local and national concerns 
were entwined through anecdotal stories which attempted to illustrate cultural 
incompatibility. The inflexible nature of Muslim culture was also a central theme, 
and was employed to explain why Muslims were so problematic: 
Muslims cannot compromise because their religion does not allow it. They 
must therefore relentlessly change the world around them to suit their own 
image… [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 21 August 2008]. 
Presented as unable to compromise, peaceful co-existence with Muslims in 
Dudley was considered impossible. Muslims were portrayed as attempting to 
change Dudley’s landscape and culture to be more Islamic, and support for the 
mosque was thus constructed as tacit support for the cultural destruction of 
Dudley: 
… [A previous correspondent] correctly stated that: “it is part of the Muslim 
culture to deceive and manipulate”. It is also part of their culture to try to 
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dominate and intimidate wherever they live. And that’s exactly what Khurshid 
Ahmed and his cronies are trying to do! [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 12 
August 2007]. 
This presentation of ‘Muslim culture’ as static and monolithic not only paved the 
way for portrayals of Muslims as responsible for the actions of their co-religionists 
(discussed below), but also served to present Muslims as essentialised and 
sharing culturally conditioned nefarious aims.  Drawing on orientalist stereotypes, 
this representation of the threat to Dudley was reliant on the notion that Muslims 
were inherently problematic because their culture determined them to such an 
extent that they simply could not be any other way. 
    Much of the discussion about the incompatibly of Muslim culture with Dudley 
was based on the idea that there is a finite amount of culture available to a 
person, or within an area, and that if one culture advanced, another must 
retreat: 
We want to keep Dudley, not change its name and culture to Islamabad. 
[Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 22 February 2007]. 
This underlying understanding permeated articulations that called for opposition 
to the mosque because of threat it potentially posed to the dominant culture, and 
tied in with the idea that the mosque would become the focal point of Dudley, 
somehow erasing its past: 
Our Black Country heritage is the only guaranteed thing we thought we could 
pass on to our children. Now even that will be gone and in its place we will be 
known for the mosque… [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 1 March 2007]. 
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This view reinforced the representation of the mosque as a provocative symbolic 
statement that placed an Islamic claim on Dudley: 
… [the mosque] would dominate and tell all the non-Muslim people (not just 
the white British) this is our area, this is our town, this is our borough and one 
day, this is going to be [our] country. [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 12 
August 2007]. 
The cumulative effect of the discourse of threat within the letters pages of 
Dudley News was to present local Muslims as deeply unsettling people. Muslims 
were presented as shunning both local custom and national law, intent on 
violence, and aiming to bring Dudley’s culture, history and heritage to an end. 
However, most troubling for the correspondents, was that even if Dudley’s 
Muslims were not engaged in such activities, they all had the potential to be so, 
and thus were all in some way to blame. 
    The representation of Muslims as a threat to national or local identities is 
based on the belief that for Muslims Islam takes precedence over all other 
identities and that it is inherently oppositional to British, and Dudley, culture. This 
understanding was present in the discourse of community cohesion, which was 
predicated on the notion that Muslims were particularly resistant to national 
assimilation,250 and counterterrorism discourse, which served to position Britain 
as existentially threatened by Islam and its adherents.251 The central premises of 
these discourses were recycled and re-articulated by the correspondents, who 
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positioned Dudley’s Muslims as implicitly suspicious, potentially disloyal and 
dangerous. 
    That Islamic identity is primary has been challenged by numerous studies. In 
his historical study of Muslim presence in Britain, Humayun Ansari concluded that 
British Muslims have seldom viewed Islam as their sole form of political and social 
identification.252 Afshar et al. have demonstrated that hyphenated and hybrid 
identities were readily taken on by Muslim women in Britain, who accepted 
cultural, ethnic and national identities that defined them differently in different 
circumstances.253 Polling data further problematizes the notion that Muslims 
consider their Islamic identity to be in conflict with national identity. A 2007 
Gallup poll found that 77% of British Muslims claimed to identify with the United 
Kingdom (compared with 50% of the general population), and 82% said that 
they were loyal to Britain.254 The emphasis on a stable Islamic identity that acts 
as the primary self-definition for Muslims was similarly refuted by young Muslims 
in Luton, who emphasised the fluidity of identities: ‘We have multiple identity and 
according to mood and circumstance we call ourselves Bangladeshi, British, 
Muslim or Lutonian or whatever.’255 Indeed, local identities have been shown to 
have greater salience than national identity. As Justin Gest has pointed out, 
British separation of ethnocultural factors from citizenship means that belonging 
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is more likely to be conceived in terms of passports and residence, rather than an 
emotional attachment to the nation.256  
    Other empirical works have suggested that British Muslims identify more 
strongly with local, rather than national, culture. Steve Fenton’s study of young 
adults’ conceptions of national identity found that while a small proportion 
embraced or enthused about English or British identity, there was a broad band 
of indifference and hostility towards assuming a national identity, and local 
identities were often cited as more important.257 The prevailing assumption that 
British Muslims viewed their religious and national identities as incompatible relies 
on a static and bounded conception of identity that finds little empirical support. 
 
Blame for the actions of other Muslims 
The central theme of blame that ran through the representations was based on 
the underlying premise that all Muslims were determined by their overriding 
Islamic identity. This unidimensionalism assumed that Muslim behaviour was 
derived from an Islamic cultural imperative. 
    One effect of representing Muslims as inescapably culturally determined was 
that they were considered collectively responsible for any action undertaken by 
any Muslim anywhere in the world. This logic allowed the correspondents to hold 
all Muslims responsible for the actions of some, and the mosque was portrayed 
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as the thin end of an Islamic wedge that would lead, as it did in all Muslim 
societies, to repression:  
You do not object to the mosque, but at what point would you object? When 
Islam becomes the dominant religion? When TV is banned? When freedom of 
speech is banned? [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 22 February 2007]. 
Correspondents invoked the negative characteristics of some Muslim societies in 
order to conflate the characteristics of particular Muslim societies with the 
wishes, desires and essence of all Muslims. This narrative not only assigned 
blame to all Muslims for the actions of some, but also implied that Muslims 
should apologise for the anti-democratic nature of some Muslim regimes: 
I’d ask Mr Ahmed to name one democratic multi-party, pluralistic Muslim state 
before he condemns the democratic decision of an elected council and the 
democratic voice of the people of Dudley. [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 
5 April 2007]. 
The above passage draws directly on this notion of collective responsibility. To be 
hypocritical as the author suggests, Ahmed would have to share the blame for 
the crimes against democracy that are invoked. Such a position can only be 
sustained by the underlying assumption that Muslims everywhere are somehow 
answerable for the actions of their co-religionists. 
    The notion that Muslims should take responsibility for the lack of pluralism and 
democracy in other Muslim societies was similarly applied to British society, here 
groups established to respond to discrimination were charged with creating social 
disharmony, rather than seeking to alleviate it. Again, all Muslims were implicated 
as accountable: 
133 
 
If Mr Ahmed wishes to build harmony in society he should concentrate on 
disbanding the Muslim Council of Great Britain, the Federation of Black Police 
Officers and the British Muslim Initiative. How can we have harmony with 
these organisations in place? [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 7 March 
2007]. 
The discourse of blame for the actions of other Muslims in Dudley News 
combined to assert that Muslims had no right to agitate for a mosque until they 
had put their own house in order.  
    Because culture was implicated as responsible for both the 2001 uprisings and 
the September 11, 2001 and 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks, a discourse of blame 
emerged that used the notion of ‘shared values’ to imply that Muslims were 
collectively responsible for the actions of their co-religionists. The Northern 
uprisings were presented as a problem of excessive cultural relativity that had 
weakened nationalistic attachment,258 while the intensive legislative focus259 of 
counterterrorism on Muslim communities promoted a discourse of blame that 
obliged ordinary Muslims to consistently and monotonously condemn terrorism 
and disclaim extremism.260  
    The discourse of collective responsibility is predicated on the 
unidimensionalising of Muslims as essentially the same because of their shared 
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adherence to Islam and the inescapable effects of ‘Muslim culture’. This was 
regularly drawn upon by the correspondents who highlighted negative aspects of 
some Muslim societies in order to make broader arguments about the 
compatibility of Muslims with Dudley in particular and Britain in general. 
    It barely needs to be pointed out that given the existence of more than a 
billion Muslims, settled on every continent, speaking fifty languages and 
innumerable variations of denomination and cultural tradition any pronunciation 
on ‘Muslim culture’ must be treated with the utmost caution.261 As Bruno Etienne 
has argued, Islam is united only in its monotheism, with every other aspect of 
Muslim life the object of sharp contestation between and within traditions. 
Contrary to the thesis that holds ‘Muslim culture’ as transhistorically uniting 
Muslims, this is precisely because the historical challenges encountered by 
differently socially situated Muslim societies have produced varied interpretations 
of the Prophetic tradition.262 
    At a more local level, the work of Frank Reeves demonstrates the vast 
differences in opinion between Dudley Muslims on issues such as dietary 
practices, religious clothing and attitudes towards homosexuality. His survey of 
Dudley residents showed that 20 percent of Muslim respondents were prepared 
to relax their attitude to halal  food at a social event out of politeness, more than 
a quarter (26.7%) disapproved of women wearing the niqab (face veil) in public 
places and over half (56.7%) believed that homosexuals should be treated 
equally.263 Reeves’s work demonstrates that there are significant differences of 
opinion even in a small sample on issues that are often articulated as evidence of 
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Muslim cultural unidimensionalism. The notion that there exists a determinate 
fundamental ‘Muslim culture’ that shapes the behaviour of all Muslims does not 
bear scrutiny at the national or local level.  
 
Blame for lack of integration 
Finally, the correspondents laid the blame for perceived lack of integration with 
Muslims, charging them with deliberately holding themselves aloof and choosing 
to self-segregate: 
I myself am convinced by many conversations and other exchanges with 
Muslims that they are not interested in integration… [Letter to the Editor, 
Dudley News, 11 January 2007]. 
They talk of integration, but they are the ones not wanting to integrate, they 
alone wish to take over! [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 1 February 2007]. 
The notion that Muslims in Dudley were inherently problematic was central to 
such arguments. One writer compared the controversy over the proposed 
mosque with a recently opened Hindu temple, stating that it had not: 
… created anything like the controversy that the proposed Dudley mosque 
continues to create. Perhaps Dudley’s Muslims could learn something from the 
Hindu community? [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 22 September 2006]. 
The author refers to a Hindu temple situated two miles away, which was 
completed in 2006 and was, at the time, the largest in Europe. The fact that 
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this did not generate such controversy was taken by the author to indicate that 
Hindus got on with their lives peacefully, unlike Muslims:  
Everything a Muslim thinks, says and does is governed by the will of their God 
with the result that compromise is impossible… Without compromise we 
cannot have integration [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 10 November 
2006]. 
Through a discourse which presented Islam as completely determinative of 
Muslim life, the correspondents worked to culturalize social realities and hold 
Muslims responsible for perceived lack of integration in the local area. 
    The writers were also pessimistic about the idea that the detached community 
centre would promote mixing between people of different backgrounds, primarily 
because Muslims were believed to be hostile to others: 
… one must really doubt that, in reality, ‘the centre would be for the whole 
community and not be race or faith specific’ since in many ways the Muslim 
community is becoming more and more inclusive [sic] and inward facing. 
[Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 22 September 2006]. 
Will all people irrespective of what race, religion and nationality be allowed to 
do ‘their thing’ without objections from the Muslim sector? Or will it inevitable 
be a case of whenever anyone else wants to use it, the place is fully booked? 
[Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 22 February 2007]. 
By representing Muslims in Dudley as hostile, correspondents not only made their 
objections to the mosque appear rational, but also attended to potential charges 
of Islamophobia by marking out Muslims as the instigators of community strife. 
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This can be understood as a form of victim blaming, whereby the subjects of 
discriminatory discourse and practice were blamed for the discrimination they 
received. By doubting the inclusiveness of the community centre, the 
correspondents shifted the blame for poor community relations on to Muslims.  
    The discourse of blame worked to hold all Muslims responsible, both for the 
actions of their co-religionists and for a perceived lack of local and national 
integration. The mosque project was represented within this imaginary as a 
deliberate attempt to antagonise the non-Muslim population of Dudley. All 
Muslims were implicated in the discourse of blame, and the correspondents held 
them to account by withholding support for the mosque 
    Lack of integration was a central theme of community cohesion discourse, 
which contained the implicit suggestion that Muslims were responsible for their 
‘parallel lives’ and had chosen self-segregation from the majority population.264 
Nationally, this was articulated as a problem of excessive cultural diversity which 
was managed by reversion to a monocultural ideological project that championed 
‘British values’ and treated diversity as suspicious.265 Correspondents to Dudley 
News rearticulated this national discourse of culture as problematic in the local 
context to argue that since Muslims were not willing to integrate with Dudley, the 
mosque should not be permitted. 
    Self-segregation is a problematic concept, and implies a desire on the part of 
those suspected of it to remain aloof from the majority in order to protect their 
                                                            
264 Ouseley, “Community Pride Not Prejudice - Making Diversity Work in Bradford,” 18. The Cantle 
Report in particular emphasised that the parallel lives of residents who lived in mixed areas but 
did not have contact with one another had been a major cause of the ‘misunderstandings’ that 
had led to the 2001 uprisings. Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRC), Community Cohesion: 
A Report of the Independent Review Team (chaired by Ted Cantle), 9. 
265 Derek McGhee, The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights 
(Berkshire: Open University Press, 2008), 144. 
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cultural identity. As Ludi Simpson’s work demonstrates, cultural explanations for 
segregated living patterns fail to appreciate the realities of movement, 
particularly in areas of deprivation. His work on Bradford, the archetypal 
polarised city, shows that the number of predominantly South Asian (mostly 
Muslim) areas did increase, but that this was due to population growth from 
immigration and natural increase, rather than a result of the movement of 
residents to areas of South Asian concentration.266 Polling data on Muslims’ 
attitudes to integration similarly throws doubt on the notion of self-segregation. A 
2006 Pew Center poll found that while 64% of Britons surveyed believed that 
Muslims wanted to be distinct from society, only 35% of Muslims agreed with this 
statement, and a significant minority of British Muslims said that they believed 
Muslims in Britain mostly anted to adopt national customs.267 
    Frank Reeves’s local survey similarly found little evidence that Muslims in 
Dudley sought to self-segregate. In fact, the overwhelming majority (93.3%) 
wanted the council to provide more opportunities for people of different religious 
backgrounds to mix. Contrastingly, only 28.6% of non-Muslims were in favour of 
this, while more than a third (38.2%) were opposed.268 Reeves’s data suggests 
that what is perceived as self-segregation is driven more by lack of opportunity 
for mixing than by a deliberate drive on the part of Muslims to hold themselves 
apart from majority society. Indeed, the fact that the original plans for the 
mosque were changed in order to detach the community centre from the mosque 
so that it could be used by all communities further undermines the idea that 
                                                            
266 Ludi Simpson, “Statistics of Racial Segregation: Measures, Evidence and Policy,” Urban Studies 
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267 Pew Research Centre, The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other, 
Director (The Pew Global Attitudes Project: Washington DC, 2006), 
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Muslims in Dudley did not wish to mix. On the contrary, it seems that a 
significant minority of non-Muslims were hostile to integrating with Dudley’s 
Muslim communities. 
 
Contesting the dominant discourses 
Surprisingly few of the letters that made it into the pages of Dudley News 
contested these dominant discourses. Whether this reflects an inclusion bias on 
the part of the newspaper’s editor, or whether it is indicative of a widespread 
support for these positions is not clear. What is clear is that the micro-climate of 
hostility made alternative positions difficult to sustain.  
    Only five of the 30 letters studied in detail expressed no opposition to the 
mosque, and only three of these actually engaged with the dominant discourses 
in order to refute them (the other two focused instead on the practicalities of the 
project and argued that a mosque was needed but that plans should be scaled 
down). One correspondent, who did engage with the dominant discourse, 
contested the unidimensionalism of Muslims within the letters page: 
If one faith person does something wrong it does not mean that all of them 
are the same… What you see on TV and [in the] media if not what all Muslims 
are like (terrorist). [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 7 March 2007]. 
Another engaged with the fear among the correspondents that Dudley values 
would be corrupted, asking: 
Is their identity and confidence in themselves so fragile that they can’t 
tolerate people different to themselves and instead see them as a threat? 
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What else could be responsible for such hostile views that see Muslims as 
some kind of boogie-men ready to rape our children, steal our cars, and use 
mosques to build bombs, train terrorists or plan attacks? [Letter to the Editor, 
Dudley News, 28 February 2007]. 
The final letter in this group acknowledged that Islam was viewed as threatening, 
but argued that the growing number of Muslims in the area needed somewhere 
to pray: 
I think the thing that gets to people the most is that Islam is growing and 
that’s the threat to them, not the building of the mosque. Muslims go to the 
mosque for a pace to worship, not to drink tea and biscuits like they do in 
churches. [Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 22 February 2007]. 
The latter two letters elicited responses from others and it is worth briefly 
addressing the way in which those opposed to the mosque reaffirmed the 
dominant discourses in their counter-arguments to the points raised. A reply to 
the second letter, which had argued that those opposed to the mosque based 
their arguments on irrational fears of Muslims, was published the following week 
and simply refuted the central argument by maintaining that some Muslims were 
terrorists who used mosques to plan attacks, thereby restating the link between 
Muslims, mosques and terrorism.269 The reply to the third letter followed a similar 
strategy, arguing that there was a lack of understanding between Muslims and 
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non-Muslims, but that Muslims were to blame for this because of their 
involvement in terrorism: 
So far lessons have been dominated by the twin towers, holiday villages in 
Bali and the London Underground etc. Some insight into her beliefs would be 
more welcomed than the strident tone. Drinking tea in church seems far more 
acceptable than some of the activities associated with mosques. [Letter to the 
Editor, Dudley News, 28 February 2007]. 
The overall effect was that those who did engage with the dominant discourses 
in order to counteract them were silenced by a ‘common sense’ understanding 
that Muslims, mosques and violence were linked and because of this the risk to 
Dudley, should the mosque be built, was simply too great. 
    In sum, correspondents to Dudley News held to a representation of Muslims 
as threatening to national security and national identity, and collectively 
responsible for terrorism and a lack of integration. Dominant discourses that 
portrayed Muslims as problematic both externally (to security) and internally (to 
identity), were rearticulated in the local context in order to underscore arguments 
that the mosque was unacceptable.  
         
The ideological effects of the discourses of threat and blame 
The first order critique above draws attention to the assumptions that underpin 
the discourses of threat and blame. A second order critique aims to underline the 
ways the discourses function politically and ideologically in their representations 
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of Muslims, and considers how these discursive associations shaped the identities 
and relationships of all players in the conflict over Dudley mosque. 
    The most conspicuous ideological effect of the discourses employed by 
correspondents to Dudley News was the construction of a ‘Muslim other’, which 
facilitated the representation of a culturally stable Dudley threatened by the 
presence of Muslims. The discourses of threat and blame relied on the 
representation of Muslims as culturally predisposed to socially unacceptable 
behaviour, and this allowed the correspondents to make sweeping 
generalisations about all Muslims in order to oppose the mosque. Predicated on 
the explanatory purchase of ‘Muslim culture’ as the primary maker and marker of 
behaviour, Muslims were positioned as intrinsically ‘other’ to Dudley and 
threatening to the culture of the locality. Kinvall and Linden have highlighted that 
the pressures of globalisation and migration force both migrants and ‘host’ 
societies to rework their identities in response to the new realities they face, 
causing some to retreat into a mythical past in an attempt to ‘securitise’ 
subjectivity by clinging to one identity.270 The correspondent’s anxieties about 
Muslims can be understood from this perspective as an attempt to fix destabilised 
identities. By projecting the image of an eternal and unchanging ‘Dudley culture’ 
as threatened by culturally antagonistic Muslims, the non-Muslim community was 
brought together and identities were articulated against this perceived threat. 
    The discourses of threat and blame also functioned to sustain existing power 
relations. The addition of a mosque to Dudley was consistently represented as an 
intolerable challenge, threatening to its history and heritage and something that 
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could not be absorbed or accepted. None of the correspondents were willing to 
entertain the notion that Dudley culture could adjust in order to accommodate 
the mosque. Gabriele Marranci has theorised this as fear of the ‘transruptive’ 
effects of Islam on European identities. In this sense, as Islam fails to assimilate 
and fade within contemporary Europe, the identities of European states and 
peoples are changed as they come into contact with Muslims, who are also 
transformed by the encounter.271 Marranci has argued that contemporary 
Islamophobia is a fear of this change, and manifests in the desire to uphold 
traditional identities. This was evident at the local level in Dudley, where Muslims 
were portrayed in negative and threatening ways as making unreasonable 
demands of the locality, which in turn served to justify Dudley’s overwhelmingly 
hostile reaction. The problem of deteriorating community relations was then cast 
not as the result of the hostility of non-Muslims, but due to the unreasonable 
demands and alien values of Muslims.  
    At a more concrete level, discourses work to constrain and establish 
possibilities for action by making some actions appear inevitable and others 
simply implausible.272 The dominant discourses in Dudley worked in this way to 
put pressure on decision-makers to reject the proposal. Reeves noted that his 
research team was instructed not to undertake the survey of Dudley residents 
prior to the outcome of the May 2008 elections lest an already volatile and 
contentious situation was further provoked.273 The unanimous rejection of the 
proposal by Dudley Council’s Planning Committee in February 2007 may also, 
arguably, be seen as a response to the dominant discourses exhibited in Dudley 
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News. Of course, this is not to suggest that the letters page of a local newspaper 
was the only, or even primary, source of pressure on councillors. Huge public 
interest, the campaigns of far-right parties, sustained and hostile local media 
coverage and the 22,000-strong oppositional petition all coalesced to make 
rejection of the proposal an attractive option for councillors, who knew that 
should the DMA appeal the decision it would be taken out of their hands and 
referred to the government’s planning inspector. Nonetheless, the importance of 
the discursive representations within the letters should not be overlooked, 
especially in free newspaper delivered throughout the borough. The letters page 
functioned as a site of contestation and argumentation, and correspondence 
aimed to call others to action to reject the mosque. As such, the dominant 
discourses within the letters made it clear to decision-makers that the only 
acceptable course of action was rejection of the plans. 
    Related to this are longer term effects of strained community relations and the 
breakdown of trust that some Muslims felt following the council’s rejection of the 
mosque. Despite extensive remodelling of plans in the face of local objections, 
the proposal was unanimously rejected by councillors against the 
recommendations of their own planning officers. Given the efforts made to 
accommodate local concerns, it is not surprising that Muslims felt indignant at 
what they perceived as the discriminatory and Islamophobic nature of the 
council’s decision to deny permission.274 Justin Gest has highlighted that the 
perception that Muslim voices were being ignored in local struggles led to a 
heightened sense of alienation among young Muslims in East London.275 Again, 
the cumulative effects of a consistently hostile discursive atmosphere in Dudley 
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News should not be underestimated. As negative stereotypical representations 
mounted in the pages of the newspaper, the overwhelming public sentiment 
towards Muslims would have left few in doubt that they were unwelcome and 
unwanted in the area. 
     
Conclusion 
This chapter has critically analysed the dominant narratives expressed in 
opposition to the proposed Dudley mosque in order to demonstrate how the 
national representations of Muslims discussed in the previous chapter were 
employed, rearticulated and altered in local context. The purpose of the chapter 
is not to suggest that these were the only representations of Muslims circulating, 
or that these views were necessarily representative of the majority of Dudley 
residents. Rather, it aims to highlight how discourses with national prominence 
and elite approval furnished the anti-mosque position with a veneer of rationality, 
maintained existing power relations and served to silence alternative 
representations in the din of hostility, fear and threat.  
    The discourses of dysfunction served a clear purpose for Dudley during the 
mosque controversy. The national focus on Muslims as culturally responsible for 
the gravest contemporary ills allowed social problems such as extremism, 
terrorism, segregated towns and lack of social cohesion to be de-contextualised, 
de-historicised and repackaged as products of Muslim cultural malady. Conceived 
as such, reform was portrayed as the responsibility of Muslims, and something 
the state could only hope to challenge by compelling its supposedly recalcitrant 
subjects to assimilate.  Such thinking is characteristic of a problem solving 
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approach to social management,276 in which the status quo is left secure and 
unscrutinised, and the historical policies, inequalities, political grievances and 
discrimination that have contributed to contemporary problems are dismissed in 
favour of an all-encompassing discourse of Muslim cultural dysfunction. The 
problem is with ‘them’, not ‘us’, and the solution does not require ‘us’ to change 
in any way, except to welcome Muslims out of their cultural bondage and make 
the transition to ‘integration’ as attractive and straightforward as possible. 
    The portrayal of the mosque as an unacceptable challenge to Dudley’s history 
and heritage pivoted on the local articulation of dominant national 
representations of Muslims as dangerously opposed to an ill-defined and mythical 
‘British culture’. Muslims were not considered part of Dudley culture, and the idea 
that Dudley could itself change to include markers of Muslim faith was dismissed. 
The discourse demanded recognition of the eternal and unchanging heritage of 
Dudley, and the repeated calls for Muslims to integrate in order to be better 
citizens of Dudley were invested with the corresponding claim that to be a good 
citizen of Dudley one must respect the heritage of the town and consequently 
oppose the mosque as damaging to this. The demands for integration were 
couched in conditions that called for Muslims to abandon legitimate claims for 
their faith in the interests of a history from which they were excluded, and a 
future in which their participation was unwanted.  
    Muslims are clearly considered most dangerous when they are visibly Islamic, 
that is, when they make claims for their faith, in this case by calling for a new 
place of worship. It is at this point when anxieties about cultural incompatibilities 
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come to dominate the discourse, and representation of Muslims as fundamentally 
alien to British culture becomes a key theme. 
    These representations support the conceptualisation of Islamophobia as 
cultural racism. Through an unswerving focus on ‘Muslimness’ and an 
understanding that all Muslim action and behaviour was culturally conditioned, 
Muslims were differentiated from non-Muslims and de-differentiated from one 
another through the unidimensionalising focus on the determinative nature of 
Muslim culture. It was this dual process that allowed Dudley’s Muslims to be 
compared to rioters in Bradford and terrorists in Pakistan. A political 
conditionality was attached to Muslim interaction with society that demanded 
Muslims first show their willingness to integrate and repudiate terrorism before 
any benefits could be distributed to them. But since any claims for faith were 
tainted with the dangerous mark of Muslim culture, Dudley’s Muslims found 
themselves in an impossible position.  
    The discourses of threat and blame and their underpinning construction of 
Muslims as unidimensional and culturally dysfunctional served as discursive 
weapons for the correspondents to argue against change in Dudley. Yet the 
assumptions that these discourses are based upon are vulnerable to critique at 
both national and local levels. Recognising the way in which these discourses 
serve to disguise discriminatory practices aimed at Muslims, by explaining them 
as the natural outcome of antithetical cultures clashing, is essential in order to 
challenge dominant narratives and open up spaces for contestation. As a 
generation of young British Muslims grows up expected the full rights and 
entitlements of citizenship and making claims for their religion, discourses that 
exclude them as not properly belonging to the nation, while simultaneously 
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reprimanding them for failing to integrate, serve to foster an alienation and 
disaffection that can all too easily be exploited. 
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Chapter Five - ‘Not racist, not violent, just no longer silent’: Racist 
discourse construction and the ideology of the English Defence 
League 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have demonstrated how the discourses of threat and 
blame worked to represent Muslims since 2001 as dangerous to identity and 
security. At a national level this took the form of community cohesion and 
counterterrorism discourse, and these were rearticulated at a local level during 
the Dudley mosque debate for the purpose of preventing local change. My aim in 
these chapters has been to show how these representations were constructed 
and how they were able to gain enough social currency to be utilised for local 
struggles. As I argued in the previous chapter, these representations can be 
considered Islamophobic because of their unrelenting focus on Islam as the 
primary motivation for all Muslim behaviour. 
    The present chapter aims to address the question of whether Islamophobia 
can be considered a form of racism by an analysis of the discourse of the English 
Defence League (EDL), an ‘anti-Islamist’ street protest group that singularly 
focuses on Muslim activity in Britain. Despite the violence and anti-Muslim 
rhetoric associated with its protests, the EDL claims to be an anti-racist human 
rights organisation dedicated to protecting liberal freedoms and a bulwark 
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against ‘Islamic extremism,’277 and this claim is contained in their protest chant: 
‘not racist, not violent, just no longer silent.’278 
    The English Defence League emerged in 2009 as a mass street protest 
movement able to attract supporters in the thousands to demonstrate against 
‘Islamic extremism’ in towns and cities across the UK. The group’s paradoxical 
combination of antagonistic, often violent, street protest and their apparently 
benign intellectual output has confounded observers. The group has staged 
dozens of protests (including marches, static protests, and ‘flash 
demonstrations’), which have often descended into violence as supporters broke 
through police lines to assault local Asians, confront counter-protesters, and 
attack Asian businesses and property.279 By September 2011 the cost of policing 
demonstrations was estimated to be in excess of £10 million, with more than 600 
arrests made in connection with EDL protest.280 Despite the violence and virulent 
anti-Muslim rhetoric that has become associated with the group the EDL strongly 
denies Islamophobia, claiming to be only against ‘Islamic extremism’ and not all 
Muslims.  
    This chapter employs a critical methodology to address these claims, analysing 
EDL literature in order to isolate the group’s representation of Muslims and 
considering these alongside strategies identified as typical of racist discourse 
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construction. The representations, narratives and rhetorical strategies employed 
by the group support the analysis of Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism 
that constructs opposing ‘British’ and ‘Muslim’ subjects and functions to maintain 
traditional ethno-cultural dominance of the former over the latter. 
    There have been a number of academic studies of the group,281 which have 
focused primarily on the attitudes and ideology of EDL supporters. These studies 
address an important aspect of the popular appeal of the EDL, yet it is 
remarkable the extent to which the group’s own justification for its existence and 
ideological position has been ignored. The present study contributes to this 
literature by discursively analysing publicly available texts produced by the 
English Defence League in order to determine the central tenets of the group’s 
ideological representation of Muslims and analyse the claim that they are not 
racist.  
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    The chapter first considers the extent to which the EDL can be considered a 
typical far-right group, before moving on to outline the central representations of 
Muslims employed by the EDL. I argue that despite their claims to the contrary, 
EDL Islamophobia is an example of (culturally) racist discourse. Through the 
demarcation of a non-Muslim in-group, presented as superior in culture and 
values, and a Muslim out-group, which threatened the privilege and position of 
the former, EDL discourse functioned ideologically to maintain traditional ethno-
cultural privilege and exclude Muslims from the national community. An analysis 
of the articles published on the EDL News section of its website revealed three 
central narratives that make up the core of EDL discursive representation of 
Muslims; that Muslims were uniquely problematic, that ‘Islamic ideology’ was the 
source of these problems, and that Muslims were collectively responsible for the 
problems identified.   
    These narratives are critiqued in order to identify the contestable claims that 
they rest upon, before moving on to demonstrate how EDL Islamophobia 
functioned as a culturally racist discourse. By essentialising Muslim culture as an 
immutable obstacle to integration, and through strategies typical of racist 
discourse construction, such as denials, projection, diminutives, and positive-
self/negative-other representations, the EDL rearticulated Islamophobia as anti-
racism and attempted to normalise it as the natural perspective of those 
committed to liberal freedom. The group may not be traditionally racist, but the 
culturally racist discourse employed distributed privilege and laid blame along a 
hierarchical line through the construction of opposing and irreconcilable subjects: 
Muslims, who were blamed for society’s ills and required to radically reform their 
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religion, and non-Muslims, who were presented as blameless victims of ‘Islamic 
extremism’.  
    The purpose of this chapter is not to label the EDL an Islamophobic 
organisation, although as will be shown, it is difficult to argue that it is not. The 
aim instead is to show how the group constructed all Muslims as (potentially) 
dangerous and proposed a culturalist explanation of Muslim inferiority to bolster 
the representation of superior Englishness. In their representation of Muslims as 
uniquely problematic, EDL Islamophobia found explanatory value for all Muslim 
action within Islam, and demanded that traditional ethno-cultural dominance be 
maintained in the face of unacceptable Muslim challenges. As the analysis will 
show, the apparent gulf between the violent anti-Muslim rhetoric of those 
attending street protests on one hand, and the ostensibly reasonable and rational 
opposition to Islam that makes up the group’s ideological core on the other, is in 
fact largely illusory. Both rest upon the notion that Muslims represent a perilous 
and existential threat to Britain, and both construct ‘Muslim’ and ‘British’ as 
opposing and ultimately irreconcilable identities. The EDL’s insistence on the 
superiority of the latter demonstrates the fundamental similarity between racist 
discourse and Islamophobia.   
 
The English Defence League and the far right 
The English Defence League emerged in 2009 as a major ‘anti-Islamist’ street 
protest group. Formed in Luton, the group was initially comprised of a small 
collection of individuals on the fringes of the English football hooligan scene who 
objected to Islamist activity in the town. In March 2009, Ahlus Sunnah wal 
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Jammah, an offshoot of al-Muhajiroun, had protested at the homecoming parade 
of the 2nd battalion Royal Anglian Regiment, returning from a six-month tour of 
Iraq.  After they shouted abuse at the soldiers and held up inflammatory banners 
reading ‘baby killers’ and ‘butchers’, the crowd turned on them, providing the 
spark for the formation of United People of Luton (UPL), which later became the 
EDL.282  
    UPL marched through Luton in May 2009 demanding an end to Islamist 
presence in the town and the interest generated led to the establishment of 
networks of sympathisers. Tommy Robinson (Stephen Yaxley-Lennon), who 
emerged as the group’s de facto leader, stated:  
When we saw Birmingham's demonstration [organised by ‘British Citizens 
Against Muslims Extremists’] they were using the same slogans as us: 'We 
want our country back', 'Terrorists off the streets', 'Extremists out', 'Rule 
Britannia'. From there the EDL was set up.283  
The group grew dramatically through social networking sites and involvement 
with ‘Casuals United’, a loose association that linked ‘firms’ of the English football 
hooligan scene,284 and by the end of 2010 the EDL had held more than thirty 
protests in cities and towns across the country and attracted supporters in the 
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thousands for national demonstrations in Stoke, Manchester, Dudley, Bradford, 
and Leicester.285 
    The group has no formal system of membership, and invites people of any 
political persuasion, ethnicity, race and sexuality to demonstrate under the EDL’s 
banner. Group organisation centres on a series of area ‘divisions’, each directed 
by a regional organiser. As of 29 February 2012 there were 94 local divisions 
listed on the group’s website.286 In addition to these there are a number of 
specialist groups, including a Jewish division, a women’s division (EDL Angels), 
and a lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) division. The existence of 
such groups provides the EDL with an important point of differentiation from 
traditional far-right groups, and sustains the group’s claims to be anti-racist, 
liberal and tolerant.  
    As the movement grew, expensive security operations to police the protests 
and violent clashes with local Asian youth and counter protesters led to massive 
media coverage which questioned what the EDL hoped to achieve with their 
increasingly high profile demonstrations. In response the group set up a website 
to complement its presence on social networking sites Twitter and Facebook. 
Englishdefenceleague.org comprises a mission statement explaining the purpose 
of the EDL, a forum which allows sympathisers to network, and even an online 
shop which sells branded clothing, flags, and toys. An important section of the 
website is EDL News, which represents an effort to justify demonstrations, 
explain the EDL’s concern with ‘radical Islam’, and rally supporters to its cause. 
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    It is important to note that although EDL News presents the ‘acceptable face’ 
of the movement, the nature of EDL protest has often been far removed from the 
apparently liberal tolerance espoused on this site. The group has repeatedly 
stressed it is not opposed to all Muslims, only ‘extremists’, yet studies of 
demonstrations indicate that supporters have little grasp of any difference 
between the two. It will be shown that official EDL discourse represents all 
Muslims as suspiciously dangerous to British people and ‘values’.  At street level, 
however, this distinction has disappeared, with protest chants including: ‘I hate 
Pakis more than you,’287 ‘Give me a gun and I will shoot the Muzzie scum,’288 and 
‘Allah, Allah, who the fuck is Allah?’289 Demonstrations have often descended into 
violence as EDL supporters have broken through police lines to assault local 
Asians, confront counter-protesters, and attack Asian businesses and property.290 
Jon Garland and James Treadwell, who have undertaken important covert 
ethnographic work at EDL demonstrations, have highlighted that supporters 
espouse a much more traditional racism than the group’s leadership would be 
willing to admit, particularly against young Muslim males who are seen as fair 
targets for violent aggression.291  
    Because of the amorphous structure and lack of formal membership, studies 
into the demographic profile and ideological motivations of EDL supporters have 
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proven difficult. The only such study to date estimated that the EDL had 
approximately 25,000 to 35,000 active supporters, concentrated around the 
London area, with a higher proportion of male (81%) to female (19%) members, 
and an older and more educated profile than perhaps would be expected, with 
28% of supporters over the age of thirty and 30% holding a university or college 
degree. The primary reasons cited for joining and demonstrating with the EDL 
were opposition to Islam or Islamism and a desire to preserve national and 
cultural values.292 
    The tactics and discourse of EDL demonstrations, as well supporters’ 
comments on its social networking sites, have led to difficulties in conceptualising 
the movement. As noted, protests have often involved racist chanting and hate 
speech, yet the EDL’s online articles consistently advocate anti-racism. The liberal 
tropes that infuse EDL discourse, as well as its efforts to recruit ethnic and sexual 
minorities, are apparently incongruous with claims that the group is simply racist. 
This paradox has implications for considering the group a far right organisation. 
Several scholars have noted that contemporary extreme right parties have sought 
to cast off their thuggish image and appeal more to the electorate by careful 
avoidance of overtly racist language.293 Is the EDL merely a new manifestation of 
this phenomenon? A brief comparison with Britain’s most successful far right 
party, the British National Party (BNP), serves to illustrate that although 
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similarities exist, there are important differences which make the identification of 
the EDL as a far-right movement problematic.  
 
The BNP and the EDL 
While BNP and EDL ideology share surface level resemblances, these should not 
be overstated. Both groups focus on Islam as a central danger threatening 
Britain, but for the former Muslims are merely a particular symptom of the wider 
problem of immigration and multiculturalism. Muslims are considered racial 
‘others’ by the BNP, lacking the white Anglo-Saxon ‘liberal gene’ that genetically 
predisposes the British to liberal democratic culture.294 This focus on Muslims as 
biologically not-British is illustrated by the party’s representation of the 2005 
London bombings as ‘…genocidal race attacks by immigrant Islamic Fascists 
against White Christian British people….’295 Similarly, the BNP’s proposed solution 
to the problem of Islamist terrorism (closure of borders, an end to immigration, a 
programme of expulsion and abolishment of multiculturalism)296 exemplify its 
preoccupation with racial purity. It is true that the increased hardening of public 
attitudes towards Muslims has provided a platform of populist legitimacy on 
which the BNP has argued for its racist policies, but it is precisely this focus on 
race that distances it from the EDL. 
    In contrast, the EDL disavows crude biological determinism, and uses a more 
sophisticated discourse of culture to mark out Islam out as a sociological, rather 
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than a biological, impediment to assimilation. The movement rejects the BNP’s 
conflation of Muslims, immigrants and non-whites, and does not concern itself 
with multiculturalism in general. In EDL discourse Muslims are sharply 
distinguished from other immigrant communities in the UK, which are looked 
upon favourably in comparison. In distinction to the BNP’s repatriation policies, 
EDL solutions centre on presenting the ‘real facts’ about Islam to the public and 
the demand that Muslims reform their religion. It should also be noted that a 
strong vein of anti-Semitism runs through the contemporary BNP.297 Manifested 
in claims of media control and the attribution of multiculturalism to a Jewish 
conspiracy, this ideological pillar of the far right is certainly not shared by the 
EDL. With its firm support of Israel, the existence of a Jewish division within its 
ranks and its regular denouncement of anti-Semitism, the EDL cannot be said to 
subscribe to such conspiracy theories, at least regarding Jews.  
    In addition, ideological differences have been noted by both groups. Until 
recently BNP members were proscribed from attending EDL demonstrations or 
making links with the group,298 and when Tommy Robinson announced his 
defection from the EDL in October 2013, he claimed that the proliferation of far-
right activity within the group had led to him spending ‘too much time keeping 
goose stepping white pride morons’ away from demonstrations.299  As Joel 
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Busher has argued, being anti-racist is an important element of identity 
construction for EDL activists,300 and the consistent rejection of BNP advances 
are a point of pride for the movement.301 Although there are reasons to be 
cautious about future directions, particularly with regard to the type of supporter 
it potentially attracts and the malleability of the group’s ideology, at this point in 
its history there are clearly marked and profound differences between the EDL 
and the established far right. The English Defence League does not biologically 
racialize the threat from Islam or blame multiculturalism and immigration for the 
‘Muslim problem’ it perceives, and the ends sought are far removed from the 
repatriation policies advocated by the BNP. 
    One reason the EDL has been categorised within the far right is that previous 
studies have concentrated predominantly on the attitudes and ideology of 
supporters. These have included examinations of the nature and threat of EDL 
protest,302 studies highlighting the demographic profile of self-identified 
members,303 and ethnographic studies which have investigated the discourse and 
ideology of EDL supporters.304 While there is demonstrable need for more work 
on this topic, this chapter is not concerned with the attitudes of supporters, and 
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focuses instead on what may be termed the official ideology of the English 
Defence League.   
    There are significant differences between the EDL’s stated ideology and the 
concerns of those who claim ideological affinity with the group. Previous studies 
have suggested that anti-Islam prejudice accounts for only one part of 
supporters’ concerns.305 Matthew Goodwin, for example, found that those who 
agreed with the ideals and/or methods of the EDL were more likely to be 
authoritarian and xenophobic, and held more negative attitudes towards 
immigration and ethnic minority groups.306 In contrast, it is striking the extent to 
which the issue of immigration is ignored by the EDL in its official material. Only 
two of 117 EDL News articles discussed immigration, and neither politicised the 
issue, stating only that the government’s approach had been ‘seriously flawed,’307 
but: ‘Just because the government has been far too focused on the advantages 
of immigration (without consideration of the possible problems), is no reason to 
forget the advantages altogether.’308 Indeed, in contrast to the generalised 
xenophobia and opposition to immigration espoused by supporters, some articles 
specifically argued against this, stating the benefits of immigration to Britain309  
and emphasising positive aspects of cultural diversity.310 In the pages of EDL 
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News, immigration and multiculturalism are not in themselves problematic: ‘… it 
is not multiculturalism, but Islam, that has failed.’311 While supporters may hold 
generalised anti-immigration prejudice, official EDL discourse either ignores or 
specifically argues against this.  
    It is important, therefore, to emphasise ideological variance between the 
movement and its supporters. The group operates as an umbrella organisation 
for anyone who wishes to demonstrate against ‘Islamic extremism’, and those 
who protest under its banner will surely have additional anxieties. The EDL itself, 
however, quite consciously shuns wider issues to focus exclusively on Islam. To 
some extent, these differences afford the group an element of plausible 
deniability against charges of racism, Islamophobia and extremism. The fact that 
the EDL has no formal structure of membership and exists as an organisation to 
which people are affiliated (and can therefore become dis-affiliated) is 
advantageous, since those using overtly racist language at protests or on its 
social networking sites can be dismissed as outside agitators; since the EDL is 
avowedly anti-racist why would racists want to join its protests?312 This rhetorical 
question underlines the need to analyse the official discourse of the group. Why, 
indeed, are those with the attitudes described by Goodwin attracted to the EDL? 
    Since the EDL claims to have no interest in electoral politics it does not 
produce pamphlets explaining its purpose and goals. In the absence of such 
platforms, the only texts which elucidate the group’s official ideology are the 
articles which make up the EDL News section of the website 
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englishdefenceleague.org. These represent an effort to justify demonstrations, 
deflect negative media attention, explain the EDL’s concern with ‘radical Islam’, 
and rally supporters to its cause. Links to these articles are provided on the 
group’s Facebook and Twitter pages, and consequently every online follower 
receives regular exposure to this material on their social network newsfeed. As 
the EDL’s internet popularity soars,313 an analysis of its ideological representation 
of Muslims is crucial. 
 
The discourse of EDL News 
EDL News contains articles and commentary, as well as information for 
forthcoming demonstrations and campaigns. As of 29 February 2012 there were 
a total of 117 publicly available articles, 86 of which discussed Muslims and/or 
Islam and formed the corpus for further analysis. These articles were subjected 
to predicate analysis, which focused on the ideational collocates of the nouns 
‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ in order to determine central narratives, frames and 
themes.314 This step identified three consistently recurring narratives. First, 
Muslims were seen as uniquely problematic, posing a distinctive threat to British 
people and to ‘British values’. Second, the problems caused by Muslims were 
thought to be traceable to Islam itself: through scripture, the example of the 
Prophet and ‘Islamic ideology’. Finally, Muslims were held collectively responsible, 
for both the actions of their co-religionists and the reform of Islam. By failing to 
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speak out against fellow Muslims and root out problematic individuals within their 
communities, the EDL claimed that Muslims had abandoned their responsibilities 
and must therefore be coerced into reform. 
    These narratives appeared consistently, regardless of which topic a particular 
article focused on, suggesting that they form the core of EDL ideological 
representation of Muslims. The final part of the analysis followed a critical 
methodology,315 where each narrative was subjected to a first order critique, in 
order to identify contradictions, myths and misrepresentations, and a second 
order critique, which considered the ideological effects of EDL discourse, through 
a comparison of rhetorical strategies with those identified as typical of racist 
discourse construction. 
    Taking each narrative in turn, the chapter proceeds by identifying how 
Muslims were problematized by the EDL and critically examining these claims, 
before moving on to consider the rhetorical strategies employed and demonstrate 
how EDL discourse functioned ideologically as a form of racial discourse. 
 
Narrating Islamophobia: Central themes of EDL representation of 
Muslims and Islam 
Muslims as uniquely problematic 
The EDL presented Muslims as a unique and exclusive threat to Britain. In 
addition to the recycling of negative topics across the articles (extremism, 
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terrorism, etc.), within-text repetition of Muslim deviance served to indicate the 
conviction that society’s problems could be laid at Islam’s door:   
The biggest threat to British Muslims isn’t ‘Islamophobia’, it’s the extremism 
that thrives [with]in the Muslim community – the embrace of violent and 
anti-democratic means, the intolerance, the separatism, the attacks on 
homosexuals and Jews, the hatred of ‘the West’, and the continued hosting 
of radical preachers.316  
… [the] problems associated with the Muslim Community are [not] just 
down to a few bearded lunatics. If we’re to put an end to “home-grown” 
terrorism, so-called “honour-killings”, child grooming (which, sadly, is 
dominated by Muslim men), the preaching of extremism on our streets and 
in British Mosques, and all of the other problems that stem from the Muslim 
Community, then we can’t be afraid to make serious and considered 
criticisms.317. 
    These repeated lists of negative behaviour were presented as the exclusive 
reserve of Muslims. The most common activities highlighted were extremism and 
terrorism; however Muslims were also associated with violence more broadly. 
Two cases in particular serve to highlight how local incidents were used by the 
group to further their agenda: the case of Rhea Page, who was attacked in 
Leicester by a group of Somali women in June 2010; and the assault of Daniel 
Stringer-Prince in February 2012 by a group of Asian youths in Hyde, Greater 
Manchester. In response to these incidents the EDL organised demonstrations 
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against ‘Islamic extremism’ in both Leicester and Hyde (in the latter case against 
the family’s wishes). EDL News justification of the demonstrations, as well as 
speeches made at the rallies, explicitly connected Islam to the violence, despite 
there being no demonstrable link in either case between the religious background 
of the offenders and the attacks: 
Islamic extremism is barely out of the news, and neither is the self-imposed 
segregation of the Muslim community, or the intolerance and religious 
supremacism that, unfortunately, so often goes with it. In this context, isn’t 
it reasonable to ask whether Daniel was likely to have been attacked not 
because of his skin colour, but because he was non-Muslim?318 
In the Stringer-Prince case the religious background of the assailants was not 
clear,319 and though the Rhea Page case was complicated by the possibility that it 
was racially aggravated (the attackers shouted ‘white bitch’ as they assaulted 
her320), that she had been targeted as a non-Muslim was never suggested by 
police or the prosecution. In justifying their demonstration against the ‘two tier’ 
justice system that had handed suspended sentences to Page’s attackers, 
reportedly because they were Somali Muslims not used to drinking alcohol, the 
EDL nevertheless suggested that, given the supremacist beliefs of Muslims, Page 
may have been targeted as a non-believer: 
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Somali Muslims might not be used to alcohol, but if they’re members of the 
religion of peace, then surely they should be uniquely placed to know that 
violence is wrong? Or is it not too bad when it’s aimed at the non-
believers?321  
These incidents demonstrate the contentious nature of the ‘facts’ employed by 
the EDL, and show how tenuous associations between the supposed background 
of the attackers and their violent behaviour were made on the basis of 
assumptions. 
    The EDL used the example of other minorities to illustrate the uniquely 
problematic nature of Muslims, claiming that the former had integrated within the 
national community without difficulty. By stressing the ‘seamless integration’ of 
other minorities, the EDL emphasised the unique challenges posed by Muslims 
whilst simultaneously neutralising possible objections that racist attitudes had 
hampered Muslim integration:  
… there have never been any problems with Sikh integration in this 
country… Sikhs have shown an impressive willingness to integrate, to 
accept the laws of the land, and to confront and defeat any form of 
extremism.322  
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There are no Buddhist suicide bombers. There are no Christian suicide 
bombers. There are no Jain suicide bombers. There are only Islamic suicide 
bombers. Murderous jihadists exist wherever there are Muslims…323 
    This narrative is deeply ideological, and disregards the long history of 
struggle in which minority communities have engaged to have their cultures 
and customs recognised. The suggestion that Sikhs had been unconditionally 
accepted by British society overlooked the protracted struggle to be allowed to 
carry the kirpan (ceremonial dagger), as well as the turban disputes at work 
(and for motorcyclists), both of which resulted in national debates about Sikh’s 
ability to integrate.324 The threat to social cohesion and national identity posed 
by black communities has also been a recurring theme of national debate,325 
and such ideas still hold currency today, as demonstrated by the discussions 
around the 2011 English riots, which singled out ‘black culture’ as a major 
contributory factor.326 The fact that these debates are far from settled in the 
21st century illustrates the EDL’s deliberate distortion of history, both of 
minority communities and their acceptance into the national community.  
    Having identified the major problems in British society as stemming from one 
particular ‘community’, the explanation for such behaviour was situated in the 
shared ‘ideology’ that was believed to inspire it. Islam was identified by the EDL 
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as the crucial causal factor that provided Muslims with motive and justification for 
their behaviour. 
 
The problematic nature of ‘Islamic ideology’ 
The EDL explained perceived Muslim over-representation in anti-social behaviour 
by referring to Islamic teaching. Scripture was believed to sanction such 
activities, and this was illustrated with selective and de-contextualised passages 
from the Qur’an.  Islam was regarded as the rationale for all Muslim action, and 
thus the source of the problems identified. Considered intrinsically Muslim 
problems, extremism and terrorism were represented as embedded within the 
religion:  
The primary cause [of terrorism] is right in front of us. It’s simple. It’s what 
Islamic terrorists and Islamists have in common. That’s right, it begins with 
an I.327  
The suicide bombers are always described as being good or devout 
Muslims. Hey, you think Islam itself could be a problem?328  
    The influence that Islamic teaching had on other criminal activities was also 
highlighted, and in this context the EDL’s analysis of the Rochdale and West 
Midlands child-grooming scandals merits close attention. The group claimed that 
Muslims were over-represented in these crimes, and argued that the sexual 
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exploitation of young (white) girls could be traced to Islamic scripture, which 
promoted the inferiority of non-Muslims and thus made them acceptable targets:  
… many Muslim men see little wrong with applying the example of the 
prophet (sex with young children) to those who they regard as “dirty kuffar” 
(non-Muslims, not worthy of the same rights as Muslims under the Sharia - 
Islamic Law).329   
Tommy [Robinson] singled out the example of the prophet Mohammed as 
particularly worthy of criticism. Here was a man whose history is hotly 
contested, but who Islamic scripture itself describes as a murderer and 
rapist who had sexual intercourse with a girl of 9 (or younger according to 
some sources). And yet Muslims are still taught that their prophet set a 
perfect example for them to follow.330 
The group’s assertion that these were Muslim crimes was based on the Pakistani 
heritage of the majority of the perpetrators. The extent to which the men 
involved were practising Muslims is unknown, and any notion that ‘Islamic 
supremacism’ may have fuelled their activities was not reported. Nevertheless, as 
with the cases of Rhea Page and Daniel Stringer-Prince, the EDL were confident 
enough to demonstrate outside court at both hearings in order to protest the 
‘Islamic extremism’ they claimed had resulted in these crimes. The idea that 
members of ‘Muslim child grooming’ gangs were ‘Islamic extremists’ stretched 
the term beyond recognition. Men who plied young girls with alcohol and 
exploited them for sexual gratification were clearly not following any 
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interpretation of the Qur’an, extreme or otherwise, and sexual offences can 
hardly be deemed a ‘Muslim’ problem. The fact that 85% of sex offenders in the 
UK are white men331 has not led the EDL to deeply question the ideological 
foundations upon which masculinity is constructed, yet the assumed Muslim 
background of the perpetrators in these cases was focused upon as if it had 
explanatory value.  
    Muslims’ supposed self-segregation was also represented by the EDL as 
traceable to Islamic teaching, which was deemed to undermine the ties of 
national identity. These culturally conditioned anti-integration tendencies were 
believed to not only preclude peaceful co-existence, but were also presented as 
exemplary of a general, scripturally sanctioned desire to colonize all social 
spaces:  
… [within Islam] an ideology has developed that believes that there can be no 
loyalty to anyone or anything other than Islam…332   
… a picture emerges of an ideology that is commanded not to integrate with 
others. It’s an ideology whose followers are commanded to wage war. 
Whether it’s physical, cultural, economic, social or political warfare, it’s 
incumbent upon all Muslims to follow the example of Mohammad.333   
    Islam itself, devoid of distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘radical’ practitioners, 
was clearly considered by the EDL to be the problem. All Muslims were therefore 
seen as potentially prone to such behaviour. The understanding that scripture 
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provided the rationale for Muslim criminality endorsed the conviction that Islam 
was inherently dangerous to British society. As a consequence every Muslim, 
indeed every person with a Muslim background or name, was considered 
suspicious and (potentially) guilty by association. Accordingly, nothing less than 
total reform of Islam was demanded.  
 
Muslims as responsible for reforming their religion 
The EDL stressed that all Muslims shared responsibility for the ills they identified, 
and therefore must make efforts not only to root out those engaged in such 
behaviours but also to make Islam more acceptable through reform. Because 
such efforts (if they had been made at all) were considered to have failed, the 
EDL contended that Muslims had shown themselves unwilling to make the 
changes demanded of them, and their commitment to ‘British values’ was 
questioned. Muslims were deemed to have wilfully ignored thriving extremism in 
their midst, complaining about discrimination and those who insulted Islam rather 
than addressing the Islamic root of such behaviour and making efforts to prevent 
radicalisation:  
 Islamic extremism is an Islamic problem, and the Muslim community needs 
to get its house in order.334 
… [it is] Islam that has a problem with extremism. And this should entail 
certain responsibilities. It should mean that there is a clear need for 
reform.335  
                                                            
334 EDL, “Tommy Robinson Vs. Weyman Bennett,” EDL News, 26 October, 2011, 
http://englishdefenceleague.org/edl-news-2/158-tommy-robinson-vs-weyman-bennett [Retrieved 
1 March 2012]. 
173 
 
For the EDL, Muslims had failed to stem the tide of negative behaviour within 
their communities because they did not see the need, or have the will, to take 
action. The group claimed that Muslims were shirking their responsibilities and 
attempting to deflect attention from their failures by remonstrating about 
discrimination instead of tackling difficult issues:  
WAKE UP CALL – Muslims, it is up to YOU to sort out these problems... You 
cannot moan about being treated with suspicion when you do nothing to 
deal with those extremists within your communities.336  
Muslim community leaders often appear not to have noticed any Islamic 
extremism at all. They consistently refuse to accept any portion of 
blame…337  
The willingness of Muslims to protest when Islam was offended was compared 
with the ‘silence’ when ‘British liberal values’ were contravened. The EDL again 
highlighted Islam’s distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim as the basis for 
this perceived double standard: 
… the Muslim community often seems unwilling to make the effort to 
seriously combat the extremism within its midst. Cartoonist draws 
Mohammed - angry Muslims on the street. Muslims kill innocent people in 
the name of Islam - relative silence.338 
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Did we see Muslims worldwide protesting against those actions [9/11 and 
7/7], or celebrating them? Those friendly neighbourhood Muslims we all 
know did nothing, because they will never condemn a Muslim “brother”, yet 
another teaching from the Koran.339 
The allegation that Muslim leaders had failed to undermine extremist ideas 
from an Islamic perspective was considered evidence that Muslims were 
evading their responsibilities and, through their silence, providing implicit 
support for such ideas.  
    The contention that Muslims had not addressed these issues deliberately 
disregarded the myriad voices that have condemned violence and terrorism 
over the past decade. To mention just a few: Pakistani religious scholar Dr 
Tahir il-Qadri, who, in March 2010, issued a 600 page fatwa against terrorism 
and extremism, rebutting every Islamic justification used by al-Qaeda;340 the 
Minhaj-ul-Quran International peace conference at Wembley arena, organised 
to mark the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, which had an attendance of 
12,000 and included a range of Muslim speakers who all unequivocally 
denounced terrorism;341 the ‘jihad against violence’ campaign by British 
Muslim women’s group Inspire which aimed to ideologically and practically 
combat violence (particularly against women) justified in the name of Islam;342 
and the Muslim Council of Britain’s repeated condemnations of Islam inspired 
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terrorism.343 These few examples illustrate that diverse Muslim organisations 
have recognised the need to tackle extremist ideas, and were willing to take 
on the challenge. The EDL’s insistence that Islam was the source of extremism 
and violence rendered these voices meaningless.  
    The perception that Muslims had failed to confront extremism led the EDL to 
suggest that a pool of support for ‘extremist’ ideas must exist:  
We’re always told that this silent majority reject extremism, but if that is the 
case then why are they so silent? We can think of three possible reasons: 
either they do not really reject extremism, they are terrified of speaking out 
against the radicals, or they do not feel any need to press for reform. 344 
The group considered Muslim rejection of extremism disingenuous, and implied 
this was due to insincerity and lack of will. Pointing to ‘Islamic extremist’ groups 
such as al-Muhajiroun, the EDL claimed that if Muslims were serious about 
eradicating extremism such groups would not exist. The actions of Ahlus Sunnah 
wal Jammah at the Royal Anglian Regiment homecoming parade was used to 
support this contention, and portrayed as exemplary of thriving extremism and 
evidence that Muslim words were empty. Yet the EDL’s analysis of this incident, 
in its assumption that these actions were religiously motivated, discounted the 
intrinsically political nature of the act. Ahlus Sunnah wal Jammah may have 
protested as an Islamic group, using religious language and symbolism in their 
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demonstration, but the protest was essentially political. The religious discourse of 
the protesters was incidental to their central message; opposition to the Iraq war 
and the actions there of British soldiers and the British government. 
    The conviction that ‘extremism’ was thriving, along with the belief that Muslim 
pledges to fight it were insincere, led to the conclusion that there must be 
widespread support for such ideas within Muslim communities. The EDL chose to 
accept the rhetoric of ‘extremist’ groups as representative; concluding that if such 
groups could religiously justify their claims there must be a large number of less 
vocal Muslims with the same ideas. By blaming Muslims for the ills identified, the 
group’s assertion that Islam must be reformed, through coercion if necessary, 
had a semblance of legitimacy. 
    The themes identified above form the spine of the EDL’s official ideological 
position, which professed to identify problematic elements in British society 
(Muslims), isolated the root and source of these problems (primarily Islam, but 
also Muslims’ unwillingness to reform), and proposed possible solutions (pressure 
on Muslims). The adaptability of such an ideology to a wide range of situations is 
evident, and the EDL has used this to justify its own existence as well as the 
numerous protests and campaigns it has organised. However, it is equally 
apparent that the facts upon which these narratives are based are highly 
contestable. As the above critique has demonstrated, EDL ideology relies heavily 
upon distortion and the recycling of myths to explain the problems that the group 
associates with Muslims.  
    However, it is important to note that Islamophobia exists as a functional 
ideology beyond its explanatory purpose: on one hand it attempts to explain who 
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is responsible for any given problem; on the other, this representation of Muslims 
serves to delineate the contours of British identity. The following section 
considers how rhetorical strategies within EDL discourse shaped shared mental 
representations of Muslims as an existential threat to British identity, whilst 
simultaneously bolstering ‘British values’ and the EDL’s claim to them. 
 
The ideological effects of EDL discourse 
The English Defence League not only put forward the case that Muslims and 
Islam were to blame for the various problems identified, but also used a range of 
rhetorical strategies to construct two opposing subjects: ‘British’ and ‘Muslim’. 
These supposedly irreconcilable identities were then used by the group to contain 
challenges to the traditional ethno-cultural dominance of non-Muslims over 
Muslims. The discussion that follows delineates these strategies in order to 
demonstrate how the EDL presented Muslims as intrinsically and inescapably not-
British, and in doing so were able to represent British identity and values as 
superior.  
    EDL discourse repeatedly employed positive-self and negative-other 
representation to show that deviant Muslims were breaking well established 
British norms. This was evident not only from the extensive negative topics 
across the texts, but also within-text rhetorical strategies. An important part of 
this strategy is the denial of prejudice,345 and the EDL achieved this by marking a 
distinction between ‘ordinary Muslims’ and ‘Islamic extremists’ and claiming to 
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oppose only the latter. That this distinction continually broke down, as the group 
identified Muslim culture and Islamic scripture as the source of all problems, did 
not reduce the efficacy of the strategy.  By claiming to have no problem with 
ordinary Muslims, the EDL could discursively operate in a territory of apparently 
legitimate concerns. 
   In their positive self-representation the EDL laid claim to British tolerance and 
convivial values. The integration of other minority groups was represented as an 
account of British acceptance and hospitality, which simultaneously portrayed 
Muslims as rejecting integration and testing the boundaries of acceptability with 
their persistent demands. The EDL’s commitment to liberalism functioned in 
much the same way. Through its claim to welcome all races, faiths, and political 
persuasions, including ‘moderate’ Muslims, the group presented itself as 
embodying British liberal values. Muslims who rejected the EDL could therefore 
be dismissed as ‘extremist’, since rejecting the group was a rejection of the 
values it claimed to embody. 
    The claim that Muslims were making unreasonable demands that exceeded 
the cultural tolerance of British society further emphasised this positive-
self/negative-other representation. This rhetorical strategy is linked to the power 
relations of racist discourse,346 where the majority group considers itself at liberty 
to decide whether demands are reasonable or unreasonable and marks the limits 
of tolerance in order to determine whether the out-group has transgressed the 
boundaries of social acceptability. This found expression in the discourse of the 
EDL’s campaigns against mosques, which implicitly drew upon the notion that the 
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dominant (non-Muslim) group was entitled to decide the number of ‘necessary’ 
mosques and the range of views that were allowed to be expressed within them. 
The EDL’s belief that, as part of the majority group, it had the right to police and 
challenge Muslim behaviour reflected its desire to preserve the traditional ethno-
cultural dominance of British society against Muslim demands for religious 
recognition. 
    Projection strategies were used to assert that Muslims had a superiority 
complex, with almost a fifth of the articles discussing ‘Islamic supremacism’. This 
projection of cultural racism onto Muslims represented them as violating 
established egalitarian norms, whilst simultaneously casting non-Muslims as 
victims. The discourse of white victimhood has been highlighted by scholars of 
contemporary racial ideology,347 who note that those espousing this discourse 
share an ideological world in which equality legislation has erased discrimination. 
Claims by minorities that they are victims of discrimination are thus met with 
scepticism and viewed as attempts to use their race to gain advantages (‘playing 
the race card’).  
    The EDL’s assertion of the inherently supremacist nature of Islam meant that 
Muslim actions were considered expressions of this supremacism. Mosques were 
thus deemed symbolic of Muslim desires to dominate, increasingly available halal 
meat was seen as evidence of the ‘creeping Islamification’ of Britain, and Muslim 
political participation was viewed with deep suspicion as entrism and an attempt 
to expand the reach of Islam within the British political system. Muslims were 
believed to be culturally colonising the UK, and the EDL claimed that non-Muslims 
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were, and would increasingly be, disadvantaged and victimised as a result. This 
projection of supremacist motivation thus formed the basis for EDL counter-
mobilisation against Muslim demands, ideologically formulated as a fight for 
equal treatment.348  
    A further strategy was the presentation of views as reflecting external reality 
rather than internal psychology. Racist discourse entails an outlook in which 
negative perceptions of minorities are articulated not as irrational fears, but as 
factually grounded in the out-group’s transgression of norms.349 Islamophobia 
works in much the same way. The EDL’s preoccupation with Muslims was 
explained as a natural reaction to their negative behaviour, a consequence of 
living in proximity that politicians and the ‘liberal elite’, whose lives were far 
removed from the ‘Islamic ghettoes’, could not possibly understand. The English 
Defence League constantly referred to itself as a symptom of ‘Islamic extremism’, 
and stated that if the government could be trusted to tackle it there would be no 
need for the EDL. The contention that the EDL is merely the consequence of 
unacceptable Muslim behaviour is an ideological claim which naturalises 
Islamophobia as a reasonable reaction, rather than a prejudicial ideology, and 
effectively blames Muslims for anti-Muslim sentiment. 
    ‘Denials’ (‘I’m not racist but…’) function in racist discourse to present a 
positive self-image of tolerance and reasonableness.350 The EDL employed this 
rhetorical strategy in its refutation of Islamophobia, ridiculing and dismissing it as 
the paranoid fantasies of Muslims, who should be directing their energies towards 
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rooting out extremists. Islamophobia, conceptualised as an irrational fear, was 
believed to be nonsensical and the group insisted that no one in the EDL had a 
‘mental illness’ that would prejudice them against Muslims.351 This reduction of 
Islamophobia to individual prejudice served to deflect accusations of bigotry, 
however, as the discourse and narratives employed by the EDL demonstrate, 
Islamophobia is much more than this. Far from being merely a negative 
assessment of Islam and a fear of individual Muslims, it is cultural racism: an 
ideological discourse that demarcates an in-group and an out-group and presents 
the former as superior and its privilege endangered.  
    Etienne Balibar has argued that culture may have replaced biology in new 
racism but, predicated on a fear of the ‘other’ and giving rise to an identical 
denial of rights, the ideological underpinnings remain the same.352 The EDL 
constantly represented culture as a bounded and naturalised sociological 
signifier, and characterised Muslims as the bearers of an innate and opposing 
Islamic culture which could not be absorbed into Britain unless Islam was entirely 
reformed. The assumption that integration must be one-way and on the terms of 
the dominant group was implicitly an expression of the superiority of ‘British 
culture’, and the constant refrain that Muslims held unacceptable and 
inassimilable values contained a denial of the right to challenge ‘traditional 
values’ as British citizens. While the EDL instrumentalised ‘British values’ for 
decidedly illiberal ends in order to vehemently criticise Islam, the reverse would 
be unthinkable. Muslims were constrained by the discourse to such an extent that 
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any conception of the social good expressed in religious terms would be 
considered exemplary of latent extremism. 
    The deeply ideological nature of EDL discursive representation of Muslims 
supports the conceptualisation of Islamophobia as cultural racism, working on 
one hand to preserve traditional ethno-cultural dominance and privilege, and on 
the other to contain challenges to this dominance, believed to stem primarily 
from Muslim communities. The representation of Muslims by the EDL reproduced 
and sustained the cultural dominance of non-Muslims over Muslims based on a 
set of ‘British values’ that the latter were thought to violate, and the right of the 
bearers of these values to decide the boundaries of tolerance and police the 
behaviour of others.  
    While there have been few studies of the EDL at this early stage of its 
development, those available have highlighted the pessimism of its supporters, 
their view that England is entering a period of decline, and the belief that white 
working class men (of which the EDL is predominately composed) are being 
disadvantaged in comparison to other groups.353 The attraction of a discourse 
that identifies Muslims as responsible for perceived social decay is not surprising 
if supporters feel that the traditional power and sense of superiority of white 
communities is dissipating in the face of the demands of other groups. EDL street 
protest has the psychological benefit of alleviating feelings of inferiority and 
marginalisation through a performative masculinity that involves a show of 
strength and solidarity and the possibility of violent confrontation as a way to 
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work out problems.354 In this sense the group performs an important function as 
a means of expressing discontent, erasing its supporters’ feelings of despair and 
transforming them from passive into active subjects. The EDL thus affirms a 
certain kind of white working class identity, and demands that it be recognised 
and acknowledged as an heir to the historical privileges of the dominant (white) 
group. 
    The analysis of Islamophobia as an affective prejudice (a fear of Islam or 
Muslims) has led to difficulties of conceptualisation that the EDL have gleefully 
exploited in their dismissal of the term as nonsense. Yet, if we retreat from the 
notion that Islamophobia is an individual negative attitude, and instead consider 
it a shared social narrative, its ideological usefulness becomes more apparent. 
Islamophobia has currency enough to motivate thousands to take to the streets, 
and tens of thousands to claim some affinity to the EDL because, like all racial 
discourse, it has ideological value. In its explanation of social problems as 
resulting from cultural deviance, Islamophobia not only identifies Muslims as 
problematic, but also relieves the rest of society of responsibility. The EDL’s 
constant chastisement of Muslims, whether for their lack of will or success in 
tackling extremism, or their failure to see that it is their problem, reflects the 
group’s belief that the rest of British society bears no responsibility. Islamophobia 
has ideological appeal precisely because it finds non-Muslim Britons blameless. 
 
Conclusion 
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In April 2011, Adrian Tudway, the Metropolitan Police’s National Co-ordinator for 
Domestic Extremism, sent an email to the National Association of Muslim Police, 
stating:  
… [the EDL] are not extreme right wing as a group. Indeed if you look at 
their published material on their web-site, they are actively moving away 
from the right and violence with their mission statement etc… I really think 
you need to open a direct line of dialogue with them, that might be the best 
way to engage them…355  
Tudway’s comments  suggest either that he has taken the EDL’s claims at face 
value, or that he subscribes to some extent to the ‘problematic Muslims’ 
discourse. It is difficult to imagine these comments addressed to any other group 
in society; they are only acceptable because there is some social currency to 
understanding Muslims as problematic and the ‘Muslim community’ as responsible 
for changing anti-Islam views. To underscore this point, it is worth considering 
whether an Islamist website, which drew constant attention to the criminal 
deviance of non-Muslim Britons, explained this behaviour through inferior British 
values, and organised thousand-strong demonstrations throughout the country 
which regularly resulted in non-Muslims being targeted with violence and 
intimidation, would be considered ‘extremist’. It is equally absurd to imagine that 
Jews would be advised by the National Co-ordinator to engage with an openly 
anti-Semitic group that was, nonetheless, ‘moving away’ from violence.  
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    This chapter has argued that the English Defence League’s Islamophobia is a 
culturally racist discourse. Racist discourse construction involves the demarcation 
of an in-group and an out-group, where the former considers itself superior and 
claims the right to decide who can belong, while the latter is represented as 
threatening its privileges and position.  EDL discourse performed this function by 
racialising Muslim culture as the source of Muslim behaviour and conferring the 
role of arbiters of acceptability to culturally superior non-Muslims. The group 
utilised rhetorical strategies such as denial of prejudice, projection of culturally 
racist motivations on to Muslims, positive-self and negative-other representation, 
and diminutives such as ‘we are not against all Muslims, but...’ These strategies 
worked to construct Islam as oppositional to British values and identity and 
contained an implicit assumption of the latter’s superiority.  The EDL’s claim that 
it only opposed ‘radical Islam’ dissolved into a discourse that laid the blame for 
the problems of society at Islam’s door and made aggressive demands that the 
religion be reformed to be more acceptable. Whether the EDL’s leadership 
sincerely believed itself not to be Islamophobic is a moot point. But knowingly or 
otherwise it employed a discourse which stratified British society hierarchically, 
constructed opposing subject positions for Muslims and non-Muslims, and 
endeavoured to protect the privileges of (traditionally white) non-Muslim British 
people against real and imagined demands for Muslim recognition.  
    Adrian Tudway’s assessment that Muslims should consider engaging with the 
EDL indicates a broader problem. The group’s analysis of Muslims and Islam is 
not considered extremist precisely because it is not particularly ‘extreme’ to hold 
such views - they are articulated every day in newspapers, by government 
ministers and by think-tank intellectuals who all converge around the same 
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theme: that Muslims in Britain are dangerous. In such a climate the soaring 
popularity of the group and the dramatic spike in Islamophobic hate crimes 
following high profile instances of terrorism356 should come as no surprise.  
    The English Defence League are indeed a symptom; not, as they claim, of 
‘Islamic extremism’, but of the increasingly socially acceptable discourse of 
‘problematic Muslims’. The challenge posed by the group is therefore not simply 
to quell its violence or confront the more caustic elements of its protests. Rather, 
it requires deep reflection and confrontation of the entrenched societal 
Islamophobia that makes such a movement possible.  
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Chapter Six – Islamophobia and national identity construction in 
Europe 
 
Introduction 
On 22 July 2011 a car bomb was detonated outside government buildings in the 
Norwegian capital of Oslo, resulting in eight deaths. Within an hour the 
Observer’s foreign affairs editor, Peter Beaumont, had declared that the 
explosion was most likely the work of a ‘Jihadist’ group, and posited that Norway 
had been targeted because of its involvement in the war on Afghanistan, its 
reprinting of controversial Danish cartoons, and the filing of terror charges 
against an Iraqi born cleric who had threatened politicians with death if he was 
deported from the country.357 A few hours later, reports about further 
developments began to emerge. A man dressed in police uniform had opened fire 
on young people attending a Labour Party youth camp on the island of Utøya. 
Sixty-nine youths were killed on the island before police apprehended Anders 
Behring Breivik, a 32 year old ethnic Norwegian.  
    In his 1,500 page manifesto, entitled 2083: A European Declaration of 
Independence, Breivik explained that his motivation had been the desire to spark 
a revolution against the Islamicisation of the continent.  Political correctness, 
‘cultural Marxism’, radical feminism, and the EU’s deliberate attempt to Islamise 
Europe, were all implicated in what he perceived as the cultural treason against 
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Europe’s essence. For Breivik, Islam was quietly colonising Europe with the 
support of multiculturalist politicians and he considered himself a warrior whose 
duty was to defend Western Europe against this onslaught: “You cannot defeat 
Islamisation or halt/reverse the Islamic colonization of Western Europe without 
first removing the political doctrines manifested through multiculturalism/cultural 
Marxism…”358  
    Breivik’s actions were universally condemned by European governments and 
commentators, yet the ideology that spurred him to action finds support across 
the continent, in both national debates about Muslim minorities and their 
integration and the civilisational discourses which seek to define European 
belonging. The construction of both European and national identity has been 
predicated historically on the construction of ‘others’, and in the post-2001 period 
Muslims have increasingly been identified as possessing values and identities that 
are considered antithetical. In this sense, Breivik’s ideology is not an aberration 
but a radical continuation of mainstream discourses that view multiculturalism as 
a dangerous to European identity and solidarity, and Muslims as the most 
profound threat. Across Europe the discursive construction of stable national 
identities defined in cultural terms has been deemed essential to ensuring social 
cohesion, and within this discourse Muslims have been singled out as most 
threatening and most in need of coercive assimilation by the state. 
    This chapter considers how Muslim identity has increasingly been discursively 
constructed within European states as an ‘other’ against which to articulate 
national identity. The chapter explores culturalist conceptions of national identity 
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in four European countries: Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France. 
These countries diverge in their political culture, their immigration history, the 
state’s official position towards immigrants, and state management of claims for 
religious recognition. Yet despite these variations, there has been a remarkable 
convergence across all four countries in terms of the narratives employed in 
debates that centred on questions of Muslim belonging. As Liz Fekete has noted, 
all over Europe states are defining themselves in opposition to Muslim culture, 
and moving away from multicultural projects towards a monocultural national 
identity, where ‘Western’ values are articulated as antithetical and superior to 
Muslim norms and practices.359 The following analysis considers how these 
identities have been put forward, and, using critical methodology, explores both 
contradictions within the discourses and the political effects of these narratives of 
exclusion. 
 
The discursive construction of national identity 
Engaging the concept of national identity requires a preliminary note of caution. 
Siniša Malešević has claimed that national identity is a conceptual chimera not 
worthy of serious analytical attention, pointing out that national identities are 
neither things nor living beings that can impose requirements, make connections 
or feel threatened.360 The notion that individuals possess or are in need of a 
tangible, well defined national identity is an ideological position, and is entangled 
in the discursive work that nationalism does to interpellate subjects in certain 
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ways in order to give rise to certain identities. In this sense, noting Malešević’s 
criticism, national identity is here treated as an ideological subjectivity that 
sustains the nation as an imagined community. Without a nation there would be 
no need for national identity. The concept, chimeric as it may be, upholds the 
legitimacy of the nation state and it is therefore in a state’s interest to nurture 
the identity of its citizens to reflect national belonging. National identities are 
therefore only understandable in the realm of discourse, and through the 
language and other semiotic practices that construct belonging to the imagined 
national community.361  
    The discursive work of national identity lies in its capacity to mark an inside 
and outside, a native and a foreign. As Catarina Triandafyllidou has argued, 
national identity expresses a relative feeling of belonging that only makes sense 
when compared with the feelings members of a nation have towards 
foreigners.362 National identity therefore requires difference in order to 
demarcate those who belong and those who do not, and this difference is often 
interpreted as danger. As David Campbell has demonstrated, discourses of 
danger have been central to the process of imagining the national community: by 
telling us what to fear these discourses are able to fix who we are.363 In this way 
alternative identities are often represented as the negative ’other’ against which 
national identity is contrasted: what the nation is not is used to affirm what the 
nation is.   
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    This chapter is concerned with how national identity has been constructed in 
contrast to Muslim identity. In Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
France, Islamophobic discourses which identified Muslims as dangerous and 
threatening to the nation led to high profile public debates about national identity 
and values. In what can be understood as the performative constitution of 
identity,364 these states demarcated their boundaries through the invocation of 
‘Muslim culture’, conceived as diametrically opposed to national values inherited 
from the Enlightenment. Those values deemed ‘European’ or ‘Western’ were 
represented as natural and essential national characteristics, and were 
instrumentalised to police the boundaries of who did or did not belong to the 
nation. The concepts considered particularly demonstrative of the character of 
the nation differed among the four countries studied, but all used the idea of the 
inherent and eternal ‘otherness’ of Muslims as a way to shore up both national 
identity and enlightened European belonging. The Islamophobic dimension of 
these discourses lies in the way that Muslim culture was considered the 
impediment to national belonging, in such a way that even descendants of 
immigrants from Muslim majority countries, born and educated in Europe, were 
marked out as dangerous to the existence and continuance of the nation. 
    In order to delineate Islamophobic discourses of national identity the chapter 
focuses on ‘construction moments’; events which have involved the 
representation of Muslims in the nations studied. Construction moments are 
catalysts for the emergence, recycling and re-framing of discourses, and occur 
when a given event leads to public debate and an attempt to represent 
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subjectivities in a particular way.365 The construction moments detailed below 
represent changes in, or reaffirmations of, national discourses. These may be 
triggered by a public event and occur over a relatively short period of time, such 
as the anti-minaret initiative in Switzerland and the Danish cartoon controversy, 
or they may be much more well entrenched positions that are nonetheless re-
awakened by particular incidents or utterances as in the case of Dutch homo-
emancipation policy or French gender equality arguments in relation to Islamic 
dress. The key is that a debate is initiated in which identities are questioned and 
discourses of national identity come to be articulated. The following analysis 
considers how these discourses of national identity were articulated in opposition 
to ‘Muslim identity’ and ‘Islamic values’. 
 
Islam as Europe’s ‘other’  
In each of the countries under study a particular discourse was put forward 
which claimed that Muslim identity, values and culture were oppositional to 
national culture. In the case of Switzerland, the minaret referendum was more 
than a question of whether the architectural expression of religious diversity 
should be permitted. By tying the vote to questions of national identity the 
initiative became an opportunity to symbolically reject Islam and the values it 
was supposed to promote. Similarly, in Denmark, escalating anger at Muslim 
outrage towards the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons created a dichotomy of 
identities which demanded not only that Muslims in Denmark choose sides in an 
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increasingly international conflict, but also that Danes choose between sensitivity 
to the feelings of others and a commitment to absolute free expression, newly 
defined as a central premise of Danish national identity. In both the Netherlands 
and France, Islam was constructed as the exclusive domain of particular negative 
ideological positions, which were represented as absolutely antithetical to 
national culture and Enlightenment values. Culturally determined ‘Muslim 
homophobia’ in the Netherlands was constructed as existentially threatening to 
the tolerant ‘homo-friendly’ Dutch nation. Correspondingly, the conflicts over 
Islamic dress in France focused (amongst other things) on the danger that veiling 
was thought to pose to gender equality.  
    In each country Islam became central to representations of the nation, 
marking the boundaries of belonging according to certain values deemed 
‘European’. In this sense the construction moments gave rise to nationally 
specific discourses that not only sought to define the identity of the nation in 
opposition to this ‘other’, but also re-affirmed national belonging to the idea of 
Europe, considered superior, rational and liberal. The following analysis considers 
these four states in turn. 
 
The Swiss minaret referendum and the symbolic rejection of Islam  
The Swiss minaret referendum represents the first, and to date only, time that a 
specifically anti-Islam popular vote has been undertaken in Western Europe. 
Initiated by the right-wing populist Sweizerische Volkspartei  (SVP), with the 
backing of a minor Christian evangelical party (Eidenossische Demokratische 
Union, EDU), the referendum proposed a constitutional ban on the construction 
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of minarets, and was passed in November 2009 with a majority of 57.5 percent 
in favour.  
    Most striking about the anti-minaret initiative was its symbolic nature. The 
central issue of the referendum was whether minarets, a symbol of Islam, should 
be tolerated in Switzerland. The vote itself was also largely symbolic, entailing no 
economic or political consequences that may otherwise have impacted on 
individuals’ decision to vote in favour or against the initiative.366 In addition, the 
discourse promoted by the SVP to support its anti-minaret position consisted 
largely of emotive symbols which helped to escalate the matter from a local 
building permission issue into a nationwide referendum that sought to define the 
place of Islam in Switzerland.  
    The referendum was sparked by an application for the country’s fifth minaret 
in the town of Langenthal, Berner Mitteland. The 2006 application for the fourth 
(and final) minaret, in Wangen bei Olten, had caused controversy when local 
resistance against construction led to a long spell of legal wrangling in local and 
national courts before the application was finally approved in 2009 by the 
Supreme Court.367 Conceptualising the issue as an intolerable aesthetic attack on 
the nation’s skyline, the SVP launched a 2007 initiative calling for the prohibition 
of minarets in the country and this was submitted in July 2008 with 114,895 
supporting signatures.368 Apart from the EDU, all other political parties in 
Switzerland were opposed to the initiative, and the Federal Government issued 
                                                            
366 Olga Orlanskaya and Gunther G Schulze, “The Determinants of Islamophobia — An Empirical 
Analysis of the Swiss Minaret Referndum” (2010): 3, http://crem.univ-
rennes1.fr/EPCS11/submissions/epcs2011_submission_256.pdf [Retrieved 18 June 2011]. 
367 Ibid., 5. 
368 Johannes Matyassy and Seraina Flury, Challenges for Switzerland’s Public Diplomacy: 
Referendum on Banning Minarets (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2011), 17, 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/legacy/publications/perspectives/
CPDPerspectives_P4_2011.pdf [Retrieved 2 September 2012]. 
195 
 
four arguments recommending rejection, claiming that it: violated religious 
freedom and was discriminatory since it was directed exclusively at Muslims; was 
contrary to the Swiss constitution and breached fundamental human rights 
conventions; was ineffective in fighting extremism and would not stop the 
influence of Islam, and; would hinder the integration of Muslims in Switzerland, 
as well as potentially damaging the country’s standing in the world and 
negatively impact national security and the economy.369 Despite pre-referendum 
polls which predicted that the ban would be rejected,370 the vote passed with a 
57.5 percent majority, as well as a cantonal majority, with only four of 
Switzerland’s 26 cantons opposed to the initiative. As a result, Article 72 of the 
Federal constitution was amended to read: ‘the construction of minarets is 
prohibited’.371  
    The notion of public space as a site of identity contestation has been studied 
by Jeanne Kilde, who highlighted the centrality of identity in the debates 
concerning the Park 51 Islamic centre near the ‘ground zero’ site of the former 
World Trade Center. Kilde has pointed out that during the debates about the 
site’s reconstruction a national discourse emerged that focused upon the need to 
use the space sensitively, implying that the close proximity of Muslims would be 
                                                            
369 Simon J A Mason, Abbas Aroua, and Annika Åberg, “Mediating Tensions over Islam in 
Denmark, Holland, and Switzerland,” Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich and Cordoba 
Foundation, Geneva Center for Security Studies (CSS) Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 
2010, 13–14, 
http://129.132.199.42/var/ssn/storage/original/application/f4900bb611904ea6ef86caf1a507da38.
pdf [Retrieved 2 September 2012]. 
370 Martin Baumann, “Anxieties, Banning Minarets and Populist Politics in Switzerland – a 
Preliminary Analysis,” Pluralism Project at Harvard University, 2009, 
http://www.pluralism.org/files/spotlight/Baumann_Swiss-ban-on-minarets_Nov09.pdf [Retrieved 
2 September 2009]. 
371 Orlanskaya and Schulze, “The Determinants of Islamophobia — An Empirical Analysis of the 
Swiss Minaret Referndum,” 2–5. 
196 
 
insensitive.372 Proponents of the discourse sought to exclude Muslims from this 
particular public space in deference to the grieving families of victims, suggesting 
that the connection between Islam and the September 11 attacks meant Muslims 
were less entitled to the space than other Americans. The symbolic 
incompatibility of an Islamic centre near the ‘ground zero’ site thus provided the 
rationale for the exclusion of Muslims as not fully American and entitled to fewer 
rights than other members of the national community. The Park-Zero controversy 
illustrates how discursive representations have material political effects, making 
some actions inevitable and others unthinkable.  The exclusion that begins 
through a discursive questioning of Muslims can lead to concrete exclusionary 
practices when Muslims are prevented from accessing public space on the same 
terms as non-Muslims. The Swiss minaret referendum followed a similar logic.  
    The increased visibility of Muslims in Switzerland over the last decade has 
been shaped both by public criticism of court decisions which affirmed Muslim 
religious claims (such as the High Court decision to allow the construction of the 
fourth minaret, as well as struggles within municipalities over Islamic burial sites) 
and an increased resentment of Islam after the September 11, 2001 attacks and 
especially the 2004 attacks in Madrid. However, while the New York attacks led 
to increased media stereotyping of Islam, the Madrid attacks unleashed a more 
profound change in reporting, and threat became a central motif. Muslims were 
no longer presented as victims of inadequate integration, but perpetrators who 
shunned mixing, and ‘Muslim culture’ was presented as threatening to Swiss 
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norms and values.373 The 2006 World Values Survey revealed that negative 
opinions of Muslims in Switzerland had increased relative to general xenophobic 
sentiments, with 19.8 percent reporting that they would not want a Muslim for a 
neighbour as opposed to 7.1 percent who would not want a foreigner for a 
neighbour.374  
    The SVP’s anti-minaret campaign escalated a planning issue into a matter of 
national identity through a dual process of politicisation and culturalization. The 
desire to construct a minaret was politicised through the presentation of an 
argument that stressed that minarets were unnecessary since Islam could be 
practised freely without the feature. The desire to construct a minaret was 
therefore cast as inherently suspicious, an aggressive symbol of non-conformity 
and a mark of the ascent of Islam on the Swiss landscape which, if not 
countered, would lead to the spread of Sharia.375 Despite the fact that 
architectural features themselves pose no objective threat, minarets were made 
contentious through an association with Islamic fundamentalism, which served to 
re-ascribe them as symbols not of religion, but of power. The SVP’s Ulrich 
Schlüer, co-president of the Stop the Minarets Movement, stated: ‘The minaret 
has got nothing to do with religion. It's a symbol of political power, a prelude to 
the introduction of sharia law’.376 By linking minarets to the inevitable growth of 
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sharia in Switzerland, the anti-minaret campaign invoked images of an intolerant 
Islam diametrically opposed to European values which would be encouraged 
should voters reject the initiative:  
We do not want to limit freedom of religion, we want to outlaw the political 
symbol.... The fear is great that the minarets will be followed by the calls to 
prayer of the muezzin… sharia is gaining in importance in Switzerland and in 
Europe. That means honour killings, forced marriages, circumcision, wearing 
the burqa, ignoring school rules, and even stoning.377  
As a symbol of the power of Islam, the minaret was represented as an intolerable 
challenge to Swiss constitutional values and a claim to sole representation that 
undermined democracy. When prominent radical feminist Julia Onken called on 
women to support the initiative she further entrenched this discursive 
construction. Stating that ‘mosques are male houses, minarets are male power 
symbols,’378 she maintained that the minaret represented a visible sign of the 
state’s acceptance of the oppression of women and must therefore be opposed. 
Through the symbolic representation of minarets as emblematic of Muslim power 
designs on Swiss public space, the cultural threat posed by Islam became the 
central theme of the anti-minaret campaign.  
    One of the most contentious symbols of the anti-minaret campaign was the 
poster produced by Goal advertising agency, which depicted an ominous burqa-
clad figure alongside a Swiss flag pierced with looming missile-like minarets and 
the words: ‘Stop. Yes to the minaret ban’. The poster accessibly gathered 
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together the central tropes of the anti-minaret position, representing a 
threatening and dangerous Islam that would not only blot the Swiss landscape 
but would also implicitly challenge Swiss values by sanctioning Islamist social 
models that allegedly professed inequality between the sexes. Proponents of the 
ban thus explicitly demonstrated a causal relationship between Islam, violence, 
and social models incompatible with Swiss gender equality norms. This semiotic 
display emotively linked minaret construction to the dissolution of Swiss culture 
and society, and the ability of the minaret initiative’s backers to bring these larger 
issues into the debate illustrates how the process of culturalization worked. By 
enfolding discourses of culture into a debate about the suitability of architecture, 
minarets formed a proxy for a larger rejection of Islam, defined negatively and in 
opposition to Swiss culture.  
    This discourse appears to have been successful in politicising and culturalising 
the minaret issue. Post-referendum polls revealed that the majority of those who 
voted in favour of the ban had done so to set a sign against both the spread of 
Islam and Islamic social models and to emphasise that the limits of Swiss 
tolerance had been stretched too far by Muslim demands.379 That no evidence 
existed to suggest mosques with minarets are any more likely than others to 
propagate these values was irrelevant. The referendum became a symbolic 
rejection of a constructed threat through the representation of the minaret as a 
political symbol that encouraged both the spread of Sharia and Islamic social 
models that relegated women to second class status. This discourse transformed 
the referendum from a planning into a civilisational issue, creating subject 
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positions which made the vote a choice between supposedly incompatible and 
oppositional cultures. The fact that only 15 percent of those who voted in favour 
of the ban cited specific criticisms of Muslims living in Switzerland suggests that it 
cannot be understood as a general rejection of Swiss Muslims.380 Rather, the 
referendum should be understood as a symbolic vote against Islam and the 
perceived Islamisation of Switzerland. It is unlikely that a mere planning issue 
would have gathered such popular support in a national referendum had 
proponents of the ban not discursively constructed the initiative as symbolic of a 
wider issue. Through the employment of a civilisational discourse, which explicitly 
pitted Swiss values against ‘Muslim values’, the anti-minaret campaign was able 
to unite a disparate nation without linguistic, cultural or ethnic homogeneity 
against an ‘other’ that was not just outside the nation, but outside of Europe 
itself. 
 
The Danish cartoon controversy and the politics of outrage  
On 30 September 2005, as a result of Culture Editor Flemming Rose’s request 
that cartoonists stop self-censoring, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten 
published twelve cartoons in an article entitled The Face of Muhammad. The 
discourse which emerged in the din of controversy that followed worked to 
emphasise the centrality of free expression as a Danish and European value, 
against the intolerance of Muslims and their demand for special treatment. The 
article accompanying the cartoons articulated what was to become the central 
premise of the discourse: that Muslims demanded a respect not accorded to 
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other groups and which undermined the principle of freedom of speech. The 
construction moments that occurred during the cartoon controversy worked to 
underscore this representation. Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s 
unwillingness to meet with Muslim ambassadors to diffuse the conflict was 
articulated as a decisive refusal to engage with those who wished to see him 
censor the press. At the same time, violent protests across the world were 
represented as archetypal Muslim reactions to perceived provocation, and this 
understanding encouraged the perception of Danish Muslim protest as 
demonstrations against freedom of expression rather than a call for mutual 
understanding and dialogue. 
    The immediate background of the cartoons was a heated discussion in 
Denmark about growing Islamic extremism in Europe and perceived increase in 
media self-censorship with regard to Muslim issues. The difficulty experienced by 
Danish writer Kåre Bluitgen in finding an illustrator for his children’s book on the 
life of Muhammad was much publicised, as was the attack on a lecturer at the 
University of Copenhagen, who was set upon by a gang apparently because he 
read Arabic passages aloud from the Qur’an during lectures.381 Flemming Rose 
claimed that frustration with this increased climate of timidity and self-
censorship, along with a stifling European culture of political correctness which 
made it impossible to criticise minorities, had led to the idea for the article.382  
    As Simon Weaver has pointed out, only the most rigid of readings could 
consider all the cartoons to be equally offensive, blasphemous, racist or 
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Islamophobic.383 Each of the illustrations took up a different theme; one 
portrayed Muhammad with a stick walking through the desert; another poked fun 
at the newspaper, depicting a school child named Muhammad pointing at a 
chalkboard on which was written in Arabic: ‘the editors of Jyllands-Posten are a 
bunch of reactionary provocateurs’. The most inflammatory cartoon, however, 
and certainly the most discussed, was Kurt Westergaard’s depiction of 
Muhammad with a lit fuse in his turban. Alongside the twelve drawings, the 
article’s text claimed:  
Modern secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand an 
exceptional position, insisting on special consideration for their own religious 
feelings. This is incompatible with secular democracy and freedom of speech, 
where one has to put up with insults, mockery, and ridicule. It is certainly not 
always attractive and nice to look at, and it does not mean that religious 
feelings should be made fun of at any price, but that is of minor importance in 
the present context.384  
This justification for publication set the tone of the representations that were to 
follow. Placing Muslims in opposition to modernity, secularism, democracy and 
freedom of speech, this binary created subject positions that were eagerly 
employed by a variety of Danish actors.  
    As the conflict was escalated on to the world stage the reaction to the 
cartoons’ publication took many different forms. In October 2005, Prime Minister 
Rasmussen refused to meet with 11 ambassadors from Muslim countries to 
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discuss the article, and in response a delegation of Danish imams travelled to the 
Middle East to actively gain support outside Denmark, claiming that Rasmussen’s 
refusal illustrated that the government failed to take Muslims’ concerns seriously. 
This decision dramatically expanded the stage upon which discontent was voiced. 
Pakistani Islamist group Jamaat-i-Islami offered a $10,000 bounty on the head of 
the cartoonists, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference put the issue on their 
agenda, and protests in Muslim majority countries saw Danish flags burned in 
demonstrations in Gaza and elsewhere. In response to this German and French 
newspapers printed part of the cartoons on 1 February 2006, and this led to 
further escalation of the conflict and an apparent drawing of stark ideological 
opposition between ‘the West’ and the ‘Muslim world’. In Lebanon and Tehran 
Danish embassies were attacked, the Norwegian embassy was burned down in 
Syria, and protests in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, and Nigeria led to several 
deaths.385 These international protests were represented as emblematic of 
Muslim anger and intolerance, and undeniable evidence that freedom of 
expression must be defended in the face of violent demands for Muslim 
recognition. The cartoons and the reactions that followed had the effect of 
constructing an oppositional relationship between Danes and Muslims, with the 
former represented as championing the enlightenment value of freedom of 
speech and the latter constructed as mired in violent intolerance of any criticism 
of Islam. This binary encouraged Muslims in Denmark to be seen as internal 
carriers of a culture which rejected Danish values and posed an existential threat 
to the ongoing life of the national community. 
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    The Prime Minister’s reaction to the eleven ambassadors who wrote in October 
2005 to request an interview illustrates how these subject positions became 
entrenched. The ambassadors’ letter highlighted their concerns with what they 
perceived as a growing Islamophobia in Denmark, and the cartoons were 
mentioned as just one example of an ongoing ‘smear campaign’ against 
Muslims.386 Rasmussen refused to meet with the ambassadors and responded 
instead with a letter explaining: ‘The freedom of expression has a wide scope and 
the Danish Government has no means of influencing the press’.387 According to 
the Egyptian ambassador, the purpose of the letter had been to ask for nothing 
more than a moral condemnation of the cartoons from the Prime Minister, 
however Rasmussen interpreted and subsequently represented it to the media as 
a call for the government to limit press freedom:  ‘I will not meet with them 
because it is so crystal clear what principles Danish democracy is built upon that 
there is no reason to do so... As Prime Minister, I have no power whatsoever to 
limit the press – nor do I want such power.’388 Despite the diplomats’ 
protestations that they had merely wanted to diffuse the situation through 
dialogue, Rasmussen continued to claim that their appeal for a meeting was a 
demand for censorship:  
In my opinion, this reveals an abysmal ignorance of the principles of a true 
democracy as well as a complete failure to understand that in a free 
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democracy, the government neither can, must or should interfere with the 
press.389  
 The continued representation of the diplomats’ request in such stark terms 
indicates Rasmussen’s adherence to the discursive construction originally laid out 
by the cartoons, and this lent some official respectability to the notion that 
Muslim opposition to the images was based on anti-secular and anti-free speech 
leanings. 
    A further illustration of these subject positions can be gleaned from reactions 
to the 14 October 2005 protest organised by Muslims in Denmark. The 
demonstration was called in order to provide a focal point for Muslim opposition, 
to counter the possibility that someone may take up violence, and to show that 
Muslims were peaceful and could operate dissent democratically.390 Holding 
banners in both Danish and Arabic which read: ‘No to the clash of civilisations, 
yes to the dialogue of civilisations’ and ‘No to racism and fanaticism, yes to peace 
and co-existence’, the 3000 strong demonstration moved from Nørrebro Station, 
near the largest mosque in Copenhagen, to the town hall square, where a 
request was made by organisers to participate in a common prayer. A few 
hundred joined in the prayer, claiming that ‘praying is the most peaceful act one 
can undertake.’391 Anja Kublitz has highlighted how the protest dramatically 
revealed the different interpretative spaces of the Muslims who participated and 
the general public who witnessed it. The sight of thousands of Muslims protesting 
seemed to confirm for the public prevailing views on how Muslims demonstrate 
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and what they demonstrate for. In this sense the protest was perceived not as a 
demonstration for dialogue, peace and co-existence, rather, it was interpreted 
within a worldview that considered all Muslim political action as essentially 
Islamic: for Islam and therefore against the West. Kublitz has highlighted how 
some onlookers confronted by the sight of Muslims praying interpreted the 
demonstration as for Islam and against secular freedom of expression.392 This 
visual understanding of what was occurring was supported by a misinterpretation 
of the sounds of the demonstration. The slogan ‘Islam er fred’ (Islam is peace) 
was misheard as ‘Islam er vred’ (Islam is angry), leading pedestrians to ask the 
demonstrators if they were going to war.393  
    The demonstration confirmed for some the bipolar positions entrenched by the 
discourse of Muslims vs. secular freedom. What was seen by onlookers seems to 
have been fitted to a mental representation of what they expected to see, based 
on perceptions of how Muslims usually behave when protesting or expressing 
dissent. As the form of the demonstration appeared religious, the mishearing of 
slogans, which transformed an assertion of peace into a declaration of war, 
coupled with the prone submission of prayer fit a mental model congruent with 
media representations of Muslim protest. It is little wonder that for spectators the 
belief that the demonstrators were protesting Danish freedom of expression 
seemed to be confirmed by the form the protest took. 
     The increasingly opposing subject identities constructed by the discourse 
surrounding the cartoons meant that the ostensibly positive, progressive value of 
free speech was used to mark the boundaries of Danish national identity. This 
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was tied to larger, civilisational narratives by underscoring difference, formulated 
as the binary opposition between modernity and tradition. The publication of the 
cartoons developed an already existing narrative that centred on the 
incompatibility between Western values and Islam and promoted it to national 
and international attention. The West, aligned with democracy, individualism, 
secularism and liberalism, was increasingly represented in contrast with Islam’s 
backward primitivism, oppression of the individual and failure to accept the 
separation of religion and state, and this interpretative frame marked the 
discourse to such a degree that to be both European and Muslim was considered 
a contradiction in terms.394 Muslims were perceived as having allegiance to their 
religion over Danish values and to be signalling their difference in a way that 
undermined the fundamental underpinnings of Danish national identity: the 
separation of religion and state and the freedom to express critical opinions of 
religion.395 Freedom of expression became an absolute value in the discourse 
surrounding the cartoons.  
    Flemming Rose claimed that the decision to publish the cartoons sent a 
positive message, signalling that Muslims were accepted as an integral part of 
Danish daily life, and as such were subject to the same treatment as anyone 
else.396 The cartoons, he claimed, were an act of inclusion:  
It’s humiliating and discriminating to treat any minority as a kind of odd, 
special group. It’s very important to treat everyone equally. The cartoonists 
were just doing what they are doing every day with all kinds of figures, 
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issues, institutions. It’s an act of love and inclusion to satirize people. There is 
some kind of recognition in that, to know you can laugh and make fun of one 
another.397  
    The notion that the cartoons were an expression of inclusion, however, was 
strongly undermined by their instrumentalization as objects of revenge. In the 
early hours of 12 February 2008 police arrested three Muslim men (two Tunisian 
nationals with permanent residency in Denmark and one Moroccan man with 
Danish citizenship) on suspicion of plotting to assassinate Kurt Westergaard, 
illustrator of the most contentious cartoon. The arrests provided a pretext for 
reprinting the cartoons across the media, starting with Jyllands-Posten. This mass 
reprinting of the cartoons illustrates how the entrenched positions generated by 
the original controversy had created a binary opposition of Islam vs. freedom of 
speech that could now be wheeled out in response to any perceived Muslim 
provocation. The centre-left Danish newspaper Information justified its printing 
of the cartoons in an editorial which claimed:  
Information chose not to print the cartoons first time around. Back then we 
felt that they were a clear provocation against the Muslim community. Not this 
time though. People have been plotting to kill an innocent seventy-three-year-
old man. This is completely unacceptable.398  
This statement illustrates how the cartoons were discursively transformed from 
offensive to defensive symbols. What began as a ‘clear provocation’ against 
Muslims had now been re-ascribed as emblems of solidarity with the champions 
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of freedom, and Muslims, linked with the alleged plotters by virtue of their 
religion, were considered legitimate targets for collective punishment and no 
longer entitled to feel provoked. 
 
The (homo)sexualisation of Dutch national identity  
In the Netherlands, the discourses that constructed national identity in opposition 
to a supposed Muslim culture have taken many forms, but one of the most 
interesting and prominent was the representation of homosexual tolerance as a 
Dutch cultural value. As Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens have observed, 
sexual liberation has been used to frame Europe as the avatar of modernity and 
freedom, while depicting Muslims as the cultural bearers of backward 
homophobia.399 Nowhere in Europe is this discourse more prevalent than in the 
Netherlands, where homosexual freedom has been instrumentalised to mark the 
borders of belonging in discursive, symbolic and concrete ways.  Several 
construction moments have brought this discourse to the foreground, including 
the anti-gay comments of imam El-Moumni in 2001, which were characterised as 
typical and representative of all Muslims; the rise of openly gay and Islamophobic 
populist politician Pim Fortuyn; and government policies such as the 2008-2011 
‘homoemancipation’ strategy, which particularly targeted young people of Muslim 
background, and the ‘integration abroad act’ which utilised tolerance of 
homosexuals (among other ‘national values’) as a means of testing potential 
immigrants’ suitability for family reunification in the Netherlands.  
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    Sexual freedom, and the particular sexual freedom of gay people, has been 
used as an indicator of modernity to create a dichotomy of identities, with those 
who are modern represented as accepting and embracing homosexuality and 
those who are pre-modern represented as opposing it. Through a process of 
what Jasbir Puar has termed ‘homonationalism’,400 the liberatory struggle of gay 
people has been defined as a central tenet of Dutch national identity, and not 
only juxtaposed against a perceived Muslim cultural homophobia, but 
instrumentalised as an means of coercion and exclusion to mark the boundaries 
of the Netherlands and regulate access to the national community.  
    The Dutch positioning of homosexual tolerance as a national value has 
become central to identity construction over the last decade. In 2001, the 
Netherlands became the first country to confer equal marriage rights to 
homosexuals, effectively removing all legal discrimination against same sex 
couples and paving the way for the development of a national myth that viewed 
Dutch society as entirely ‘homo-friendly’. In this climate of national self-
congratulation, Muslim homophobia came to be seen as the only obstacle 
remaining to gay equality, and focus began to shift to immigrants and their 
descendants as the carriers of culturally sanctioned anti-gay attitudes that 
threatened the unity of Dutch society. This debate gained prominence in May 
2001 when a relatively unknown Rotterdam imam, Khalil El-Moumni, was 
interviewed on national television about the legalisation of gay marriage. El-
Moumni stated that homosexuality was an illness that threatened the 
reproduction and future of society, and his comments were taken to be an 
endorsement of increasing homophobic attacks in the area perpetrated by young 
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men of Moroccan and Turkish descent. In fact, as Paul Mepschen has 
highlighted, the imam unequivocally condemned the violence in a portion of the 
interview that was not aired.401 Nevertheless, his religiously conservative views 
were framed by Dutch media as representative of the entire Muslim community 
of the Netherlands and taken to be symbolic of the lack of cultural integration of 
Muslims. Responding to the crisis, Prime Minister Wim Kok spent the full ten 
minutes of his weekly television address explaining that Muslims must tolerate 
homosexuals and all imams were invited to a ‘tolerance conference’ by the 
Liberal Democratic Minister of Large Cities Affairs. The intervention of the 
government escalated and politicised the issue, allowing a discourse to crystallise 
which placed Muslim homophobia in direct opposition to Dutch tolerance. 
    The rise of openly gay and Islamophobic politician Pim Fortuyn and his List 
Pim Fortuyn Party, which found political success after his 2002 assassination, 
further reinforced the antithetical identities constructed by this discourse. 
Fortuyn’s populist politics focused on the perceived cultural gulf between Islam 
and the West, and his public gay identity positioned him perfectly to take up the 
defence of Dutch progressive sexual values against the threat believed to be 
posed by Islamic tradition.402 He claimed that Islam was a backward culture,403 
and linked the increasing presence of Muslims to the retreat of women’s and gay 
rights, stating that he did not want ‘to do women’s and gay liberation all over 
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again.’404 This alarmist discourse encouraged the construction of opposing 
subjectivities for Muslims and Dutch, where the former represented a threat to 
the freedoms enjoyed in the Netherlands.  Positioning the Netherlands as the heir 
of enlightened modernity, Fortuyn contrasted the country’s tolerance of gay 
people against the intrinsic homophobia of Islam, stating: ‘Muslims have a very 
bad attitude to homosexuality, they're very intolerant.’405 By representing Muslim 
homophobia as essential and culturally sanctioned, Fortuyn strengthened the 
discourse of homonationalism in which Islam in the Netherlands symbolised a 
regressive cultural assault that threatened not only the hard-won freedoms of 
homosexuals, but the very project of European modernity itself.  
    The need to protect the gains of modernity from Muslims who wished to 
restrict such freedom became so deeply rooted in the discourse around 
homosexuality that it became impossible to talk about LGBT politics in the 
Netherlands without discussing Islam and Muslims.406 The policy document 
‘Simply Gay’, launched in 2007, addressed this issue, albeit without explicitly 
discussing Islam. The document laid out the 2008-2011 ‘homoemancipation’ 
strategy for the country and identified Turkish and Moroccan communities as the 
primary targets of a policy that would create a ‘third emancipatory wave’ and 
greater social acceptance in those parts of Dutch society where homosexuality 
was still a sensitive issue.407 As Jivraj and de Jong have stressed, it was not 
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necessary to specifically state in the document that Islam was the problem, since 
it was implicit from the communities targeted that Muslim homophobia was 
considered the prime danger to gay freedom408. The problem was culturalized as 
emanating from specific (Muslim) communities, which must be targeted through 
coercive measure that demanded these problematic communities tolerate 
homosexuality. 
    The Integration Abroad Act 2005 (Wet inburgering in het buitenland) 
instrumentalised homosexual tolerance as a tool of coercion in a similar way. One 
of the provisions of the Act was the overseas integration test, introduced in 2006, 
where all non-Western foreign nationals who wished to join family members or 
spouses in the Netherlands were required to sit a pre-entry integration exam in 
their home country before being issued a visa. Part of the test required 
applicants for immigration to look at a photograph of two men kissing and report 
whether the picture offended them and whether they understood it to represent 
an expression of personal liberty. Judith Butler has highlighted that the fact that 
citizens of countries considered presumptively modern (EU and US nationals, 
Canadians, Australians, Swiss, and other ‘Western’ nations, as well as those 
whose income exceeded €45,000) were exempted from having to take the test 
underscores the assumption that the acceptance of homosexuality is a temporally 
located modern and culturally advanced position.409 The sexual freedom of gay 
people was in this way used to exclude those considered pre-modern and 
culturally regressive from access to the Netherlands (and their Dutch families and 
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partners), as well as being used as an instrument of coercion to force the 
adoption of cultural norms.  
    The examples above illustrate how the Netherlands has made its ‘homo-
friendly’ identity a tool of coercive nationalism, considering homosexual tolerance 
a key measure of integration and a precondition of citizenship. As in other 
European countries, an ostensibly progressive value - in this case homosexual 
acceptance - was used as a means of excluding and disciplining Muslims in a 
national project that identified Islam as the prime danger to social cohesion. 
Muslim homophobia was constructed along a binary axis of civility/barbarism in 
which the comments of imams were thought to be representative of the views of 
all Muslims, homophobia within Muslim communities was considered indicative of 
a cultural and religiously sanctioned backwardness, and homophobic attacks by 
Turkish and Moroccan youths were deemed emblematic of the failure of Muslim 
integration and the multicultural project.  
    The effects of this discourse were to shore up Dutch identity as Western, 
modern, tolerant and enlightened, in contrast to a premodern Muslim culture 
figured as incompatible and dangerous to the precarious freedoms won by gay 
people in the Netherlands. As Mepschen et al have pointed out, there was an 
irony in the way gay rights were heralded as if they had been the foundation of 
European culture for centuries. The 1998 Gay Games in Amsterdam had brought 
forth fierce debate and the condemnation and disgust of Dutch conservatives, 
who denounced the public display of sexuality in deeply homophobic terms. 
Columnist Gerry van der List condemned the games as ‘an Amsterdam orgy’ and 
argued that gay men led ‘a horrendous lifestyle’, yet three years later, following 
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El-Moumni’s comments, ‘Van der List had embraced gay rights as exemplary of 
“Western gains and ideals.”’ 410  
    In locating the tolerance of homosexuality as a Western norm, homophobia 
became the exclusive domain of Muslims, a cultural malaise rather than an 
individual prejudice, and ethnic Dutch homophobia was rendered invisible. The 
state was then free to utilise a certain conception of freedom in order to 
discipline Muslims and compel them to shed their unacceptable cultural 
preconditioning. Judith Butler wryly hinted at this discursive change when she 
asked, referring to the integration abroad test, whether gay and lesbian people 
were being administered tests by the Dutch government to make sure they are 
not offended by the visible practices of Muslims.411 This is an important point, 
and highlights what Halleh Ghorashi has identified as a dual discourse of 
citizenship, where the ‘real Dutch’ are responsible citizens, while the ‘unwanted 
Dutch’ must be coerced by the state into behaving acceptably.412 In the present 
period, Muslims have become the unwanted Dutch: passive, immature subjects 
who must simply do as society dictates without being allowed to enter the debate 
or raise their voices. This discourse underwrites a national project that is based 
on the incompatibility of cultures and the need to assimilate all into a culturally 
fundamentalist notion of Dutchness, exemplified by the populist right’s 
declarations of European cultural supremacism:  
Why are we not allowed to say that Muslims should adapt to our way of life, 
because our standards and values are of a higher, better, more pleasant and 
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more humane level? It is not about integration, it's about assimilation! At 
home they can wear their headscarves and slaughter their sheep; outside 
they have to behave like every Dutchman does.413  
While the acceptance of diverse sexualities is a value that most progressives 
would applaud, its use as a means of demonising Muslims in an Orientalist 
constellation of modern civility vs. barbaric traditionalism represents a perverse 
misuse of freedom for purposes of exclusion. 
 
Coercive undressing and gender equality in France 
In France, cultural anxiety over Islam has concentrated primarily on the symbolic 
threat represented by Islamic dress. Construction moments such as: the 2004 
ban on religious symbols in schools, which focused primarily on Muslim girls’ right 
to wear the hijab; the reaction to the New Anti-capitalist Party’s fielding in the 
2010 elections of ‘veiled’ candidate Ilham Moussaid; and the burqa ban in 2010, 
which criminalised the full body covering, illustrate what Vincent Geisser has 
described as French ‘hijabophobia’, where Islamic dress is represented as a 
danger to basic secular republican values.414 The debates emerging from this 
aversion to the various veiling practices of Muslim women have been 
underpinned by the French legal principle of laïcité, the strict separation of 
(private) religion and the public sphere. Yet despite this central principle of the 
French Republic, it is striking to note the extent to which issues of gender 
equality and feminism have taken an integral role. This section focuses on the 
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centrality and instrumentalization of such arguments, which were employed to 
oppose Islamic veiling specifically to protect women’s rights in France 
(particularly, though not exclusively, Muslim women’s rights), and worked to 
shore up a particular version of French identity as enlightened and modern in 
contradistinction to backward and patriarchal Islam.  
    France has the largest Muslim population in Europe, but has historically been 
hostile to recognition of ethnic and religious identities, viewing individuals as 
French only and requiring social conformity as the price of political equality.415 
Anxieties about the extent to which Muslim women threatened the idea of an 
indivisible republic became evident in the 1980s as post-war migration, until then 
perceived as temporary and solely masculine, began to be viewed as permanent 
with the arrival of women and children through family reunification. As Muslim 
women became more visible in France, they became a political issue through a 
dual representation which identified them as both threatening to the Republic, 
because of their embodied attachment to, and transference of, Islamic practices, 
and as victims of the patriarchal dominance of Muslim men.416 This ambiguous 
representation was apparent in then Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2006 
New Year’s Day address to the nation, in which he spoke of the: ‘immigrant 
woman, trapped at home, who doesn’t speak the language because her husband 
doesn’t let her leave and doesn’t put her in contact with literacy groups or French 
lessons.’417 As a victim the Muslim woman was prevented from being part of 
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French society by her husband, but her isolation also endangered the integration 
of her children and thus threatened the future of France.   
    It is in this context that the debates surrounding the veil, which in France is 
used to mean any covering of the head or face, including the headscarf (hijab), 
face covering (niqab), and full body cover (burqa), have not only centred on the 
sacrosanct principle of laïcité, but also increasingly about patriarchal Islam and 
the need to rescue Muslim women from men’s power. In this sense, feminist 
arguments have been appropriated for the purpose of targeting Muslim women, 
and emancipating them from their patriarchal culture. The veil is seen from this 
perspective as nothing more than a symbol of sexist Islam, and thus not only 
symbolic of Muslim women’s oppression but also a challenge to gender equality 
in France. This discursive representation of veils as monolithically oppressive is 
illustrated by the fact that of 150 people invited to give testimony at the Stasi 
commission, convened in 2003 by Jacques Chirac to debate the proposed ban on 
the hijab in schools, only one (Saida Kada, founder of Activist French Muslim 
Women) was a veiled French Muslim woman.418   
    The veil in France is viewed as a semiotic sign which symbolically announces 
the wearer’s attachment to values that are incongruous with French commitment 
to gender equality and the values of autonomy and freedom. Yet, there is no 
objective violation of gender equality inherent in any type of veil. As Susanna 
Mancini has pointed out, it is merely a piece of fabric and there are no laws in 
Europe banning the right to wear any other type clothing, even when, as with 
                                                            
418 Fekete, “Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State,” 21. 
219 
 
high heels and tight trousers, it may actually harm health.419 It is the subjective 
perception of the veil that causes difficulties in France (and elsewhere in Europe), 
based on its symbolic connotations. Covering the hair or face implies an 
unwillingness to engage in established protocols of interaction with the opposite 
sex, and thus provides a stark visual reminder of a different value system that, in 
the context of the discourse of the ‘war on terror’, has been constructed as 
oppositional and confrontational to the values of the West.420 
    The subjective understanding of veiling as intrinsically and predominantly 
symbolic of diametrically opposed understandings of gender relations, and 
specifically of the submissive role of women in Islam, has led to the discursive 
construction of any veil as dangerous to equality in France. This position, 
exemplified by the statements of feminists, asserts that no woman wears the veil 
autonomously, even if she believes she does. Thus the philosopher Elisabeth 
Badinter could stress that since the veil represented oppression, choosing to wear 
it was equal to renouncing personal autonomy.421 As symbolic of the patriarchal 
values of Islam, a woman who embodied these values by covering a part of 
herself was thought to be publicly renouncing her rights, and in doing so 
signalling to society that equal rights with men were not important to her. This 
interpretation of the purpose of veiling has been used over and over in France to 
sustain limitations on women’s rights to wear it, and was employed by President 
Sarkozy in June 2009, when he proposed the banning the burqa, stating: ‘That is 
not the idea that the French republic has of women’s dignity. The burqa is not a 
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sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience.’422 Sarkozy’s statement suggests that 
the burqa is only about gender relations, and the submissive position of women 
in Islam. Autonomy can therefore only be restored to such women by forcing 
them to uncover. 
    Wearing a burqa in public, or compelling someone else to do so, was banned 
in France in 2010, and the penalties imposed illustrate the centrality of the 
gender equality argument. Those breaking this law are required to pay a fine and 
attend a mandatory citizenship course. Susan Carland has claimed that penalties 
imposed indicate that the law addresses gender equality rather than secularism, 
highlighting that those who force others to cover are considered more 
problematic to the French government and have to pay one hundred times the 
fine (€15,000) of those who choose to cover (€150). The disparity in fines, she 
suggests, signals that it is women’s rights that are being addressed, since the 
penalty would be equal for both offenders if secularism were the principle being 
defended.423 The difference in financial penalty suggests that the government 
has made provisions within the law for the presumed patriarchy of Islam by 
punishing more harshly those who force others to cover. Yet the assumed 
passivity of Muslim women, which lies at the heart of this two-tier penalty 
system, contains a paradox: Would not the power of these Muslim fathers, 
husbands and brothers be so great over these women that they could be coerced 
into claiming they had chosen to cover in order that dominant men escape the 
higher penalty? And with the implicit assumption at the heart of French debate 
that wearing a veil is a renunciation of one’s autonomy, how can the covered 
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woman’s views be trusted as her own? Could the testimony of a veiled woman 
ever be accepted?  
    The distrust of veiled Muslim women and the threat they were seen to 
represent to French gender relations was further exemplified by the reaction to 
the New Anticapitalist Party (NPA) fielding of Ilham Moussaid in the 2010 
elections. Moussaid, who covers her hair, has described herself as ‘feminist, 
secular, and veiled,’424 yet her candidacy drew widespread criticism and led to an 
official complaint by rightwing feminist group Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Nether 
Whores Nor Submissives), who stressed that her candidacy was evidence that: 
‘…the NPA is perverting the values of the Republic and suggesting we re-read 
them in a manner which conforms with regressive visions of women.’425 This 
statement signals how the very presence of a veiled woman in the political 
sphere was thought to endanger France and French values, despite the fact that 
Moussaid stated continuously her commitment to feminists principles, including 
contraception and abortion rights, and her autonomous decision to cover her 
hair: ‘Try as I might to explain that I am not oppressed and it shows, there is still 
a lack of understanding.’426 
    The dominant monolithic construction of the veil in France as a symbol of 
gender oppression silenced the voices of those women, like Ilham Moussaid, who 
claimed agency in their choice to cover some part of their body. While there is no 
doubt that in some societies Muslim women are subject to enforced dress codes, 
there is an increasingly assertive Muslim feminist perspective in the West which 
                                                            
424 Keshava Guha, “Gauche Politics: Radical Leftism Resurges in France,” Harvard International 
Review Spring (2010): 10. 
425 Lizzy Davies, “Election Candidate in Headscarf Causes Uproar in France,” The Guardian, 10 
February (2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/10/french-election-headscarf-
candidate [Retrieved 5 October 2012]. 
426 Quoted in Ibid. 
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claims that covering, far from being oppressive, is actually an emancipatory 
practice that liberates women. Veiling, for some, represents freedom.427 Pnina 
Werbner, for example, has argued that through their religious observance veiled 
British Muslim women have opened up a space for autonomous decision making 
that includes the right to work, be educated, move around un-chaperoned in 
public and choose their own marriage partners.428 Interviews with French Muslim 
women have similarly shown that their reasons for wearing the headscarf differed 
significantly from mainstream French discourse that represented it as an 
oppressive religio-political symbol. Young French women of Moroccan descent 
opposed traditional patriarchal interpretations and argued that Islam advocates 
equality, authorises women to work and legitimises love marriages.429 The veil in 
this context may signal both attachment to traditional Moroccan culture and an 
assertive Islam which granted these women greater freedom, where their Muslim 
identity reassured their parents (who were often worried by their daughters’ 
French affiliation) and their practice of Islam allowed them to negotiate a greater 
freedom and transgress other rules.430  
    The trajectory of Western feminism has been so entwined with the freedom to 
uncover that the use of a discourse of women’s emancipation to underpin 
authoritarian practices which control (Muslim) women’s bodies is considered by 
                                                            
427 As former Respect Party councillor, and headscarf wearing Muslim woman, Salma Yaqoob has 
stated: ‘I think that Muslim women who wear hijab often feel that they are valued for their 
intellect rather than their looks, which is actually very liberating.’, quoted in Natasha Walter, 
“When the Veil Means Freedom,” The Guardian, 20 January, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jan/20/france.schoolsworldwide1 [Retrieved 13 October 
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Muslims in Britain and France,” 175. 
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many to be unproblematic. The liberatory discourses of the veil put forward by 
Muslim women are incongruent with mainstream discursive constructions which 
represent it as anti-emancipatory and monolithically oppressive. Based on an 
assumption that the only way to be liberated is to be uncovered, Muslim women 
who claim that sexual freedom is not the only or most important freedom a 
woman can have, and that it may actually not be true liberation at all, are 
silenced by a discourse that assures them they are deluding themselves and 
playing into the hands of patriarchal men. The effect of these discourses for 
French Muslim women who veil is, paradoxically, a restriction of their freedom. 
Renee Le Mignot, co-president of French NGO Against Racism and For Friendship 
Between Peoples has emphasised the increased discrimination against women 
who wear the headscarf, including their being refused access to voting booths 
and driving lessons, barred from their own wedding ceremonies in town halls, 
ejected from university classes, and in one case prevented from withdrawing 
cash from her own account at a bank counter.431 The visual symbol of the veil, 
constructed as indicating a woman’s lack of belonging to French society, thus 
invited discrimination and encouraged the treatment of covered women as lesser 
citizens.  
 
The construction of European identity in opposition to Islam 
The examples analysed above illustrate the extent to which national identities in 
the post 2001 period have been constructed in opposition to an imagined Muslim 
identity. In each case, certain ‘Western’ values that were thought to encapsulate 
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the identity of the nation were seized upon as timeless and essential 
characteristics and contrasted with ‘Muslim values’ that were oppositional and 
threatening. The debate about the suitability of Islamic architecture in 
Switzerland quickly mutated into a value-laden dispute about the place of Islam 
in Swiss society. Based on the notion that minarets were representative of 
unacceptable Islamic social models, the national virtue of tolerance was 
represented as being in direct competition with Muslim politico-religious power 
desires, and Swiss neutrality was deemed threatened by Islam’s inability to 
relegate religion to the private sphere. Danish debates about ‘The Face of 
Muhammad’ cartoons similarly positioned a national commitment to freedom of 
expression as oppositional to a perceived Muslim demand that their religion be 
respected above all else. Muslims were represented as intolerant and 
authoritarian, incapable of understanding the liberal concept of press freedom, 
and prone to violent rage when provoked. Dutch sexual diversity was portrayed 
as deeply threatened by Muslims who could not shed their cultural predisposition 
to homophobia. The Netherlands was represented as possessing an excessive 
national tolerance that was endangered by Islamic intolerance and repression of 
sexual freedom. Finally, French debates over the right of Muslim women to cover 
coalesced around the threat that veiling practices were believed to pose to 
gender equality. The veil was constructed as symbolic of Muslim patriarchy and 
female oppression and thus a direct challenge to feminism and women’s freedom 
in France. In every case, national values were represented as rational, 
enlightened and superior, and this hierarchical construction highlights the 
Eurocentric self-understanding that guided these discourses of national identity. 
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    The internalisation of the civilised/barbaric dichotomy was central to the 
discursive creation of national identity for each state. This binary construction 
was used to designate the nation as modern, enlightened, rational and 
progressive, in opposition to an imagined Islam within its midst and outside its 
borders which was considered pre-modern, obscurantist, irrational and 
regressive. This bipolarity is a central construction of Eurocentrism, giving rise to 
identities which are deemed entirely oppositional and irreconcilable and 
containing a logic that demands the ‘barbaric’ is subsumed entirely into the 
‘civilised’ as a condition of residence in Europe. This closing down of symbolic 
borders is evident in the discourses of those states which consider themselves 
immigration countries (France and the Netherlands), as well as traditional 
isolationists for whom immigration is a relatively new reality (Denmark and 
Switzerland).  
    The dominant discourses adopted worked to represent Muslims as 
monolithically opposed to whichever value was being nationally championed, and 
the superior values of the enlightened Europeans were instrumentalised as 
disciplinary tools in an authoritarian discourse that demanded Muslims shed their 
cultural impediments to modernity. The threat to Switzerland that Muslim social 
models were believed to pose was countered by prohibiting the construction of 
minarets. Danish discourse sought to protect free expression by condemning and 
silencing the freely expressed outrage of some Muslims. The Netherlands utilised 
a culturally racist discourse which considered anti-gay feeling inescapably 
inscribed in the mind-set of anyone with a Muslim background in order to 
discipline actual and potential Muslim citizens. And France sought to practice 
gender equality by silencing and excluding from French civic culture those 
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women who claimed that their freedom and equality could best be served by 
their own autonomous choice to cover whatever they saw fit.  
    Yet, it should be made clear that these discourses did not serve only as a 
means of excluding Muslims to forge national cultural homogeneity. Despite the 
varied starting points; tolerance (Switzerland), free expression (Denmark), 
(homo)sexual freedom (the Netherlands), and gender equality (France) are all 
ostensibly progressive values that were intrinsically linked and explicitly 
articulated as European and Western. The national discourses thus not only 
sought to exclude, but also provided pivotal ideals around which European 
belonging could be reaffirmed. This highlights the central place of the 
civilised/barbaric binary. Anti-Muslim feeling in Europe has a long history, but the 
Islamophobia that we are now witnessing is a product of and nourishes the post-
September 11, 2001 international order and the discursive constructions of the 
‘war on terror’. In a world that was deliberately, discursively, and self-consciously 
structured by the appealing Manichean logic of ‘with us or against us’, to be ‘with’ 
is to be civilised, enlightened, and Western. The fluid boundaries of this identity 
are policed and fortified by values recognised as products of the European 
historical trajectory. In affirming these Eurocentric values, states affirm their 
belonging to the ‘right’ side in the ‘war on terror’. 
    The understanding of such values as inherently Western requires that they be 
constantly reaffirmed as such, and this was achieved through a politicisation of 
culture and a culturalization of politics.432 Culture is politicised when social and 
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390; Mason, Aroua, and Åberg, “Mediating Tensions over Islam in Denmark, Holland, and 
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political issues are linked to the essentialised culture of groups.433 This may be 
achieved in a negative sense, for instance by linking social problems such as 
‘ethnic ghettoes’, the low socio-economic status of immigrants and descendants, 
or crime to the culture of Muslims. It may also be positively politicised, through 
discourses which assert that political systems and values such as secularism, 
democracy and liberalism are the preserve of a particular culture. The 
culturalization of politics is a process whereby this essentialised notion of cultural 
difference is instrumentalised in a political project which seeks to discipline those 
cultures perceived as antithetical. Slavoj Žižek has stressed that this ideological 
operation constructs political differences, which are conditioned by inequality, 
into cultural differences through a process of naturalisation and neutralisation.434 
This is illustrated by those national projects which, viewing Islam as contradictory 
to Western liberal democracy, employed culture as a means of exclusion through 
integration tests and the coercive assimilation of Muslims through civic training 
and the prohibition of Muslim practices.  
 
    By considering political systems to be cultural artefacts, and by using culture 
as a political disciplinary tool to mark the boundaries of the nation, the discourses 
delineated above advanced a Eurocentric notion of national identity. The 
ideological representation of these national values as the universal and 
progressive standards to which all the West aspires allowed states to cultivate a 
civilisational sense of belonging in their affirmation of European/Western values. 
These Eurocentric values were also used to mark the borders of identity, policing 
who could and could not belong to the community by interrogating their 
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commitment to such values, based on culturalist notions of essential difference. 
In this sense, they were instrumentalised to exclude individuals and groups from 
belonging both to the (European) value community and to the national 
community that predicated its identity on these values.  
    There is, however, a central paradox at work in projects which seek to protect 
the freedom of some by sacrificing the liberty of others, and this underscores the 
superiority intrinsic to Eurocentric ideology. The impulse to authoritarianism was 
revealed in each nation’s attempt to work through the problems perceived to be 
posed by Muslims and their inassimilable and oppositional cultural identities. 
Despite the fact that Muslims make up a significant percentage of Europe and its 
nations, the integration of Islam into European and individual national identity 
has been disregarded in favour of projects of national cultural chauvinism. 
Muslim voices and opinions, it seems, are not required by those who seek to 
define national identity. This underscores what Haleh Ghorashi has highlighted as 
the dual discourse of citizenship.435 Muslims are increasingly considered the 
passive ‘unwanted Europeans’, who must be coerced into acting as society 
dictates without being permitted input into the debate. Such practices contribute 
to the isolation of Muslims in Europe by refusing equal access to the shaping of 
national identities, and increase the perception of a cultural gulf by asserting a 
Eurocentrism which identifies Muslim values as oppositional, barbaric, and 
inferior, and therefore not worthy of discussion or integration into new European 
and national identities.  
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Conclusion  
Matti Bunzl has emphasised that the question of civilisation lies at the heart of 
Islamophobia, which considers Islam to have a worldview fundamentally 
incompatible with Western civilisation.436 Unlike biological racism and anti-
Semitism, it functions less in the interests of national purification than as a 
means of fortifying Europe, by questioning whether Muslims, with their 
alternative civilisation and mind-set, can be European at all. Each of the 
discourses studied in this chapter has posed the same question through the 
identification and reification of a particular ‘European’ value as sacrosanct and 
endangered by Muslims and their practices. These European values were 
represented as modern, rational and superior, in contrast to traditional, irrational, 
and inferior Muslim values. The civilised/barbaric binary central to Eurocentric 
discourse thus created the conditions for discriminatory and exclusionary 
practices, allowing for ostensibly positive values to be instrumentalised in order 
to quash alternative identity conceptions that were represented as dangerous 
and threatening to the solidarity and cohesion of the nation. 
    This chapter has analysed the discursive construction of Islam as antithetical 
to national identity in Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands and France by 
focusing on construction moments in which Muslim identity was politicised as 
irreconcilably ‘other’ to the nation’s conception of itself. In emphasising the 
Eurocentric assumptions that have upheld narratives of national identity, the aim 
has been to illustrate the discursive mechanisms by which such identities have 
been ideologically constructed. By demonstrating alternative positions that 
challenge the dominant narratives I have attempted to de-naturalise the logic of 
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these discourses and highlight the subjectivities that are silenced by the 
constrictions inherent in these binaries. My intention has not been to suggest that 
each nation considers Islam as a threat in the same way or to the same extent. 
Islamophobia is in each case subject to national particularities, and the varying 
construction moments and their accompanying discourses illustrate the extent to 
which different conceptions of Islam’s otherness were instrumentalised. Yet 
noting that Islamophobia is not homogenous across Europe should not blind one 
to the Eurocentric suppositions that sustain these narratives of identity. As David 
Theo Goldberg has pointed out, Islam is viewed in the dominant European 
imaginary to represent a collection of lacks: of freedom, civility, and equal 
respect for women and gays.437 In contrast, the West is considered to hold these 
values in abundance. The binary of Western values/Islamic values thus provides 
a vast tapestry of oppositions from which to cherry pick in times of identity crisis 
and a bounty of discourses which may be instrumentalised to discipline and 
exclude those who are considered to occupy the inferior side of this civilisational 
border. 
        When Anders Behring Breivik attempted in July 2011 to ‘start a revolution’ 
in Europe, he was drawing upon the very same conceptions of identity that have 
been discussed in this chapter. Viewing his actions as the precursor to a long war 
which would wrest the very soul of European civilisation from the clutches of 
Muslims, his justifications employed an identical civilised/barbaric binary that 
viewed Western society as existentially endangered by the presence of Islam. 
Breivik’s actions should caution us to the dangers of stark binaries that 
essentialise culture and employ it as a coercive tool in projects of national 
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hegemony. His violent solution to the problem perceived to be posed by Muslims 
in Europe is only the extreme end of a spectrum of exclusionary and 
discriminatory practices made possible by Eurocentric discourse.  
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Chapter Seven – Theorising Islamophobia 
 
Introduction 
All of the discourses explored in this thesis have in common the cultural 
problematisation of Muslims. This can be understood as the central organising 
principle that holds together the diverse enunciations and practices that fall 
under the rubric of Islamophobic discourse. The previous chapters have sought 
to demonstrate how Islamophobia functions as a culturally racist discourse, by 
problematizing Muslim culture and with ideological effects that disadvantage 
Muslims and advantage non-Muslims. The present chapter aims to understand 
why this discourse has such salience at the present historical moment and how it 
serves those who employ it.  
    Understanding Islamophobia as cultural racism implies that there is more 
going on than merely a prejudicial stance against Muslims. As an ideology, racism 
(in whatever form it may take at any given historical moment) performs 
particular functions for those employing its discourse and practices. Islamophobia 
is no exception, and the functions it performs are related to an understanding of 
(culturally) racialized space. Whether it appears at the local, national or 
international level, Islamophobia emerges from a cultural anxiety generated by 
the notion that previously Western spaces are being undermined by the presence 
of Muslims. Those who employ this discourse consider that their previously 
special relationship with a particular territory is now under strain because of 
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Muslim presence, and they use Islamophobia as a means of re-gaining control 
over the objects (Muslims) which block their identity as Western subjects. 
    In his 2000 book White nation: Fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural 
society, Ghassan Hage explored this territory in relation to nationalism, arguing 
that both those considered ‘racist’ and those considered ‘multiculturalist’ share in 
common the conviction that they are masters of the national space and it is up to 
them to decide who stays and who ought to be kept out of that space.438 Hage 
argues that this is a fantasy of white supremacy, the belief in white mastery over 
the nation and the conception that ethnic minorities are merely national objects 
to be moved or removed according to white national will.439 This understanding 
of race relations as an expression of nationalism centres the notion of territorial 
power as a motivating ideology. Hage contends that racist practices are better 
conceived as nationalist practices, which assume first, an image of national 
space, second, an image of the nationalist as master of this space and third, an 
objectified image of the ethnic other within this space.440  
    Although Hage discusses Muslims as ‘ethnic others’ within the nation, his 
specific focus is racist practices and how they are better conceptualised as 
nationalist practices. I wish to extend his theoretical position specifically in 
relation to Islamophobia, and in doing so I argue that something greater than 
national identity is at stake. While nationalist practices do inform many 
Islamophobic discourses, a larger understanding is at work that situates local and 
national expressions of Islamophobia in a more global context. Islamophobia 
entails not only the understanding that Muslims block the special relationship 
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between locals and their localities, nationalists and their nation, but also the 
conception that Muslims’ existence within the West problematizes the privileged 
relationship between Westerners and the imagined civilizational space of the 
West.  
    This global dimension of Islamophobia can be understood as an expression of 
resurgent Eurocentrism, which aims to reconstitute threatened spaces through a 
subject/object dichotomy in which Western subjects are positioned as the cultural 
managers of local, national and global territories, while Muslims are constructed 
as objects whose presence changes or contaminates the fantasised ideal spaces 
appealed to.  
    The present chapter first considers the spatial dimension of Islamophobia, 
before going on to analyse how the Muslim undesirable is constructed within this 
discourse as spatially threatening to particular territories.  Islamophobia operates 
as a discourse of control that works to put Muslims in their place as local, 
national and civilisational objects to be directed by subjects whose claims on the 
territories in question are considered greater. Both exclusionary and inclusive 
discourses explicitly and implicitly draw upon the articulation of spatial 
dominance, and it is in this sense that Islamophobia can be best understood as 
Eurocentrism. Though the assertion that Western values are superior and the 
demand that Muslims integrate in to them, Islamophobia provides its adherents 
with a means of reconstituting their privileged relationship with the territories 
that Muslims are perceived to threaten.  
 
The spatial dimension of Islamophobia 
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They talk of integration, but they are the ones not wanting to integrate, they 
alone wish to take over! They believe their religion is the best and refuse to 
accept other religions, so why should we allow the Muslim community to 
trample all over our historic market town of Dudley?441 
Islam is not just a religious system, but a political and social ideology that 
seeks to dominate all non-believers and impose a harsh legal system that 
rejects democratic accountability and human rights. It runs counter to all that 
we hold dear within our British liberal democracy…442 
For the first time in a generation there is an unease, an anxiety, even at 
points a resentment that our very openness, our willingness to welcome 
difference, our pride in being home to many cultures, is being used against 
us; abused, indeed, in order to harm us.443 
The quotes above are taken from radically different sites, enunciate very different 
perspectives, and have different purposes. The first is a letter to the Editor in the 
local newspaper Dudley News, the second is from the English Defence League’s 
Mission Statement, and the third is from Prime Minister Tony Blair’s speech, A 
duty to integrate, which discussed integration in the context of the 7 July 2005 
London bombings. What the three have in common is an understanding of a 
space of values and heritage that is threatened by the presence of Muslims, and 
a shared conviction amongst these diverse speakers that they have the right to 
decide the values of the spaces they seek to protect. It is this spatial dimension 
of Islamophobia that I wish to explore. 
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        In each of the above statements the word ‘our’ was used to denote a 
relationship that the speaker felt he or she had with a given territory. Whether 
local, for the Dudley News correspondent, or national, for the EDL and Blair, this 
territory was considered in some way endangered by Muslims.444 In each case 
Muslims were presented as destructive (trampling over our history, dominating 
non-believers, harming us) and antagonistic (refusing to accept other religions, 
rejecting British liberal democracy, exploiting our openness to other cultures). For 
each of these speakers, Muslims occupy the position of ‘the undesirable’.  
    Constructed as undesirables, Islamophobic discourse represents Muslims as 
the group which blocks the relationship between speakers and the territories 
imagined as theirs. Each of the speakers appealed to fantasy space rife with 
positive attributes (a historic market town, a dearly held British liberal 
democracy, a nation that is an open and welcoming haven for all cultures) – 
spaces which had, in the past, been infused with positive ideals, but whose 
goodness was now endangered by a Muslim presence that threatened the 
continued achievement of these ideals. The above examples also underscore the 
proprietal relationship that speakers believe they have with the space to which 
they refer. By employing a discourse which fantasised a space once infused with 
positivity, now threatened by Muslim presence, each speaker claimed some sort 
                                                            
444 Tony Blair’s speech was touted as the official government position on British multiculturalism 
following the 7 July 2005 London bombings, and his speech was quite explicit in its targeting of 
Muslims as the problematic community about which he is speaking: ‘It is true there are extremists 
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particularly originating from certain countries’. Ibid.  
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of special relationship with that space, which justified his or her perceived right 
to decide what it should be like.445 
    Hage argues that the undesirability of a group presupposes an idealised image 
of a territory – a fantasy space in which the undesirable group is perceived as 
blocking the positive identity of the ideal territory.446 Islamophobic discourse 
implicitly understands some relationships with a particular territory to be more 
legitimate than others - specifically it understands that Muslims have fewer rights 
over local and national spaces in Britain than non-Muslims. This can be 
understood as a form of spatial dominance, in which those non-Muslims who 
employ Islamophobic discourse believe that they have managerial rights over a 
territory;  a feeling of entitlement to decide what this territory should be like, 
who belongs there and who should be removed.447  
 
The Muslim undesirable 
This conceptualisation of Islamophobic discourse as a response to perceived 
spatial threat foregrounds its function, permitting a greater understanding of its 
usefulness to those employing it. As an ideological tool it aims to explain the 
                                                            
445 It is an entirely reasonable objection to point out  that Tony Blair, as Prime Minister, had at 
this point a democratically elected right to decide how the nation should be. However, Blair 
positioned himself in this speech not simply as the leader of a nation, but as a subject whose 
concern for the fulfilment of national goodness was normal, natural and something that all fellow 
nationals should share. The intention of his speech was to explain and gain support for the 
changes to immigration and integration policies that followed the 7 July 2005 bombings, and as 
such, his speech was an attempt to draw some national subjects in to the nation, through 
appealing to its positive attributes and inviting them to claim these as part of their identity, at the 
same time as marking out a risky Muslim community that endangered their national realisation. In 
this sense, Blair was opening up the national terrain to other subjects as a territory whose future 
should be cherished. His speech represented an attempt to encourage British nationals that the 
nation was of value, at the same time as singling out Muslims as the community which stood in 
the way of the realisation of the national fantasy to which he appealed. 
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world as it is and as it should be, and each instance of Islamophobic discourse 
analysed in the preceding chapters has used this ideological understanding in 
order to reconstitute a formerly privileged and now endangered spatial 
relationship. But why are Muslims considered to pose such a problem to the 
spaces in question?  
    Part of the answer to this question lies in the fact that it is not individual 
Muslims who are considered to be so threatening. Rather, the anxiety is caused 
by the perception of a large Muslim minority with an identical Muslim cultural will. 
Appreciating the culturally racist aspects of Islamophobia is essential to 
understanding why Muslims are considered to be the group that frustrates the 
realisation of the ideal territory imagined by those employing this discourse. 
    There is widespread agreement that there has been a transformation in racist 
discourse since the end of the Second World War, from overtly biological 
understandings of race to a focus on culture. 448  Cultural racism employs many 
of the tropes of biological racism but averts its attention from race, blood and 
biology, to focus instead on the cultural heritage of groups and individuals. 
Although this discourse rarely mentions the word race, its essentialisation of 
culture performs the same function. The focus on the deterministic and 
inescapable culture of a group in terms of beliefs, habits, behaviours and values 
institutes a hierarchical understanding, within which individuals are naturalised as 
subjects of superior or inferior cultures which regulate their abilities, attributes 
and psychology. Islamophobic discourse asserts that a Western subject, 
socialised within a cultural form that cherishes freedom, equality and liberalism, 
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has imbibed Western values into his or her very being. Conversely, Muslim 
subjects, socialised within a culture of inferior Islamic values (submission to Allah 
above all else, clinging to premodern traditions and values) are unable to move 
beyond the strictures of Islamic thought. From the perspective of cultural racism, 
Muslims will always revert to Islam as the guide for their thought processes and 
behaviour.  
    As the previous chapters have demonstrated, the essentialisation of Muslim 
culture as a driver of behaviour is what makes up the fundamental nature of 
Islamophobia. Yet, as Hage points out, one can believe that Muslims are 
essentially different, even inferior, and not act upon this belief.449 The imperative 
for action within the ideological world of Islamophobia comes not from an 
understanding that Muslims are radically different, but from an understanding 
that their presence is undesirable and harmful to the wellbeing of non-Muslims. If 
one understands Muslim culture as being determining, then it does not 
necessarily follow that individual Muslims are particularly problematic.450 The 
problematisation of Muslims comes about when their group presence is seen to 
threaten the way that things are, based on the perception that Muslim will is 
widespread, unified, and antagonistic. If Muslims are understood to exercise an 
Islamic will, then the greater the number of Muslims in a particular territory, the 
more anxiety will be generated by the possibility that there exists a potential bloc 
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of culturally determined Muslims that may alter the territory to their advantage 
and to the disadvantage of non-Muslims. 
    The construction of Muslims as undesirables within Islamophobic discourse 
always involves a cultural anxiety.451 This anxiety is not necessarily caused by the 
belief that Muslims are radically different or inferior, which can exist 
independently of the need to vocalise or act upon such a belief. Rather, it is the 
fear that Muslims might change who we are, or the space in which we live, that 
forms an imperative for Islamophobic acts of discursive or physical exclusion.452  
    The Dudley mosque debates serve to illustrate this point. The mosque caused 
such anxiety in Dudley not because it represented any real threat to Dudley itself, 
but because of how it symbolically represented the changing face of the locality. 
The anxiety of those locals who petitioned Dudley News with their views about 
the undesirability of the mosque was saturated with symbolism, and the idea that 
the mosque represented was more worrying than its actual existence. This is why 
a central debate at the time concerned the size of the minaret and fears that it 
would be higher than the spire of the Church of St Thomas. Local people saw in 
the mosque Muslim will and ability to transform the landscape, and considered 
the preservation of Dudley as it is was preferable to the economic investment 
that the mosque complex would have generated. The maintenance of a 
privileged cultural relationship with Dudley led those opposed to the mosque to 
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panic about particular racialised cultures, but is more an anxiety about ‘our’ culture and what is 
happening to it. This suggests that there is a dualism within cultural racism that, in establishing 
cultures as natural, deterministic and boundaried, works to concentrate attention on the ways 
some cultures are contaminated or blemished by the negative effects of being in close contact 
with other, inferior cultures. R. D. Grillo, “Cultural Essentialism and Cultural Anxiety,” 
Anthropological Theory 3, no. 2 (2003): 165. 
452 Marranci discusses this in relation to the fear of true multiculturalism that Islamophobia 
implies. Marranci, “Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of Civilisations Theory: Rethinking 
Islamophobia,” 115–116. 
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act against their own local economic interests, preferring to stem Muslim cultural 
will in order to preserve these privileged relationships at the expense of a better 
economic future for the area. When not exercising a specifically Islamic cultural 
will, Muslims are not considered dangerous or threatening. It was the possibility 
that Muslims would change the locality, and by consequence, the locals, that 
drove the anxiety witnessed during the Dudley mosque controversy.  
    This fear that the local or national landscape may be changed also helps to 
explain why Muslims are so relentlessly focused upon. If, as I have argued, 
Islamophobia is cultural racism, and therefore has the potential to be applied to 
any culture considered drastically different, then why does Islamophobia have 
such appeal at the present historical moment? If the terrain of exclusion centres 
on values, why are Muslims singled out as such a threat, as opposed to other 
cultural or religious minorities such as Hindus or Sikhs?  
    The typical answer offered to this question is that Muslims are more culturally 
antagonistic than other minority groups. In order to unpack this claim, it is useful 
to consider the example of British Sikhs. Many of the claims made of Muslim 
culture could be extended to Sikh culture. British Sikhs are clustered in certain 
residential areas in much the same way that British Muslims are, due to the 
racialized housing policies which segregated immigrant groups during the mid-
twentieth century.453 There is a strong symbolic difference between Sikhs and 
non-Sikhs, manifested in styles of dress, such as covering the hair, the bangle, 
and the carrying of the kirpan, as well as observation of festivals and religiously 
forbidden activities such as eating meat and eggs. In addition, cultural issues that 
affect the South Asian population more generally, such as forced and arranged 
                                                            
453 Phillips, “Parallel Lives? Challenging Discourses of British Muslim Self-Segregation,” 27. 
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marriages, ‘honour’ killings, and the status of women, are potentially equally 
applicable to Sikhs. Many of the issues that are believed to signal Muslim 
difference and supposed Muslim inassimilability are directly analogous to the Sikh 
population of Britain. Why then are Sikhs not considered dangerous in the same 
way? Why is Sikh difference containable?  
    I venture that the answer to this question lies in the relative power of Sikhs, 
both within the UK and in the world. Sikhs are considered a containable minority 
precisely because they are a small minority, while Islam, in contrast, is 
experiencing both national and global resurgence. Muslims are considered 
dangerous not because of something inherently antagonistic about Muslim 
culture, but because they are considered actually or potentially powerful, and 
since Muslims are consistently the group which is worse off in almost all national 
indicators of multiple deprivation,454 their perceived power must lie in their 
numbers. The anxiety that drives Islamophobia is caused by the perception of a 
demographically increasing Muslim population and a unified Muslim cultural will, 
and it is this sense that ‘we’ have lost, or are about to lose, control that feeds the 
apocalyptic fantasies of individuals like Anders Breivik and groups such as the 
EDL and Stop the Islamization of Europe (SIOE).455  
                                                            
454 Ceri Peach, “Muslims in the 2001 Census of England and Wales: Gender and Economic 
Disadvantage,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 29, no. 4 (2006): 648. 
455 This fantasy makes up the ‘Eurabia’ thesis, which proposes that Muslims are involved in the 
cultural colonisation of Europe through fifth column tactics. Jelle Van Buuren, “Spur To 
Violence?,” Nordic Journal of Migration Research 3, no. 4 (2013): 205–215. The standard 
argument used to counter the claims I have made is that the Sikh community, in Britain and the 
world, do not pose a terrorist threat. Contrary to this position, there is ample evidence that Sikh 
militant movements operate from Western states in a transnational capacity. See, for example, 
Maryam Razavy, “Sikh Militant Movements in Canada,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 
(2006): 79–93. However, the fact that Sikh terrorism exists does not adequately answer this 
criticism. When individuals explain their discomfort with Muslims because of terrorism they are 
essentialising Muslim culture as predisposed to violent extremism, and rationalising the general 
distrust of Muslims because of the actions of some. This argument is only structurally sound 
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The discursive reconstitution of privileged spaces 
My argument so far has emphasised the spatial dimension of Islamophobia, 
illustrating how the discourse articulates privileged spaces which are considered 
under threat from Muslim undesirables who do not or will not recognise the 
specifically non-Muslim character of these spaces. Islamophobia operates as a 
discourse of control to re-articulate these spaces as closed to cultural change by 
Muslims, through both exclusionary and inclusive discourses that re-emphasise 
the incontrovertible (non-Muslim) values of a particular territory. The following 
section aims to explain why speakers who employ this discourse attempt to 
control Muslims. If Islamophobia is understood as a discourse of control, then to 
what end is it used? 
    Islamophobic discourse works to reconstitute the imagined privileged 
relationship that those employing this discourse believe they have with a 
particular territory. Islamophobia is thus not just a means of controlling Muslims, 
but a means of reinstating spatial dominance. It is a discourse that works to 
restore the fantasised authority of non-Muslims over Muslims in spaces imagined 
as theirs.      
    Ghassan Hage conceptualises this operation within nationalist practice as the 
white nation fantasy, in which immigrants or ‘third world looking people’ are 
relegated to the position of national object through problematisation of their 
presence.456 Hage argues that the integration debate performs a socio-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
within the context of essentialised cultural racism, whereby Muslim culture is believed to justify, 
or in some way incline individuals to, acts of terrorism.  
456 Hage, White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society, 233–235. 
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anthropological function for those who subscribe to this fantasy, giving them the 
illusion of power to decide the make-up of the nation and positioning them in a 
supervisory role with the capability to decide how much and what type of 
integration is desirable.  At a time when widespread cynicism with electoral 
politics leaves individuals feeling powerless to change national policy through the 
political process, the immigration and multiculturalism debates become a 
ritualised alternative. The impotence of conventional political engagement is 
alleviated through the institutionalised form of the integration debates, and 
provides ordinary white people with a means of reproducing their sense of 
control over the nation and its destiny.457 
        Islamophobia accomplishes a similar function by giving non-Muslims the 
illusion of control over local, national and civilizational spaces through the 
performative enactment of the discourse. By problematizing Muslims as 
endangering privileged relationships with particular territories, Islamophobia 
provides its adherents with a discursive means of reconstituting that fractured 
relationship. The following section explores in greater detail the means by which 
speakers employ both exclusionary and inclusive Islamophobic discourse for the 
purpose of reconstructing privileged relationships, and how the local, national 
and civilizational levels interplay in this ideological operation. 
 
Reconstituting privileged spaces: Exclusionary Islamophobia 
Exclusionary Islamophobia at the local level 
                                                            
457 Ibid., 240–241. 
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The ideology of Islamophobia problematizes its targets culturally, and for that 
reason it may be equally articulated to local, national and 
international/civilizational contexts. Through the identification of Muslims as the 
problematic objects which prevent an idealised space being the way it should be, 
Islamophobic discourse attempts to restore the (fantasised) authority of non-
Muslims to re-make that space discursively and decide its values and culture. For 
this reason, the local, national and civilizational levels within Islamophobic 
discourse are heavily intertwined. Privileged relationships with local spaces often 
include articulations of the ideal nation, as well as a civilizational understanding 
of where that nation, and the locality in question, belongs. In letters to the Editor 
of Dudley News, correspondents tied the construction of the mosque to the 
destruction not just of Dudley’s culture and heritage, but of English culture more 
generally:  
Dudley has a long history of iron and steel, coal, limestone works, chain 
making etc. Our proud ancestors built the town through its industry and off 
the backs of manual labour. Our grandparents – men, women and children 
– grafted and broke their backs for long, hard days… Are we expected to sit 
back and allow our culture and heritage to be dismantled bit by bit until we 
end up with something that barely resembles England, let alone a Black 
Country town?458 
Through the appeal to homely imagery, heritage, tradition and an idealised past, 
speakers connected local landscapes to treasured national ideals. Muslims were 
constructed within this fantasy as the significant other whose presence and 
                                                            
458 Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 8 August 2008. 
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demands effectively dismantled dearly held traditions and blocked the 
achievement of the imagined and idealised local and national space. 
    Such utterances illustrate more than merely a fear of change. In their appeals 
to almost apocalyptic fantasies, speakers expressed a profound dread of Muslim 
presence and symbols, based on an overinflated and exaggerated understanding 
of Muslim power. The fear was not change itself, but reflected a deep anxiety 
that Muslim power had the potential to reverse traditional dominance, to the 
detriment of the traditionally dominant. The consistent reiteration that Muslim 
power must not be left unchecked underscores the notion that there are natural 
managers of particular spaces who are able to check this power, and must do so 
before roles are reversed. It is the naturalness of this managerial cultural position 
that is perceived as threatened by Muslim demands. 
    Appeals to Dudley culture and tradition must be seen through this lens if we 
are to understand why Islamophobia has such sway at this moment in time. 
When speakers appealed to the heritage of Dudley, therein lay an understanding 
that this history was implicitly not Muslim. As ‘natural Dudleians’, correspondents 
exercised local cultural capital, a construction that pivoted on their attempts to 
situate themselves as the bearers of Dudley’s past and the legitimate owners of 
its future. Islamophobic discourse was a means by which to make a claim of 
ownership on the local landscape, and served to legitimise the speaker’s claims to 
represent Dudley. The discussions of Dudley’s past were more than an idealised 
history of monolithic Dudley culture. They were a claim to the right to have an 
opinion on the cultural landscape of Dudley that only those who believed 
themselves to be the legitimate bearers of its culture felt able to make. 
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    The fear that time is running out is present in Islamophobic discourse in an 
almost hysterical manner, but at its core this anxiety is related to the ability to 
stem the tide of Muslim power, believed to be increasing as Muslims make more 
and more culturally specific demands.  
I seriously think if this mosque goes ahead it's the beginning of the end of 
our identity as a Christian country and I won't have Father Christmas in 
stores to take my niece to see and any grandchildren I might have. Like-
minded people should get together before it's too late.459 [Emphasis 
added]. 
As the above quote illustrates, the narrative that time is running out rests on the 
notion that control is being lost by the natural managers of a privileged local 
space, and also acts as a call to action before the positions of dominance are 
unalterably reversed. In the demand to do something ‘before it’s too late’ lies the 
fantasy of cultural power to stem the tide of role reversal. It is a fantasy because 
it bestows an illusory power on to the imagined, culturally coherent, ‘real’ 
Dudleians. The Islamophobic discourse of the Dudley mosque debate attempted 
to resolve the identity crisis of those who employed it by restoring imagined 
power over the cultural landscape of the locality.  
    The above quotes have in common an understanding of Dudley as part of a 
larger conglomerate. It was understood not just as part of the Black Country or 
Britain, but also as West European town, and thus rightfully heir to the cultural 
heritage of the West. This helps to explain why correspondents drew upon 
civilizational discourse, which constructed Dudley’s Muslims as part of a 
                                                            
459 Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 2 October 2006.  
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threatening and dangerous global Islamic community and represented mosques 
as inexorably linked with terrorism and disorder.460 This discourse functioned not 
only to present an apparently rational opposition to the mosque’s construction, 
but also provided a broader psychological resolution to the identity crisis brought 
about by the perception that power relations were being re-drawn. Dudley’s 
natural Western belonging enabled correspondents to invoke all the positive 
attributes (of freedom, civilization, modernity, progress, and superiority) attached 
to Western identity and claim it for the locality. 
    This exercise in civilizational capital accumulation is particularly important for 
individuals who are not perceived to ‘naturally’ belong to the spaces in question. 
For those whose skin colour or background marks them out as having been born 
or descended from the non-West, belonging is not natural and unquestioned but 
something that must be accrued and articulated.461 One way of doing this is to 
draw a line between oneself and the undesirable: 
I am a Sikh. I will not be using this mosque, nor will my children, friends, 
relatives, neighbours, work colleagues or anyone else I know. Do you ever 
see a Muslim coming out of a church, temple or any other religious place? 
They just want to make a stand that they have power over Dudley and 
England… England is a small beautiful country, stop spoiling it with these 
hideous buildings… They just want power over the world. We want to keep 
                                                            
460 For example: ‘The continuing building of these mosques must be a real threat to our country's 
security because you can't fail to notice on every single raid for terrorists and arms the search 
starts and ends at their front door.’ Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 24 July 2007; ‘… some 
Muslims are indeed bogey men, who use mosques to train and indoctrinate less informed Muslims 
to walk alongside decent members of society, including fellow Muslims, and detonate their bombs 
as they did on 21/7.’ Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 7 March 2007; ‘It could be another 
breeding ground for Islamic terrorists and the people's concerns need to be heard.’ Letter to the 
Editor, Dudley News, 22 February 2007.  
461 Riley, “How to Accumulate National Capital: The Case of the ‘Good’ Muslim,” 60. 
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Dudley, not change its name and culture to Islamabad. Wake up Dudley, 
don't let this happen.462  
The above quote illustrates how local, national and civilizational capital was 
accumulated by individuals whose belonging may have been in question. The 
correspondent, Mrs Kaur, distinguished herself from Muslims by invoking their 
problematic presence in Dudley, England and the world. Since her Sikh heritage 
meant that belonging was not automatic, she employed Islamophobic discourse 
to entrench her own position on the right side of the West/Islam divide and stake 
her own claim to Western belonging.   
    Islamophobic discourse always appeals to larger narratives in order to 
reconstitute a privileged civilizational place for its adherents. The Dudley mosque 
debate amply demonstrated that the construction of Muslims as possessing a 
unified cultural will has consequences beyond an abstract understanding of the 
dangerous ‘Islamic world’. Dudley’s Muslims were punished for the crimes of their 
fellow religious adherents, held to account as subjects of a backward religion and 
viewed as furthering the most apocalyptic of agendas.  
    The fear of being dominated by Muslims, consistently articulated during the 
Dudley mosque debate, is a central trope of exclusionary Islamophobia.463 Why 
were correspondents so afraid that the construction of a mosque would result in 
the Muslim domination of Dudley? It is easy to dismiss these anxieties as 
exaggerated paranoia and fear of change, but this fails to grasp the underlying 
                                                            
462 Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 22 February 2007. 
463 Several of the correspondents expressed this fear, for example: ‘We wish to keep our heritage 
and retain our nationality and not be dominated by another faith’ Letter to the Editor, Dudley 
News, 16 October 2006; ‘It is also part of their [Muslims’] culture to try to dominate and 
intimidate wherever they live. And that's exactly what Khurshid Ahmed [chairman of Dudley 
Muslim Association] and his cronies are trying to do!’ Letter to the Editor, Dudley News, 12 
August 2007.  
250 
 
crisis of dominance that Islamophobia expresses. The anxiety communicated by 
this trope is that existing patterns of ‘natural’ dominance in particular spaces will 
be imminently reversed, and non-Muslims will soon be dominated by an alien 
faith. This worry expresses both an understanding that relations of domination 
and subordination are the natural order of things, and the profound dread that if 
Muslims are emerging from the position of subordination, non-Muslims will soon 
occupy that position.  
    The relation between dominant and subordinated is the subject/object 
construction of Eurocentrism.464 The fear of being dominated, as expressed by 
opponents to Dudley mosque, is a fear of being objectified; a fear of losing one’s 
subjectivity and managerial rights and becoming an object to be moved and 
directed. Eurocentrism relies on a domination/subordination binary that can 
produce only two identities – a Western subject who dominates and a non-
Western object which is subordinated. When the subordinated begin to contest 
their constructed identity as objects - when they articulate a subjectivity that has 
not been tendered by the naturally dominant subjects of a territory - the stability 
of the established Eurocentric binary is challenged and requires a hegemonic 
articulation.  
    The various expressions of Islamophobia during the Dudley mosque debate 
may be viewed as a hegemonic articulation of Eurocentrism, an attempt to close 
the gap being opened up by Muslims who were perceived as not merely 
demanding cultural recognition from the traditionally dominant, but also claiming 
an equal right to a stake in the cultural values of Dudley. The identity crisis 
                                                            
464 Edgardo Lander, “Eurocentrism, Modern Knowledges, and the ‘Natural’ Order of Global 
Capital,” Nepantla: Views From the South 3, no. 2 (2002): 246. 
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brought about by the expression of Muslim subjectivity was resolved through 
Islamophobia, a discursive means to reconquer the territory in question and 
restore to dominance the cultural will of Dudley’s ‘natural’ managers  at the same 
time as providing a means by which the latter could bolster their claim to 
authority by accumulating local, national and civilizational capital.  
 
Exclusionary Islamophobia at the national level 
As the discourse of the Dudley mosque debate employed Eurocentric 
understandings to rebuff Muslim requests for cultural recognition and reposition 
subjects in their ‘natural’ positions, the English Defence League articulated its 
Islamophobia according to the same mental model. Although the EDL’s stark 
reductionism meant that almost every Muslim related issue was considered 
illustrative of widespread ‘Islamic extremism’, the group merged local, national 
and international spaces in the same way as the correspondents to Dudley News, 
and claimed these spaces as rightfully belonging to non-Muslim cultural 
custodians.   
    The English Defence League took a special interest in the case of the proposed 
mosque in Dudley, holding three protests in the town and publishing several 
articles in EDL News. Discussing Dudley council’s rejection of the full plans for the 
mosque in September 2011, EDL News stated: 
Dudley is important because it sends a clear and very loud message to 
Islam in Britain.  It says you will not dictate to us how and what we should 
build in our country.  We will not be dictated to by a minority with an 
agenda to destroy us culturally and we will not allow you to destroy the 
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architectural style and heritage of this country with Arabic monstrosities.465 
[Emphasis added]. 
Referring to the mosque as monstrous, Muslims were positioned as agents of 
destruction; of British culture, national heritage and even the architectural style 
of the country. The appeal to homely imagery was once again articulated, with 
deeply held national traditions represented as threatened by Muslim demands.  
    Yet, a deeper anxiety runs through this extract. The EDL feared being ‘dictated 
to’ by Muslims in their own country. Muslims were identified as an antagonistic 
out-group within a mental model that understood Muslim power to be generally 
increasing. The council’s decision was seen as so important by the EDL because it 
represented the claiming back of this power from Muslims, and a restoration of 
the natural dominance of non-Muslims. The refusal of planning permission by the 
council for a second time had a symbolic meaning for the group, sending a clear 
message to Islam in Britain and having importance beyond the confines of the 
locality in which the mosque would have been built. The rejection of the mosque 
was understood in an ideological universe in which any and every obstruction of 
Muslim demands was considered a victory for non-Muslims.  
    This construction of Muslims and non-Muslims as inevitably locked in a battle 
for power and control of local, national and international space, explains the 
EDL’s constant reductionism of all Muslim action to the ideology of ‘Islamic 
extremism’. From this perspective the EDL constantly reiterate that Islam was 
engaged in a global battle for supremacy. The same article stated: 
                                                            
465 EDL, “Dudley Mosque Defeat,” EDL News, 2011, http://englishdefenceleague.org/dudley-
mosque-defeat/ [Retrieved 1 March 2012]. 
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It raises the question why they [Dudley Muslims] need such a large mosque 
anyway?  Could it have something to do with the cultural and stealth jihad 
being waged by Wahabbist Islam?  Wherever Islam comes into contact with 
an alien culture, Islam seeks to dominate, replace and eventually 
eradicate.  We’ve seen it in North Africa which was once the spiritual, 
theological and philosophical centre of Christianity in the 7th 
Century.  Where are the great churches built during those times? They were 
destroyed by Islam of course.466 
The fear of being dominated is again present in this extract. Tying up local, 
national and international space, EDL Islamophobia understood all Muslim action 
as reducible to ‘Islamic extremist’ ideology that sought nothing but domination. 
The invocation of historical examples to illustrate the contention that Muslims 
seek only the eradication of other cultures served to represent Muslims as 
irreducibly backward, the living enactors of a historical tradition that the West 
had turned away from.  By representing Islam as unchanged over centuries, 
modern Muslims were presented as similarly intent on domination. Every appeal 
for cultural recognition or Islamic facilities was viewed through this prism as an 
attempt by Muslims to stake cultural power and wrest control of a territory that 
was not rightfully theirs.  
    For the EDL, as for the correspondents to Dudley News, local, national and 
international spaces were represented as culturally endangered because of 
Muslim presence. At the same time, these discourses betrayed a conviction that 
these spaces belonged to someone. They were all considered naturally and 
rightfully ‘ours’, and thus any effort by ‘them’ to alter these spaces endangered 
                                                            
466 Ibid. 
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the natural order. Discussing the reasons for a planned demonstration in 
Birmingham in October 2011, the EDL stated: 
Birmingham’s future matters to the locals – Muslim and non-Muslim – but it 
should matter to all of us. It does not matter where in the country radical 
Islam has managed to take root; its influence is still felt nationwide… There 
are those who blame ‘Western’ foreign policy for the growth of these 
various forms of radical Islam, and they are no doubt right that our 
involvement in the Middle East (present and past) has had some impact. 
But that is not to say that we are responsible for the emergence of Islamic 
terrorists or Islamists. The primary cause is right in front of us. It’s simple. 
It’s what Islamic terrorists and Islamists have in common. That’s right, it 
begins with an I.467 
As this extract illustrates, Islamophobic discourse relies on an understanding that 
the rightful managers of particular spaces are losing control, or have perhaps 
already lost it. When the EDL reminded their readers that they should care about 
the future of Birmingham, they meshed local, national and international space by 
explicitly positioning Muslims as the main challengers and contenders to these 
spaces. Since Islam, rather than politics (‘Western’ foreign policy), lay at the root 
of violence, the EDL contended that Islam had to be challenged locally, nationally 
and internationally. But the implication underlying this ideological position, and 
the central strand running through all Islamophobic articulations, is that these 
spaces must be defended because they belong to ‘us’.  
                                                            
467 EDL, “Birmingham Demonstration: October 29th.” 
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    One final example of EDL discourse serves to illustrate how the group linked 
local, national and global levels through an Islamophobic understanding of 
Muslims as essentially one-dimensional and dangerous to all of these spaces. 
Referring to the attempt by Birmingham City Council to have the Home Secretary 
ban the planned EDL protest, EDL News stated: 
We all celebrated when Muslims took to the streets in Egypt, declaring a 
Muslim Spring in the Middle-East. We celebrated the thought that at last 
Muslims would embrace democracy, freedom of speech and the right to 
assembly. But just as in Egypt where the Islamists have started to crack 
down on any hint of democratic process, persecute the Christian population, 
restrict freedom of speech, and limit the right to protest peacefully and the 
right to assemble, so too are the Muslims of Birmingham council trying to 
ignore the rights of Englishmen. Birmingham council, which appears to be 
run by Muslims and its dhimmi supporters in the Labour Party, have laid 
down a challenge to the rule of law, the rights of free Englishmen and the 
people of Great Britain. It’s a challenge the EDL are happy to embrace. The 
EDL will pick up the torch of Freedom and Free speech. 468 
The EDL focused on the deterioration of democratic hopes in Egypt following the 
revolution, in order to imply that there was something inherently Islamic in the 
limiting of free speech and the right to protest. Birmingham council’s attempts to 
have the EDL demonstration banned were then held up as an example of the 
same Islamic drive to silence criticism and undermine rights, presented as a 
challenge to the nation and the ‘rights of free Englishmen’. Islam’s global anti-
                                                            
468 EDL, “Betrayed by Birmingham Dhimmi Council,” EDL News, 2011, 
http://englishdefenceleague.org/birmingham_betrayed/ [Retrieved 1 March 2012]. 
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democratic impulse was thus presented as prevailing within Birmingham council. 
Through this merging of local, national and international space, the EDL 
presented Birmingham as cracking down on democratic rights in the same way as 
Muslims in Egypt, and since elected representatives (‘dhimmi supporters in the 
Labour party’) could not be trusted to defend these rights, the task fell to the 
EDL.   
    Because the EDL believe that Islam is an ideological phenomenon, the group 
sees ‘Islamic extremists’ wherever it sees Muslims. It follows from this that 
Muslims are believed to be centrally driven by the desire for cultural domination 
in each and every space they inhabit. The EDL thus understands itself through 
this ideological lens as the group which can and must take back control, and 
restore dominance to the rightfully dominant. But though its focus and agenda is 
undoubtedly nationalistic, it relies on the blending of local, national and 
international levels as spaces which are all being culturally colonised by Muslims. 
What drives this discourse and the ideology behind it is the assertion that this is 
not the way it should be. For the EDL, as with other proponents of Islamophobic 
discourse, these spaces justly belong to non-Muslim cultural managers. The 
implicit understanding running through such discourse is that rightful cultural 
managers are ‘Westernised’, if not explicitly ‘Western’, and that being 
‘Westernised’ means holding to a particularly Eurocentric cultural superiority. As 
the EDL, along with other signatories to the ‘European Defence Leagues 
Memorandum of Understanding’, stated: ‘We must not be afraid to say what 
should be obvious to all: Our way is better. Not different, better.’469 
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http://englishdefenceleague.org/european-defence-leagues/ [Retrieved 28 February 2012]. 
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Reconstituting privileged spaces: Inclusive Islamophobia  
The exclusionary discourses outlined above operate as a means of regaining 
control over spaces believed to be threatened by the presence of Muslims. This 
space may be interpreted as physically threatened by Muslims who represent a 
violent extremist threat, or it may be culturally threatened by Muslims who are 
believed to be culturally colonising and changing it beyond recognition. However, 
as I have argued, it is not change itself that is feared. Rather, it is the formerly 
privileged and now endangered relationship with that space that drives 
Islamophobic discourse and practice. Islamophobia’s imperative for action is 
based on the attempt to reconstitute this privileged relationship – it is a means of 
reaffirming the right to be a spatial manager and have a legitimate opinion on 
that territory’s future. 
    Exclusionary discourses operate to inhibit Muslims in the public sphere, for 
example by preventing the construction of Dudley mosque, or through the EDL 
intimidation. By impeding Muslim action in this way, proponents of exclusionary 
Islamophobia reclaimed local, national and civilizational territories as their own, 
and psychologically reconstituted an imagined privileged relationship with these 
territories.  Yet, if Islamophobia were made up only of exclusionary discourse and 
practice, it would not be so effective an ideology. Part of the reason 
Islamophobia is so perniciously ubiquitous is that it exists not only as bigotry and 
intolerance, but also takes an apparently rational and reasonable form that may 
be termed inclusive Islamophobia. 
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    The good/bad Muslim dualism is centrally important to inclusive Islamophobia. 
Inclusive discourses insist that ‘good’ Muslims outnumber the ‘bad’, they demand 
that the ‘moderates’ stand up to their ‘extremist’ co-religionists and take 
leadership positions within British Islam, and they maintain that integration is 
achievable and desirable. Yet, while these discourses appear to be conciliatory 
and inclusive, they still operate to discipline and control based on the same 
understanding of privileged spaces. ’Good’ Muslims, within inclusive discourses, 
are ideologically structured as objects to be moved around according to the will 
of the rightful managers of a territorial space, and they are allowed to be Islamic 
insofar as the particular Islam they practice is considered acceptable by these 
managers. Should they display an Islamic will which is outside the boundaries of 
acceptability, their status will change from ‘good’ to ‘bad’ and they will be 
subjected to exclusionary discourse and practice.  
    While exclusionary discourses of Islamophobia verge on the hysterical in their 
insistence that the situation is already out of control, inclusive discourses tend to 
be more measured. Muslim cultural diversity is viewed as excessive and 
dangerous to privileged spaces and relationships, but the situation is considered 
remediable through management strategies. The integration and tolerance 
discourses have important roles within inclusive Islamophobia. They are directed 
toward different subjects (the former is directed at Muslims, while the latter is 
entreated to non-Muslim cultural spatial managers), but they both function as 
discourses which condition behavioural expectations. What marks these 
discourses out as Islamophobic is not only their central concern with retaining 
and/or reinstating the relative power of non-Muslims over Muslims, but also the 
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centrality of those British/Western/universal values that Muslims are expected to 
integrate into.  
 
The function of integration discourse in inclusive Islamophobia 
Tony Blair’s speech on multiculturalism and integration, in the context of the 
2005 London bombings, provides a very good example of this form of inclusive 
Islamophobia, and is worth quoting at length in order to show how the argument 
works structurally. At the start of his speech Blair discussed the racial tolerance 
of Britain in glowing terms and went on to concede that the 7 July perpetrators 
had been integrated at the level of lifestyle, but stated: ‘this is, in truth, not what 
I mean when I talk of integration. Integration, in this context, is not about 
culture or lifestyle. It is about values. It is about integrating at the point of 
shared, common unifying British values.’470 Blair went on to define these values 
as ‘belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect 
for this country and its shared heritage’.471 By defining the boundaries of 
Britishness through an explicit outlining of the values British people were 
expected to share, a line of cultural tolerance was drawn which could not be 
crossed. He went on to state: ‘no distinctive culture or religion supersedes our 
duty to be part of an integrated United Kingdom.’472 This qualifying sentence 
suggested that members of some cultures or religions had indeed put their 
distinctive identities above national belonging, and he went on to name this 
community: 
                                                            
470 Blair, “A Duty to Integrate. Speech on Multiculturalism and Integration. 8 December.” 
471 Ibid. 
472 Ibid. 
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Others warned me against putting the issue in the context of 7/7, of 
terrorism, of our Muslim community. After all, extremism is not confined to 
Muslims, as we know from Northern Ireland and fringe elements in many 
ethnic groups. But actually what should give us optimism in dealing with 
this issue, is precisely that point… Most Muslims are proud to be British and 
Muslim and are thoroughly decent law-abiding citizens. But it is a problem 
with a minority of that community, particularly originating from certain 
countries. The reason I say that this is grounds for optimism, is that what 
the above proves, is that integrating people whilst preserving their 
distinctive cultures, is not impossible. It is the norm. The failure of one part 
of one community to do so is not a function of a flawed theory of a 
multicultural society. It is a function of a particular ideology that arises 
within one religion at this one time.473 
Blair problematized Muslims by relating them to extremism, terrorism and lack 
of integration. But his inclusive discourse made clear that he was referring only 
to a minority of that community. British values had been contravened, and 
though not all Muslims were the problem, it was within the Muslim community 
that this problem arose and it was this community that therefore must be 
targeted by measures to integrate it properly.  
    The language used by Blair when speaking about Muslims is also worthy of 
comment. His reference to ‘our Muslim community’ was tinged with an implicit 
expression of ownership.  This point was further emphasised when Blair stated 
that integrating people whilst preserving their distinctive cultures was the 
norm. His language betrays a conceptualisation of integration as a one way 
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process; ‘we’ integrate ‘them,’ and have had success in doing so, hence his 
assertion that multiculturalism was not a flawed theory. It is not ‘our’ way of 
doing things that are wrong, but problematic Muslims who have failed to grasp 
what being British means.  
    This paternalistic understanding of the relationship between British Muslims 
and non-Muslims and the domestic, familial imagery of the nation that this 
implies, is further underlined through the language of disappointment. Bair 
suggested that Muslims had failed to appreciate what being British means, 
misunderstood multiculturalism and neglected their duty to integrate: 
The whole point is that multicultural Britain was never supposed to be a 
celebration of division; but of diversity. The purpose was to allow people to 
live harmoniously together, despite their difference; not to make their 
difference an encouragement to discord.474 
Blair’s discourse of benevolent paternalism was nevertheless essentially 
optimistic. Since Muslims had misunderstood their duties as Britons, they could 
be educated. By making clear the boundaries of acceptability and the primacy 
of incontrovertible, non-negotiable British values, Muslims could be drawn back 
in to the nation: ‘Being British carries rights. It also carries duties. And those 
duties take clear precedence over any cultural or religious practice.’475 His 
implication was that Muslims had failed to live up to their duties, partly 
because it had not been made clear what was expected of them. Blair 
presented British conviviality and desire to welcome and nurture cultural 
                                                            
474 He goes on to state: ‘The right to be in a multicultural society was always, always implicitly 
balanced by a duty to integrate, to be part of Britain, to be British and Asian, British and black, 
British and white’ Ibid. 
475 Ibid. 
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distinctiveness as having been abused by closed communities who had used 
public money to entrench segregation. Integration required such hospitable 
attitudes to be rethought: 
In a sense, very good intentions got the better of us. We wanted to be 
hospitable to new groups. We wanted, rightly, to extend a welcome and did 
so by offering public money to entrench their cultural presence. Money was 
too often freely awarded to groups that were tightly bonded around 
religious, racial or ethnic identities.476 
    Although Blair was making a very contentious point in his linking of the 
London bombings to issues of integration and multiculturalism, he was able to 
do so by problematizing Muslims at several levels (linked to extremism and 
terrorism, refusing to integrate, misunderstanding multiculturalism) and 
representing ‘values’ as the solution to the numerous problems associated with 
them. His assertion that most Muslims were not at fault was undermined by 
his constant referral to this community as the target of state intervention. The 
ideological structure of inclusive Islamophobia thus mirrors its exclusionary 
twin. Through a process of objectification, Muslims were not addressed as 
equal citizens with whom one can have a discussion about values. Rather, they 
were represented as a community to be targeted with these values, deployed 
as weapons of control.  
    Although the discourse of integration implies something positive, it is 
saturated with a conception of Muslims as objects to be directed and 
controlled. The call to integrate contains within it an understanding that 
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something exists into which individuals can integrate, something larger that 
will contain them and within which they can be included. The integration 
debates always contain an implicit understanding of what the nation is and 
what it is not.477 
    The demand for integration is a mode of power within Islamophobic 
discourse that aims to discursively construct Muslims as national objects. The 
implicit understanding that ‘our’ values are what Muslims need to integrate 
into reinforces this power relationship, and integration becomes a disciplinary 
process which restores contested relationships of power by positioning non-
Muslims as national spatial managers with the right to decide, supervise and 
direct the level of acceptable integration. Such a discourse rearticulates and 
reproduces the differentiation between the national subject, who exercises 
will, and the national object, who submits to it.478 The uncontested centrality 
of the non-Muslim subject as someone whose opinion is legitimate and who is 
entitled to feel concerned about the level of integration is reaffirmed each time 
these debates resurface. 
    
The function of tolerance discourse in inclusive Islamophobia 
                                                            
477 Kalra and Kapoor have noted that white middle class values are those established as that 
which is being segregated from and needs to be integrated into Kalra and Kapoor, “Interrogating 
Segregation, Integration and the Community Cohesion Agenda,” 1404. Like much in the 
integration debates, these values are never explicitly named as such, but the concentration on 
‘extremists’ from Muslim and white working class communities as those who threaten integration, 
spread hatred and encourage segregation implicitly nods to embedded unarticulated normative 
values. Blair stated ‘Those whites who support the BNP's policy of separate races and those 
Muslims who shun integration into British society both contradict the fundamental values that 
define Britain today: tolerance, solidarity across the racial and religious divide, equality for all and 
between all.’ Blair, “A Duty to Integrate. Speech on Multiculturalism and Integration. 8 
December.” 
478 Hage, White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society, 94. 
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Integration functions discursively in tandem with tolerance. Both assert rights 
and duties, yet they address different subjects. While integration is pitched 
towards Muslims, and confers the right to be British on the condition that 
Muslims integrate into British values, tolerance affirms the acceptance of 
difference as a duty which goes hand in hand with the right to be British. The 
latter is an address to non-Muslims to relinquish their power to be intolerant, 
and the former conditions this by stipulating its boundaries. When taken 
together the dual power of these discourses lies not only in the central 
uncontested power of non-Muslims to set thresholds of tolerance and levels of 
expected integration, but also the implication that if integration is not 
achieved, then intolerance is natural. In other words, if Muslims fail to 
integrate as directed, then the intolerance of non-Muslims is legitimate, 
justifiable and predictable.  
    Former Home and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw’s intervention into the ‘veil 
debate’ is a good example of how integration and tolerance operate within 
Islamophobia as an expression of hegemonic power. Writing in his weekly 
column in the Lancashire Evening Telegraph, Straw discussed an encounter 
with one of his Muslim constituents: 
It was not the first time I had conducted an interview with someone in a full 
veil, but this particular encounter, though very polite and respectful on both 
sides, got me thinking. In part, this was because of the apparent 
incongruity between the signals which indicate common bonds — the 
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entirely English accent, the couple's education (wholly in the UK) — and the 
fact of the veil.479 
Straw set out a dichotomy between the veil and Englishness based on his 
perception that the former signalled separation from common national bonds. 
The woman’s accent indicated that English was her first language and her 
education, he stressed, was entirely in the UK. These facts indicate to the 
reader that the couple are British born and bred, yet the veil weakened the 
common bonds Straw felt with this couple. He went on to explain the effect 
that this incident had upon him: 
Above all, it was because I felt uncomfortable about talking to someone 
"face-to-face" who I could not see. So I decided that I wouldn't just sit 
there the next time a lady turned up to see me in a full veil, and I haven't… 
I can't recall a single occasion when a lady has refused to lift the veil; most 
seem relieved.480 [Emphasis added]. 
Straw’s discomfort led him to decide that in future he would be proactive in 
assuaging his unease by requesting that veiled women show their faces. His 
recounting of this incident can be understood within the rubric of inclusive 
Islamophobia because of the interplay between tolerance and integration. 
Straw asserted that on most levels this woman was integrated. She spoke 
English with an English accent and had a British education, yet the fact of the 
veil represented to him a weakening of these bonds of commonality and above 
all, it made him uncomfortable. His decision to no longer ‘just sit there’ with a 
                                                            
479 Jack Straw, “I Want to Unveil My Views on an Important Issue",” Telegraph, 6 October, 2006, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1530718/I-want-to-unveil-my-views-on-an-important-
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veiled woman indicates that the incident led him to abandon his diffidence and 
assert his desire to conduct interviews with constituents in a way that would 
not make him feel uncomfortable.  
    There are two things to note about this incident and Straw’s interpretation 
of it. First, in framing the veil as a signal of separation481 he marked it as a 
difference that exceeded his level of tolerance, and resolved to no longer 
accept this state of affairs by henceforth requesting that veils be removed. 
Second, he formulated this decision, and acted out its consequences, from a 
position of power. This is not just the power delegated to him by society as an 
elected representative, but a position of cultural power from which his 
entitlement to feel ‘comfortable’ was judged as normatively more important 
than Muslim women’s right to veil. His acknowledgement of this power is 
revealed in his statement that most women ‘seem relieved’ when he asked 
them to remove their veil, suggesting to his audience that by conferring 
permission to unveil he was in some sense liberating these women, portrayed 
as eagerly awaiting powerful men to authorise their undressing.  
    Muslims are expected to integrate and non-Muslims are expected to 
tolerate. Yet both of these discourses, apparently inclusive as they are, 
maintain the cultural power of non-Muslims. Non-Muslims are free to set both 
                                                            
481 Later in the article Straw reflected on what the veil symbolised to him, stating that he 
promised the woman he ‘would reflect on what she said to me. Would she, however, think hard 
about what I said — in particular my concern that wearing the full veil was bound to make better 
relations between the two communities more difficult. It was such a visible statement of 
separation and of difference.’ This exchange is far from equal. Not only did Straw set the 
meaning of the veil (as separation and difference), but there is also a paternalistic adult/child 
relationship in his framing of this conversation. He promised to ‘reflect’ on her position while she 
was implored to ‘think hard’ about his. The impression given is that he has formulated his position 
after much soul searching and has arrived at the correct conclusion, and if she endeavoured to 
undertake the same degree of contemplation she would understand and agree with him. His 
opinion is presented as implicitly more correct than hers, and if she would only think (properly) 
about it, she would concur. Ibid. 
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the boundaries of tolerance and the expected levels of integration, Muslims 
have only the power to endure or resist. Straw’s testimony of his request in 
action further underlines this: 
Last Friday was a case in point. The veil came off almost as soon as I 
opened my mouth. I dealt with the problems the lady brought to me. We 
then had an interesting debate about veil wearing. This contained some 
surprises. It became clear that the husband played no part in her decision. 
She had read books about the issue. She felt more comfortable wearing the 
veil when out. People bothered her less.482 [Emphasis added]. 
This extract is notable not only for Straw’s ‘surprise’ that the decision to veil 
may be autonomous and educated, but also that the central signifier upon 
which his own decision to request unveiling turned is itself an object of 
struggle. Both Straw and the veiled woman are seeking to go about their daily 
lives in a way that makes them feel ‘comfortable’, and both, in exercising this 
right are causing discomfort to others. Placed in a wider context of good 
community relations, if the veil is constructed as a mark of separation and 
difference, then its removal becomes a nod towards integration and similarity, 
but the symbolism of the veil – its meaning in society – is decided a priori. 
Muslim women can thus grant or refuse Straw’s request to unveil but they are 
denied any power to challenge his reading of the meaning of the cloth itself.  
    Veiled women were presented as contravening a particular value, in this 
case Jack Straw’s right to feel ‘comfortable’, which was placed in a wider 
context of good community relations in order to generalise and naturalise it as 
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something normatively desirable. In requesting the removal of veils, Straw 
prioritised his own comfort, restored his cultural will to dominance and put 
Muslims back in their place as objects to be directed. 
    The purpose of this discussion is not to mark individuals out and censure 
them as Islamophobic. Rather, what I have tried to show is that Islamophobia 
is an ideological entity that may take exclusionary and inclusive forms, but is 
basically dependent on an understanding that Muslim difference is excessive 
and dangerous and that the cultural power of non-Muslims must remain 
dominant in the face of increasing Islamic demands. 
        The integration and tolerance discourses within inclusive Islamophobia 
function to situate culturally defined individuals in positions of power and 
subordination. This discourse is usually conducted at the national level and 
appeals to national belonging and the rights and duties of British citizens. Yet 
its power goes beyond nationalism. The integration and tolerance discourses 
are heavily reliant on the internalisation of a subject/object construction, which 
determines who is a subject, with the right to set expected levels of 
integration and boundaries of tolerance, and who is an object, duty bound to 
fulfil the roles decided in advance by national subjects. Once objectified as 
articles of national will, to be directed and managed according to the whims of 
culturally dominant and value-superior non-Muslims, Muslim difference must 
be contained through Islamophobic discourse which reaffirms the right of 
national subjects to tolerate them only insofar as they have integrated. 
    
Conclusion 
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The preceding chapters have argued that it is most useful to understand 
Islamophobia as a form of cultural racism. Analysing Islamophobic discourse as 
such brings to the fore the essentialisation of Muslim culture as something that 
structures the attitudes and behaviours of Muslims, is ‘biologised’ in some way as 
innate and inescapable, and is antithetical to British cultural norms. It is this 
understanding of Muslim culture as ‘other’ that drives Islamophobic expression 
and structures Islamophobic discourse. 
    Yet, the belief that Muslims are different, and even the conviction that they 
are culturally inferior, does not necessarily provide an imperative for acting upon 
these beliefs through Islamophobic discourse and practices of exclusion. 
Individuals may hold such beliefs without feeling any need to express them. An 
analysis of contemporary British Islamophobia is thus incomplete without an 
attempt to understand why this ideology has such salience at the present 
historical moment, and why Islamophobic discourse and practices occur at such 
varied sites and are employed by such diverse actors. What is the attraction of 
Islamophobic discourse? What benefits does it provide to its adherents? And 
what does it achieve ideologically for those employing it? 
    The present chapter has aimed to answer these questions by conceptualising 
Islamophobia as a discourse of spatial dominance, where non-Muslims are 
considered to have managerial rights over a particular territory, a more legitimate 
claim on its values and an entitlement to decide what that territory should be 
like, who belongs there and who should be removed. The diversely situated 
expressions of Islamophobia analysed throughout this thesis share in common 
the perception that a particular space has been, or is being, culturally comprised 
by Muslims and a desire to reclaim that space as belonging to the dominant 
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cultural group, whether local (Dudleians), national (English/British, French, 
Dutch, etc.) or civilizational (Western/European). In every articulation of 
Islamophobia, whether explicitly exclusionary or apparently inclusive, the illusion 
of the power of the dominant group to decide the cultural component of the 
spaces believed to be endangered is implicit, even if only expressed as the right 
to have a legitimate opinion. Islamophobia provides those who subscribe to its 
ideological tenets with a sense of control over the destiny of those spaces they 
consider their own.  
    As a discourse of control, Islamophobia employs a three stage process: first, 
Muslims are presented as contravening a deeply held value with their specifically 
Islamic demands. Second, these values are appealed to as inviolable essences 
that must be upheld at all costs. Third, Muslim demands are thwarted, and 
Muslims are controlled and put back in their place through the deployment of 
Islamophobic discourse and practice, which restores the dominance of non-
Muslims and their place as legitimate deciders of, and actors upon, the national 
or local will.  
    This ideological process is cyclical and performative in its reaffirming and 
entrenching of actors’ identities and positions as antagonistic. It is also a 
constructed process, in the sense that a value only becomes an incontrovertible 
essence once it is threatened by Muslims. This is an example of what Slavoj Žižek 
understands as transference.483 As Muslims are perceived to threaten privileged 
relationships, a particular value is seized upon and retrospectively constructed as 
the essence of the particular territory seen to be under threat; an essence that 
                                                            
483 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 102. 
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has always been and is now imperilled by Muslim cultural demands, and which 
must be upheld at all costs in order that privileged relationships be reconstituted.  
    In each of the cases discussed in this thesis, because the values at stake were 
presented first as threatened by Muslims, and second as incontrovertible, 
Muslims were represented as endangering the very essence of the space held 
dear. In order that the space remain authentic, Muslims had to be put back in 
their place as an unobtrusive and inconspicuous minority who did not make 
specific demands that could potentially change the territory. Islamophobia, as a 
discourse of control, exists ideologically to restore to dominance the will of non-
Muslims, and action, in the form of Islamophobic discourse and practice, occurs 
when the privileged position of non-Muslims is challenged by Muslim presence 
and will. It is not the fact that Muslims exist as Muslims, being different in a 
particular space, which is the issue. Rather, it is that they are perceived to be 
seeking to change this space, exercising their own Muslim will and refusing to 
recognise the supremacy of non-Muslims. 
   Within this ideological universe, Muslims occupy the position of the 
undesirable. As a discourse of control, Islamophobia provides its adherents with a 
means of reconstituting threatened identities and privileged relationships to 
spaces through an objectification of Muslims as the problematic significant other 
which prevents an idealised space being what it ought to be. The presence of 
Muslims is understood through this prism as deeply threatening to settled 
identities because of their perceived unwillingness to accept the cultural 
dominance of the legitimate spatial managers. Islamophobia provides a discursive 
means of reconstituting these fractured privileged relationships and reinstating 
fantasised authority. While exclusionary discourses assume that control has 
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already been lost, inclusive discourses work on the assumption that control may 
still yet be retained.  
    The three stage process of ideological Islamophobia applies equally, although 
perhaps not so obviously, to discourses of inclusion. When Muslims were asked 
to set an example by integrating into the nation, requested to remove their veils, 
told to declare themselves against extremism and terrorism, and exhorted not to 
complain about discriminatory counterterrorism practices such as stop and 
search, house raids and increased airport security, they were being told to put 
the nation above their cultural and religious difference, at the same time as the 
nation itself was focusing unrelentingly upon this difference. The three stage 
process operated in the same way. First, Muslims were problematized as radically 
different, second, national values were presented as incontrovertible, and third, 
Muslims were controlled through Islamophobic discourse. In the case of inclusive 
discourse, this control took the form of demands for more integration. Muslims 
were problematized as radically different from other Britons and within this 
understanding was an imperative for action. Inclusive Islamophobia aimed to 
integrate by only offering recognition to those Muslims who acknowledged 
national values as their primary identification. In doing so, it privileged non-
Muslim nationals as the bearers of the right to decide who should be integrated 
and according to which values they should be accepted as British. The dominance 
of non-Muslims as legitimate deciders of, and actors upon, the national will 
remained in place. Even as Muslims were apparently invited into the nation, they 
were invited conditionally – the nation welcomed them only in so far as they 
accepted their place within it and did not attempt to change it. 
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    Such a discourse need not be exclusively applied to Muslims. Other minorities 
have historically been, and are contemporarily, excluded (and ‘included’) through 
the same process. However, Islamophobia gains its specificity through the rather 
obvious fact of being directed at Muslims. There is no reason to believe that 
similar structural discourses could not and would not be directed at other racially 
or culturally defined minorities at other historical periods. By the same token, 
Islamophobia may lose its grip on the current British situation. At the present 
time, however, Islamophobia – the cultural problematisation of Muslims as 
Britain’s significant ‘others’ and the drive to manage them through disciplinary 
discourses of control – is a principal discourse at a number of social and political 
sites. 
   It is clear from the examples discussed that Islamophobia, instrumentalised to 
safeguard privileged spatial relationships, does not end at the particular spaces 
that proponents seek to protect. Even when Islamophobic discourse is employed 
at a local level for very specific aims, such as in the Dudley mosque debate, 
proponents draw upon larger civilizational discourses in order to rationalise and 
prop up their claims. Every assertion of the values of a local territory, and every 
investigation as to whether these values had been contravened, contained within 
it an understanding of who was a subject with agency and the right to direct 
change and who was an object to be moved around according to the former’s 
will. This subject/object construction is a central feature of Eurocentric 
ideology.484 
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    Eurocentrism is usually understood as a special case of ethnocentrism, the 
tendency of human beings to view their own social group as the basis of 
evaluative judgments concerning the practices of others, with the attendant 
implication that their values and practices are superior.485 What makes 
Eurocentrism worthy of its special status is the historical trajectory of this 
particular ethnocentrism. Carried by the conquistadors to the New World in the 
15th and 16th centuries, spread globally by imperialist and colonialist practices of 
the European powers in the 18th and 19th centuries, and accompanied by 
Enlightenment rationality and the scientific method, the sense of Western 
superiority that constituted the societies of Europe (and synonymously the West) 
was imbibed with a claim to universality.486 Eurocentrism, as it historically 
developed, contained within it not simply an assertion that West is best, but also 
a claim that the rational philosophy at its core transcended cultural baggage and 
was thus available to all societies, who could (and should) imitate the West in 
order to join the march to progress that was humanity’s historical mission.487 
    Eurocentrism developed along with conquest and colonial exploitation as the 
ideology that justified and sustained them intellectually. Eurocentric thought held, 
(and holds) that Europeans had a natural advantage of culture or nature, and in 
each moment of history some natural essence of superiority that was bred into 
the very being of Europeans/Westerners was working itself out.488 From this 
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perspective, the conquest of the ‘New World’ was the natural working out of an 
essentially adventuresome nature, the French and American revolutions 
represented the natural yearning for freedom within European DNA, the industrial 
and scientific revolutions were explained as the result of essential European 
rationality, and the period of high imperialism and colonialism during the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries was considered the historical working out of natural 
European civilizational superiority. Eurocentric ideology explained the West’s 
position at the centre of the world system and world market as the natural result 
of centuries of supremacy at every level, created through European innovation 
and superiority.489 
    It is useful to consider Islamophobia under Eurocentrism as analogous to 
racism in a system of white supremacy.490 Under white supremacy, non-white 
races are subordinated and inferiorised, while those considered white receive 
social, material and psychological benefits. Eurocentrism similarly operates as a 
racialized social system with a civilizational thrust, in which (usually white) 
European ‘Westerners’ are considered superior in culture to non-Europeans. The 
exclusionary and inclusive forms of Islamophobia serve to maintain this system of 
Eurocentric dominance; a hegemonic form of control, that interpellates subjects 
as Western or non-Western and provides economic, social, political and 
psychological benefits to the former, while seeking to manage, contain and 
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assimilate the latter. Those considered to be Western receive benefits by virtue 
of being the bearers of a progressive, liberal and egalitarian civilization. Western 
values are considered the norm, and the standard by which other cultural 
subjects are judged, and Westerners have the honour of being considered 
subjects, capable of having an effect by directing and changing, or retaining and 
restricting the values of a territory. Muslims within this system are positioned as 
the bearers of a particularistic culture constructed as the West’s antagonistic 
other. While Eurocentric, Western subjects accumulate all positive signifiers, 
Muslims are perceived as culturally deficient and required to assimilate into 
Eurocentric culture, imbibing its norms and values and shedding their cultural 
difference.  
    As part of a wide and deep global racial structure which provides benefits to 
those racialized as white, Western and European, the particular cultural racism 
that is Islamophobia benefits those whose values are understood as Western. 
This is why the concept of Eurocentrism is so important. In Britain the allocation 
of material and psychological benefits still depends to a large extent on white 
skin, but not only white skin – in a multiracial society, contemporary national 
belonging has a value dimension. Those whose values are considered to be in 
line with the dominant Eurocentric values of society receive greater benefits than 
those whose values are considered antithetical, opposed or inferior. Islamophobia 
is a (cultural) racism of values, a racism that posits the values of Eurocentric 
culture as superior and claims Muslim culture to be inferior, dangerous, and 
threatening to the maintenance of Eurocentric privilege.  
    If there were no benefit to employing Islamophobia, proponents would not do 
so. What Islamophobia offers to those who utilise its narratives and mental 
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models is the prize of subjectivity, the positive attributes drawn into the West as 
an imagined civilizational territory and the consequent positive identity that is 
associated with it. Westerners within Eurocentrism are subjects, all others are 
objects. Understanding the great investment of identity that Eurocentrism 
represents helps explain its appeal. Eurocentrism tells a story of adventure, the 
conquering of the globe, the riches of the ‘New World’, the subjugation of the 
rest, and the political and technological revolutions of the early modern period. It 
is a history of glory and success populated by brave conquistadors and great 
innovators. It is an intellectual history of discovery and science, great ideas and 
noble principles. And it is the story of freedom; revolution from the tyranny of 
priests and kings and the centring of man as the creator of his destiny. By 
accumulating Western civilizational capital, individuals are able to claim a share 
of this history, and one of the most effective ways to do this is to draw a line 
between oneself and the cultural other whose values are believed to be 
absolutely antithetical.  
    Conceptualising Islamophobia as a shared social narrative of the West, rather 
than an expression of prejudicial affectation, suggests that attempts to eradicate 
anti-Muslim sentiment through myth-busting and contact theory are approaching 
the problem from the wrong angle. Similarly, integration debates are unlikely to 
yield positive results as long as they are structured within a Eurocentric 
understanding of values to be integrated into. If we understand Islamophobia as 
an expression of resurgent Eurocentrism then rising to its challenge implies a 
radically more inclusive agenda. Not only does it require that integration be 
reformulated away from assimilative policies that prioritise the values of one 
group over another, but it also demands that space be made for an open debate 
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about the relevance and normative commitments of the values to which society 
subscribes. 
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Chapter Eight - Conclusions 
 
This thesis has had two major goals: one analytical and one theoretical. My 
analytical goal was to examine the nature of post-2001 Islamophobic discourse in 
the UK. My theoretical goal was to understand the purpose of Islamophobic 
discourse, the advantages that it holds for those employing it and the reason this 
discourse is so widespread.  
    Employing critical race theory as a theoretical and analytical framework, I have 
developed an interpretation of Islamophobia that reformulates the racialized 
system of white supremacy as one of Eurocentric supremacy, where Western 
subjects are awarded a better social, economic and political ‘racial contract’ and 
seek to defend these privileges against real and imagined Muslim demands.491 
Under a system of Eurocentric supremacy, Islamophobia is not an ‘unfounded 
hostility’, as the Runnymede report describes it,492 but exists rather as a rational 
defense of collective Eurocentric advantages.493  
    Chapter one discussed the theoretical framework that guided the research, 
and argued that, as a cultural racism, Islamophobia can be conceptualised within 
                                                            
491 Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 193. Bonilla-Silva 
discusses this in relation to white supremacy as a result of the colonialist and imperialist 
expansions of the 15th and 16th centuries that led to the development of a racialised social system 
that provided whites with greater benefits. I agree with this understanding of white supremacy, 
however I think it is better formulated as Eurocentric supremacy in the present historical 
moment. Although the structures and privileges remain the same, this reformulation focuses on 
the universalising aspects of Western culture and the conditional invitation extended to non-
western subjects to join the march to progress that is humanity’s historical mission and which is 
only possible through western cultural forms. 
492 Commission on British Muslims and Islamphobia, “Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All,” 4. 
493 Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 193. 
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a critical race theory framework as the racist discourse and practice that upholds 
a system of Eurocentric supremacy. In order to further explore the implications of 
this conceptualisation, chapter two reviewed the scholarly literature on 
Islamophobia and argued that previous conceptualisations are useful in their 
explanations of the historical antecedents and structural form of the 
phenomenon, but tell us little about its purpose.  
    Eurocentric Islamophobia has developed a number of narratives that enable 
those employing it to argue rationally that they are not against all Muslims, only 
extremists. In chapter three, I aimed to delineate the dominant state-sponsored 
discourses that focused on Muslims in the post-2001 period. Community cohesion 
and counterterrorism were identified as the central organising discourses which 
aimed to represent Muslim identity and control and contain their cultural 
diversity. Analysis of these discourses highlighted the centrality of the good/bad 
Muslim binary and the related understanding that (bad) Muslims represented a 
threat to Britain’s internal cohesion and external security. I argued in this chapter 
that this binary can be understood as a representation that constructs Muslims as 
Britain’s ‘significant others’, both internally and externally threatening and thus 
requiring careful management and surveillance.  
    From the critical perspective, which argues that all discourse has concrete 
social effects, it follows that Islamophobic discourse will be used by individuals to 
argue against change that is perceived to advantage Muslims and disadvantage 
non-Muslims. Chapter four considered how the dominant discourses outlined in 
chapter three were rearticulated and reformulated for particular local purposes 
during the Dudley mosque debate. By isolating representations of Muslims 
articulated by ordinary local people for the purpose of preventing the mosque’s 
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construction, a deeper understanding of Islamophobic discourse can be obtained. 
This chapter demonstrated that discourses which presented Muslims as 
dangerous, threatening and antithetical were readily applied to a local context for 
the purpose of preventing change in the area.  
    The theoretical position outlined rests on the understanding of Islamophobia 
as cultural racism, yet this is a controversial conceptualisation. Chapter five dealt 
directly with this controversy, analysing the discourse of an overtly Islamophobic 
group, the English Defence League, and attending to their central conviction that 
they are ‘not racist.’ This chapter detailed how Islamophobia operates as 
culturally racist discourse by essentialising Muslim culture as determining and 
employing a number of strategies typical of racist discourse construction in order 
to present speakers as within the boundaries of liberal tolerance. This chapter 
also demonstrated how the EDL laid claim to the nation by presenting itself as 
the defender of its values by positioning Muslims as consistently and inveterately 
antagonistic.  
    If Islamophobia is an expression of Eurocentrism then its appeal will not be 
limited to Britain. Rather, we would expect to see any nation that has a claim to 
European/Western values invoking them in order to discipline and control 
Muslims. This was the focus of chapter six, which considered the way 
Islamophobic narratives had been used to mark national boundaries in 
Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands and France. By considering key 
construction moments, this chapter attempted to understand how Muslims were 
represented as national ‘others’ through a problematisation of their culture as 
antithetical to dearly held national values. This chapter argued that the national 
values appealed to were always positioned as cherished and timeless European 
282 
 
values whose national expression was challenged and prevented full realisation 
by the presence of Muslims.  
    The four empirical chapters revealed a remarkable convergence in discourse 
structure, narratives used to represent Muslims and larger discourses appealed 
to. Yet this convergence does not provide sufficient answer to the question of 
why individuals and groups employ these narratives. Chapter seven, attempted to 
explain this phenomenon by extending Ghassan Hage’s theoretical formulation of 
racism as nationalist practices to Islamophobic discourse. Whether employed for 
specific local purposes, as in the Dudley mosque debates, or for national 
purposes as chapters five and six demonstrated, Islamophobia relies on the 
notion that space has been culturally compromised by Muslims and must be 
restored to authenticity by legitimate non-Muslim cultural managers. As such it 
represents a discourse of control whose purpose is to put Muslims back in their 
place as an invisible and silent minority who do not make faith-based demands of 
the society in which they live. As a discourse of control, Islamophobia relies on 
Eurocentrism to give it rationality and legitimacy. Eurocentric binaries play a 
central role in this, the most important of which is the subject/object binary 
around which all other attributes of non-Muslims and Muslims are scattered in the 
Eurocentric imaginary.  
 
Contributions to knowledge 
This thesis offers two central contributions to the scholarly debate on 
Islamophobia. First, the empirical chapters contribute to the literature on the 
nature of Islamophobia by analysing the form and structure of discourse that 
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seeks to represent Muslims and Islam. These analyses have drawn attention to 
the culturally racist frames, styles and ideological understandings that 
Islamophobia recycles and relies upon, and produces new knowledge about the 
way in which individuals and groups portray and construct Muslim identity and 
the purposes for which Islamophobic discourse is used.  
    Second, the thesis has contributed to knowledge by addressing a significant 
gap identified in the scholarly literature; the purpose that Islamophobic discourse 
serves for those employing it. To this end I have conceptualised Islamophobia as 
a culturally racist discourse of Eurocentric supremacism, which operates to 
restore fantasised dominance to the supposedly legitimate cultural managers of 
particular spaces. Understanding Islamophobia in this way allows a greater 
understanding of why it has such prevalence at the present time. From the 
perspective of those employing the discourse, Muslims are culturally changing a 
space they consider their own in an unacceptable way.  
    Three central research questions have guided this study, regarding the nature, 
the character and the purpose of Islamophobic discourse. In order to conclude 
and explicate the contributions of this research I now turn to each of these 
questions and offer answers.  
 
What is the nature of Islamophobic discourse? 
Much of the discussion about Islamophobia in previous literature has been 
concerned with how to conceptualise the phenomenon. The present study has 
contributed to this debate by analysing empirical examples of discourse that 
represents Muslims and Islam for their structure and form. From the focus within 
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community cohesion and counterterrorism on the good/bad dichotomy, to the 
discourses of threat and blame which made up the discourse of opposition to 
Dudley mosque, the strategies of cultural racist discourse construction employed 
by the EDL, and the binary of western/Muslim values employed in Switzerland, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and France, Islamophobia relies upon binary 
oppositions that allow its proponents to lay claim to a host of positive values, 
while denigrating, disciplining and excluding Muslims.  
   Across these diverse sites, representations invoked an essentialised and 
determinative ‘Muslim culture’ as threatening. It is this essentialisation of culture 
that can be understood as the central organising principle of Islamophobia; the 
belief that Muslims are intrinsically different.  
 
What is the character of Islamophobic and how does it work to mark boundaries 
of identity? 
Understanding Islamophobia as a culturally racist discourse foregrounds the way 
Muslims are constructed as other through particular discursive strategies. As 
discussed in detail in chapter five, racist discourse employs a number of 
strategies to mark its ‘others’ out as, while at the same time allowing those 
articulating the discourse to make claims to rationality and reasonableness. In 
Islamophobic discourse these take the form of denial of Islamophobic prejudice, 
projection of culturally racist motivation on to Muslims, positive self and negative-
other representations, and diminutives such as ‘I’m not against all Muslims, but…’ 
In exclusionary discourses, such as those witnessed during the Dudley mosque 
debate and in EDL news articles, these are often explicit and obvious. Yet 
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inclusive discourses, such as community cohesion and integration, which 
constructed a good/bad Muslim binary and conditionally embraced the former 
while targeting and disciplining the latter, operated the very same discursive 
strategies.  
    Any discourse that essentialises culture as determinative in such a way must 
be considered culturally racist. The discourses of threat and blame that centrally 
inform Islamophobia further support this conceptualisation, but it is the essential 
function of binaries within the discourse that help to explain how boundaries of 
identity are marked through Islamophobic articulation. Islamophobia turns on the 
central construction of us and them. Every other construction is scattered around 
these two identities, and each has a number of attributes attached to them that 
are so embedded in the discourse that to invoke one always invokes its 
oppositional pair. The good/bad Muslim binary that is repeatedly invoked always 
represents a positive identity (good Muslims who are like us and can be 
integrated) and(bad) Muslims with excessive and problematic cultural diversity 
who are present as antagonistic to this and must be contained.  
 
What is the purpose of Islamophobic discourse and why do diversely situated 
speakers appeal to it? 
The belief that Muslims are intrinsically ‘other’ is not an imperative for action, and 
understanding that Muslims are represented as good or bad in order to draw 
them in or exclude them from particular sites does not explain the purpose of 
Islamophobic discourse. Why do diverse speakers across differing social sites 
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appeal to the same narratives each and every time in order to mark Muslims out 
as different?  
    Even when instrumentalised for a very particular purpose, Islamophobia draws 
upon wider narratives that serve to link local struggles with a broad civilisational 
understanding of their importance. Articulated in diverse sites, Islamophobia 
nonetheless relies upon a restricted number of tropes that serve to represent 
Muslims as deeply threatening to the values and identities of the spaces they 
occupy. Throughout this thesis I have tried to show that Islamophobia, whether 
employed for specifically exclusionary ends or to ostensibly promote inclusion and 
integration, shares the same structure. I argued that this structure is ultimately a 
discourse of control which fantasises the authority of non-Muslims over Muslims, 
and showed how this discourse works in local and national locations in Britain 
and other European countries to shore up boundaries and restore control to 
those who feel that Muslims are changing the spaces to which they relate.  
    The signifiers of Islamophobic discourse are reliant on a Eurocentric 
understanding of values, so that those who identify with Islamophobia can draw 
in and on positive attributes, while dispelling negative attributes to Muslims. As a 
symbolic field of accumulation,494 Eurocentrism operates in such a way that 
individuals and groups can accumulate civilizational capital by laying claim to 
particular attributes believed to belong to the West, regardless of their skin 
colour, ethnic background, culture or religion, as long as they are not Muslim. 
This is because Muslims are understood within the ideological confines of 
Eurocentrism to be culturally antithetical to Western norms. Those who are 
unproblematically ‘Western’ have less discursive work to do than those whose 
                                                            
494 Hage, White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society, 232. 
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heritage, ethnicity or skin colour mark them out as having originated from the 
non-West. For this latter group, Islamophobia provides a useful way of 
accumulating civilisational capital to stake their claim to Western Eurocentric 
space, and the right to decide who does and does not belong.  
    It is this fantasised right to decide that makes up the imperative of 
Islamophobia. Muslims are problematized within this discourse for the purpose of 
marking spatial boundaries and giving Eurocentric subjects dominion over them. 
By relegating Muslims to the position of local, national and civilisational object, 
Islamophobia promotes non-Muslim, Eurocentric subjects to the position of 
cultural managers. Through a three stage ideological process, Islamophobia 
restores fantasised power to those who perceive Muslim cultural difference to be 
unacceptably changing a territory. By representing Muslims as making 
unacceptable demands of a particular territory, singling out a particular timeless 
value that is under threat and reifying this value to an absolute, Muslims are put 
back in their place through the discourse of Islamophobia, while those 
participating experience  a restoration of their cultural power to decide the values 
of a space.  
     
Potential criticisms 
The theory advanced in this thesis describes a world in which some people 
receive ‘natural’ benefits by virtue of belonging unproblematically to Eurocentric 
culture. Accepting with this theory means recognising that in a culturally 
racialized social system all non-Muslims receive unearned benefits. Some receive 
these benefits naturally, by belonging unproblematically to Eurocentric culture, 
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being ‘natural’ citizens of Britain, and particularly being white. Others, whose skin 
colour and heritage marks them out as of immigrant descent have to articulate 
their belonging and mark themselves out explicitly as not Muslim by exercising 
cultural capital that often involves overtly Islamophobic discourse. As critical race 
scholars have argued, in a system of white supremacy whites develop defensive 
beliefs that attempt to explain their privileges as earned and legitimate. In a 
system of Eurocentric supremacy, natural Eurocentric subjects do the same, 
explaining their privileges as the result of socialisation in the culture of a ‘free’ 
society that values individualism, hard work and free expression.  
    Critics of this position may rebuke these claims by claiming I am making a 
fictitious distinction between Muslims and ‘Westerners’ real by reifying these 
categories. Some may even suggest that Muslims are themselves in the grip of 
Islamic supremacism or that Muslims’ cultural practice is what holds them back 
from full participation in society, leading to self-segregation and ultimately violent 
extremism, which in turn colours the dominant group’s view of them as 
unalterably ‘other’. 
    Many of these are the same arguments made against any analysis that 
considers power relations to be systemic, and although ideological positions are 
rarely destabilised by rational arguments, I will answer each of the criticisms 
outlined. 
    First, on the reification of categories, there is a very sensible objection to be 
made to the use of terms such as ‘Muslim’, ‘non-Muslim’ and ‘Westerner’, and 
some may rightly point out that these terms not only have different meanings to 
different observers, but also are constructed categories in themselves. I agree 
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that all social categories are constructed, and that the identity ‘Muslim’ will often 
mean very different things to those who consider themselves Muslim and those 
who mark others out as Muslim. I also agree with the point that ‘non-Muslims’ 
will rarely think of themselves in such terms. In fact, the identity ‘non-Muslim’ 
may seem an artificially constructed category within this analysis. I have used it 
not only to indicate the binary nature of the discourse of Islamophobia, but also 
to highlight the point that as a hegemonic ideology, those who naturally belong 
to Western culture view themselves as the universal, the norm that does not 
require articulation. A term such as ‘non-Muslim’ thus problematizes this 
naturalisation of identity as the norm against which Muslims are considered 
aberrant. In addition it is important to remember that those who mark Muslims 
out as ‘them’ implicitly construct ‘us’. It is the unarticulated nature of this ‘us’ that 
is important to bring to the fore. 
   But further, these categories reinforce the distinctions that Islamophobia 
makes between people. Islamophobia works to sustain Eurocentric dominance by 
making the socially constructed categories of the discourse into social realities. 
Claiming that you do not consider yourself a ‘non-Muslim’ does not mean that 
you do not receive social, economic, political, cultural and psychological benefits 
from a systemic cultural racism that distributes these benefits according to such 
categories.  
    A corollary to this argument is that in my focus on cultural categories, other 
identifications are ignored, dismissed or their importance diluted. Although a 
consideration of Eurocentrism requires an inordinate focus on such constructions, 
at the expense of a consideration of the intersection of other identities, in 
seeking to understand Islamophobic discourse, analysts must approach it on its 
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own terms. Islamophobia obliterates other identities in order to culturalize 
Muslims’ religious identification as their primary and overriding identity. De-
naturalising such constructions through critical analysis means attending to these 
arguments in order to destabilise their constructions. I have argued throughout 
this thesis that the culturalization of Muslim interaction with society is a strategy 
of control that works to distribute privileges hierarchically. This does not mean 
that I consider these categories to be ‘real’ in any sense, or that I discount the 
actual, varied identifications of Muslims and non-Muslims.  
    In advancing this theoretical position, it is not my intention to ignore class and 
gender dimensions. Clearly differently positioned actors receive varying benefits. 
For example, it is usually low economic status Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage 
Muslims who are targeted with the instruments of state Islamophobia. Men and 
women also receive different attention, with women usually considered to be 
damaging to internal integration and men considered a security risk. Similarly, 
middle class professional Muslims who participate in wealth social exclusion and 
self-segregation are rarely targeted through state practices which aim to 
integrate them in to British values. Nevertheless, while class and gender are 
important dimensions which condition how much Islamophobia individuals 
receive, the totalising nature of the discourse means that every Muslim, or 
individual identified as such, receives structural disadvantages in a Eurocentric 
system. 
    The same applies to non-Muslims, for whom class and racial distinctions are 
similarly relevant. The rank and file of the English Defence League, for example, 
are largely white working class men who may not feel they receive any benefit 
from Eurocentric privilege. Yet the psychological advantages of being constructed 
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as natural managers of particular local and national spaces means that they, as 
they constantly reiterate, have a right to be heard. They claim to be the voice of 
ordinary British people and they demand respect as such. In chapter five I 
argued that an Islamic group which employed the same tactics and discourse as 
the EDL would be prohibited immediately as an extremist security threat. The 
EDL are correct in their assertions that they do not receive the same privileges as 
the elite, but despite all the condemnation from politicians and the media, the 
group has been allowed to voice its discontent in spectacular ways precisely 
because of Eurocentric privilege which assumes the EDL has a right to 
demonstrate, a privilege which has not been extended to Muslims.  
    On the second point, the position that Muslims are to blame for the 
discrimination they receive is a central trope of Islamophobia and turns on 
several arguments. I have discussed these in the preceding chapters, including 
the idea that Islamophobia is largely caused by Muslim terrorism (chapter seven) 
and that excessive Muslim cultural difference makes them impossible to live 
alongside (chapter five). I want to attend here to the argument that Muslims are 
in the grip of their own cultural Islamic supremacism that leads them to demand 
special treatment that is unacceptable in a free society.495  
    According to the analysis I have outlined in this thesis, Islamic supremacism 
cannot exist in the same way that Eurocentric supremacism exists. This is 
                                                            
495 An example often cited of this is the real and perceived demand that non-Muslims show 
deference to the Prophet by not depicting him, a central trope in both the Danish cartoons 
controversy and the January 2015 attacks on the Charlie Hebdo offices. Home Secretary Theresa 
May also alluded to this in her March 2015 speech on extremism, stating: ‘in a pluralistic society 
like ours, there are responsibilities as well as rights. You don’t only get the freedom to live how 
you choose to live. You have to respect other people’s rights to do so too.’ Theresa May, “Speech: 
A Stronger Britain, Built on Our Values (delivered at Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 
London),” Gov.uk, 23 March, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-stronger-britain-
built-on-our-values [Retrieved 28 March 2015]. 
292 
 
because the latter relies on a 500 year system of domination which has 
accumulated wealth for its subjects through imperialist expansion and colonialist 
domination, created an epistemological hegemony that reified Western 
knowledge as the only true, rational knowledge, and has relied on a 
domination/subordination binary that has not only historically subjugated a large 
proportion of the ‘Islamic world’ (including the ancestors of today’s Western 
Muslims, the vast majority of which are the descendants of post-1945 economic 
immigrants of former Western colonies) but continues to do so today through the 
neoliberal economic restructuring of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, as well as the wars of intervention and reconstruction that 
followed the September 11, 2001 attacks. Muslims, in the West and in the world, 
simply do not have the power to articulate a discourse of supremacism that is in 
any way comparable to Eurocentrism. There may well be individual Muslims, as 
well as Muslim societies and groups, who do claim that Islam is a superior social 
and cultural system, but this is not reinforced by the might of a global system 
boasting half a millennia of accumulated economic, political, epistemological, 
cultural and psychological privilege. Islamic supremacism, such as it exists, is an 
ethnocentrism and Muslims do not have the power to discipline non-Muslims in 
the ways I have discussed in this thesis.  
    Having said that, there is no theoretical reason why Muslims (as a socially 
constructed group) could not over a long period of time accumulate the wealth 
and power that would make this ethnocentrism universal in the Eurocentric 
sense, and thus become ‘reverse-Islamophobic’ toward ‘Westerners’. There is 
nothing implicit within Western culture that makes Eurocentrism inevitable, and 
any cultural group with a universalising mission could potentially accumulate 
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advantages that allowed its particular culture to be articulated as both universal 
and superior. However, given the global reach of Eurocentric domination and the 
entrenched privileges that it has created for its social and cultural practices, this 
is unlikely. Islamic supremacism, thus, represents a particularistic position, while 
Eurocentrism is a global system of domination.  
 
Limitations 
As with all research, issues of design and implementation potentially limit the 
scope and interpretation of findings I have presented here. To different degrees, 
the research was limited by the theoretical positon adopted, the implications of 
using construction moments as a methodological tool and researcher limitations, 
but before discussing these in detail I would like to briefly reflect on the research 
process in order to clarify the reasons that the research was designed in this 
way.    
    I initially conceived of this project as focusing exclusively on Islamophobia in 
the British context. As I explored these discourses further, however, it became 
obvious that although Islamophobic discourse was always wielded for particular 
purposes, in every case studied there were larger discourses at play. Having 
undertaken close analysis of the discourse of the Dudley mosque controversy and 
the EDL it was apparent that although the tropes and narratives employed at 
these sites were locally or nationally focused, they incorporated larger, 
civilisational frames that tied local and national belonging to a European/Western 
context. It is for this reason that I decided to study how other European states 
had represented Muslims during and after key construction moments and found 
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that similar themes of Eurocentric belonging were entwined with national 
narratives. The work of critical race scholars, who conceive of white supremacism 
as a hegemonic form, thus became invaluable to me in my interpretation of 
Islamophobia as a form of resurgent Eurocentrism. 
    The understanding of Eurocentrism as the guiding narrative that gives shape 
to local and national Islamophobia, by positioning particular spaces as belonging 
to ‘the West’ and threatened by Muslims, is greatly indebted to the work of 
Ghassan Hage, who has interpreted these practices as nationalistic. The 
consistent return to Western values within the differently situated discourses 
indicated that a larger was being appealed to by speakers employing these 
frames. The recognition that this occurred in a number of European states 
precisely when Muslims were perceived to be more powerful than they should be, 
led to the conceptualisation of Islamophobia as a form of Eurocentrism, 
articulated when the hegemonic understanding that ‘the West’ is the best is no 
longer taken for granted.  
    As Charles Mills has argued, the modern world has been fundamentally shaped 
by European colonialism, and white supremacy as a system came into existence 
through European expansion and the historic domination of white Europe over 
non-white non-Europe. 496 This understanding, that whiteness and Eurocentrism 
are fundamentally linked, has provided the conceptual framework for this thesis 
as inductive reasoning has produced research results that required explanation. 
In the light of the findings of the analyses across chapters I have put forward a 
theory of Islamophobia that attempts to reconcile the local, national and 
civilizational spaces to which those employing the discourse appeal.  
                                                            
496 Mills, “White Supremcy as a Sociopolitical System: A Philosophical Perspective,” 37–38. 
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    Nevertheless, issues of research design, theoretical position and methodology 
always have an impact on the quality of findings, and this research may have 
been limited first by the theoretical position adopted, specifically the lack of 
attention to discourses which challenge Islamophobia, second, the use of 
construction moments as a methodological tool, and third, researcher limitations, 
chiefly that I am monolingual and therefore cannot perform true discourse 
analysis on non-English language texts. 
    On the first point, perhaps the most important limitation with regard to this 
research is its exclusive focus on Islamophobic discourse, and its lack of 
engagement with discourses which seek to challenge the constructions that 
emerge. Peter Kolchin has detailed this criticism with regard to CRT, arguing that 
a focus on image and representations makes it difficult to judge the prevalence 
of particular ideas, while quoting extensively from racist stereotypes tends to 
obscure the resistance of the opponents of such views.497 My focus in this thesis 
has been trying to understand the nature and purpose of Islamophobic discourse. 
It may thus appear that the discourses of resistance, from those who seek to 
challenge these narratives within these discursive communities, have been 
omitted from the analysis.  
    In certain contexts, for example within the pages of Dudley News and on the 
EDL news website, there was very little challenge to the dominant discourse, and 
those that did remained within the discursive regime of Islamophobia (i.e. 
arguing that some Muslims are good, but all are potentially bad, and using the 
‘we are not against all Muslims, only extremists…’ semantic move). What this 
                                                            
497 Peter Kolchin, “Whiteness Studies: The New History of Race in America,” Journal of American 
History 89, no. 1 (2002): 162. 
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suggests is that Islamophobia is a dominant discourse, and I have detailed how 
the discourse constrains the cognitive processes and social mind of those to 
whom it appeals.  
    Nevertheless, challenges to dominant discourses reveal a great deal about 
their nature and their ability to ideologically suture ruptures in their explanatory 
power. The experiential knowledge of those actors subjected to racialized 
discourses are of particular importance when adopting a CRT approach, and in 
the case of this thesis the viewpoints and experiences of Muslims would have 
added an extra dimension to the research, that would direct attention to the 
ways differently situated Muslims have understood and resisted their own 
objectification and could potentially offer strategies for challenging and 
confronting Islamophobic discourse. Constraints of time and space have limited 
my ability to further pursue the way that challenges to Islamophobia and its 
dominant tropes are articulated by those objectified by the discourse, however 
this remains an important and fruitful area for further research.  
    The lack of attention to Muslims’ own conceptualisation of how Islamophobia 
affects their lives has not been a deliberate attempt to exclude their perspectives. 
Much important work has been done in this area and there are a number of 
directions that analyses which employ the methods and theoretical perspectives I 
have detailed here could potentially take. My focus has been on how and why 
non-Muslims employ Islamophobic discourse. As David Gillborn has noted, if 
those employing critical theoretical perspectives take seriously the importance of 
experiential knowledge, then the perspectives of white identified people to help 
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inform critical interventions must not be discounted.498 My own subjectivity as an 
uncomplicatedly white, and therefore Eurocentric identified researcher, has 
placed me in a position where, during my daily life, I am regularly subjected to 
many of the argumentative strategies and tropes that are central to Islamophobic 
discourse, spoken by fellow white identified people who believe they are 
speaking to someone sympathetic with their views. As David Stovall has argued: 
Whites should be included in the focus on White privilege in that the 
responsibility in educating other Whites rests heavily with them. Their 
experiential knowledge of the construct enables them to unpack the intricate 
and subtle functions of White privilege and its various rationales.499  
My own experiential knowledge of the way Islamophobic discourse has an 
everyday and unconscious element has, in many ways, formed the rationale for 
this research as well as convincing me of its importance during the inevitable 
moments of doubt that come with the territory of any large research project. As 
such, this thesis may be seen in part as an attempt to unpack those common-
sense and mundane Islamophobic discourses that non-Muslim identified people 
are subjected to. While it is not my intention to suggest that non-Muslims are 
somehow ‘more hurt’ by Islamophobia, that would be absurd, it is important to 
recognise that a system of Islamophobia which spans all social sites encompasses 
all social actors, and that non-Muslim identified people are often seen as allies in 
Islamophobia. A central focus of this research has thus been to equip all actors to 
challenge articulations which claim to be rational and reasonable. 
                                                            
498 Gillborn, Racism and Education: Coincidence or Conspiracy?, 34. 
499 David Stovall, “Forging Community in Race and Class: Critical Race Theory and the Quest for 
Social Justice in Education,” Race Ethnicity and Education 9, no. 3 (2006): 251–252. 
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    A second limitation may be perceived with regard to the use of construction 
moments to guide methodological sampling. How far can this be said to be 
researcher bias? Surely whenever Muslims are perceived to be newsworthy 
negative discourses about them will be circulating at a greater frequency? 
Construction moments are useful for focusing discursive attention on to those 
discourses that seek to represent subjects. By focusing on moments when high 
frequency representations occur, this methodological tool allows us to see 
representations emerging and understand the underlying constructions that guide 
them. What was perhaps most interesting and illuminating about using this tool 
to guide the research was the fact that rarely did new discourses emerge. Even 
in very specific local circumstances such as Dudley discourses of terrorism, 
extremism and self-segregation were employed as rational responses to a local 
building issue. Although the use of construction moments to focus the research 
on attempts to represent Muslims could be perceived as a limitation, I believe 
that it has strengthened the research by illustrating how dominant the narratives 
and tropes that make up Islamophobia really are. Focusing on construction 
moments in different sites nationally and in Europe illustrates how resilient these 
representations are to change. Possibilities for further research using this method 
are exciting and could only strengthen a research agenda on Islamophobic 
discourse. For example, a comparison of how some of the construction moments 
analysed have been interpreted elsewhere would give a broader picture of how 
these narratives are re-articulated in other contexts. Non-Western contexts would 
be particularly fruitful area for further comparative research, and an analysis of 
how the events discussed in this thesis have been represented in Muslim or non-
Muslim international contexts, and how this supports or undermines the thesis 
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that Islamophobia is a form of resurgent Eurocentrism, would be particularly 
interesting. 
    A further word on this is necessary. During the course of this research there 
have been numerous construction moments, some of which I have alluded to in 
passing. For example, the Woolwich beheading of Lee Rigby, the Paris attacks at 
the offices of Charlie Hebdo and the continuing fleeing of British citizens to fight 
in the conflict in Syria and Iraq. Events have unfolded so rapidly that they can 
only be given a cursory treatment in this thesis, but as construction moments 
they are rich opportunities for further research to test the hypotheses presented 
here. 
    Finally there was a very clear researcher limitation with regard to the analysis 
of national discourses in other European countries. Being unable to speak 
German, Italian, Dutch, Danish or French, I could not subject the discourses that 
emerged from the construction moments detailed in chapter six to close 
discourse analysis. The narratives and tropes identified are thus reliant on 
secondary (and translated) sources and considered through thematic analysis. 
The advantage of this approach is that in taking a broad view of the way in which 
various European nation states employed Islamophobic representations, a 
comparative picture of the way Muslims are understood to threaten national and 
European values emerges. Nevertheless, native speakers would be able to pick 
up on greater nuances of representation and national themes than the analysis 
presented here is able to. Clear possibilities for future research thus offer 
themselves in the form of studies which subject these discourses to a thorough 
analysis which would pick out themes and representations that are obscured to 
non-native speakers.  
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Implications: the waste of Islamophobia 
In their book White Racism Feagin, Vera and Batur highlighted the waste of 
racism in terms of energy, a breakdown of human empathy and sacrifice of 
human talent.500 It is my position that Islamophobia should be opposed as a 
system of domination regardless of instrumental reasons for its opposition, 
however the colossal wastefulness of Islamophobia is simply too great not to 
mention.  
    Islamophobia has coloured the state’s understanding of where to focus its 
attention to such an extent that it has been immensely wasteful of both human 
lives and state resources. The ‘war on terror’, which turned on Islamophobic 
constructions of Muslims as terrorists to be ‘rooted out’, oppressed Afghan 
women in desperate need of rescue, and the exportation of freedom through 
occupation, has been estimated to have directly led to the deaths of more than 
350,000 people501 and cost more than $4.4 trillion.502 Similarly, British 
counterterrorism has pumped millions of pounds into counterterror programmes 
designed to disrupt a (highly contentious) ‘conveyor belt of terror’.503 The 
                                                            
500 Feagin, Vera, and Batur, White Racism, 31. 
501 Costs of War Project, “Direct War Death in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan October 2001- April 
2014,” Boston University, 2014, http://www.costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/Direct War Death 
Toll in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2001 to April 2014 6 26.pdf [Retrieved 27 March 
2015]. 
502 Neta Crawford, “US Costs of Wars through 2014: $4.4 Trillion and Counting,” Boston 
University, 2014, http://www.costsofwar.org/sites/default/files/articles/20/attachments/Costs of 
War Summary Crawford June 2014.pdf [Retrieved 27 March 2015]. 
503 Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley’s research into the usefulness of the conveyor belt of 
terror thesis, which holds that individuals move in a unidirectional way from sympathy with 
Islamist ideas to radicalism, has seriously problematized its assumptions. Their study suggests 
that non-violent Islamist groups may compete with their violent counterparts for members and 
thus potentially provide a bulwark against, rather than a path to, terrorism. Sophia Moskalenko 
and Clark McCauley, “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and 
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Islamophobic dimensions of these policies have included employing domestic 
surveillance programmes that have focused their gaze on Muslim institutions, 
high density Muslim communities, and Islamic university societies and 
charities,504 as well as racialized policing including ‘shoot to kill’ policies and 
increased stop and search of ‘Muslim looking’ individuals.505  
    Based on Islamophobic understandings that culturalize politics and politicise 
culture, these practices have not only wasted lives, talent, time and resources, 
but there is evidence to suggest that they have also been largely 
counterproductive, failing to reach individuals most at risk of ‘radicalisation’, 
alienating large sections of the Muslim community and creating a widespread 
distrust of the state among both domestic and foreign Muslim populations.506  
    But it is not just Muslim lives that are affected by the wastefulness of 
Islamophobia. The immense amount of energy invested in distrusting and fearing 
Muslims by those employing Islamophobic understandings, including the anti-
Dudley mosque campaigners and the English Defence League, results not only in 
a breakdown of communal bonds and empathy, wasteful in itself, but a 
proliferation of perennially blocked identities. As Zeus Leonardo has noted in 
                                                            
504 Ryan Erfan-Ghettani, “Strangers in Our Own Land. 23 March.,” Institute of Race Relations, 
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relation to whiteness, the daily fears associated with the upkeep of this fragile 
construction mean that, as a performance, whiteness is always an inch away 
from being exposed as bogus.507 Constructed on the understanding that Muslim 
presence prevents a space being what it should be, contemporary Eurocentric 
identities are similarly built on shifting sands, and rely to a large extent on worry, 
anger and anxiety. The identity crises that result from conceptualising the world 
in this way can thus never be positively resolved and attending to the 
wastefulness of Islamophobia implies also the recognition that it is 
psychologically harmful to those employing it. 
    To interpret Islamophobia as a Eurocentric discourse of spatial dominance 
highlights its nature as a structural racism that serves to disadvantage Muslims in 
a number of ways, while conversely advantaging non-Muslims. To be a Muslim in 
the post-2001 period is to be held collectively responsible for society’s gravest 
problems, relentlessly scrutinised for signs of extremism and anti-British or anti-
Western sentiment, expected to consistently and monotonously condemn 
terrorism and extremism, to put the good of the nation above one’s own cultural 
practices and to be deeply suspicious if perceived not to do so. What is being 
asked of Muslims in the contemporary climate is unjust and illegitimate. But more 
than this, it is impossible. Islamophobic discourse always implicitly or explicitly 
asserts that ‘our’ Western values are better, and they are proposed as the 
solution to all the problems that Muslims cause. The discourse asserts that if 
Muslims would practice their religion in a secular, liberal and invisible way, as ‘we’ 
practice ours, then the natural hostility of non-Muslims to their difference would 
dissolve. Couched in conditions that demand Muslims’ first priority be respect for 
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and recognition of Eurocentrism’s implicit supremacy, Islamophobia informs 
Muslims that they will never be embraced in the nation or the ‘civilisation’ until 
they shed their cultural difference, secularise their religion and become like ‘us’.  
    The problem with deploying universal values as weapons of control is that 
their very reification as non-negotiable and immutable diminishes their usefulness 
for the purposes they are being wielded. The consistent return to values as a 
salve to be applied to social conflict and excessive Muslim difference reveals 
something important about Islamophobia. It is understood that Eurocentric 
values are universal values, encompassing collective human aspirations to 
freedom, democratic representation, equality and tolerance. They are positioned 
as the starting point from which we are allowed to have differences, the glue that 
binds us, and as such are not open to debate; we must all accept these values as 
the expression of our sameness before we may assert our differences. Yet the 
sacrosanct positioning of such values as beyond challenge means that rather 
than being open to the scrutiny of alternative traditions, positions and 
understandings, Eurocentric values are increasingly wielded in a totalitarian 
manner that subverts contestation and reproduces difference as danger and 
threat.  
    Positioning such values as at the same time universal and immutable implies 
that one-way integration is the only integration considered possible. Yet, as more 
Muslims are born and raised in Britain and the West, furnished with and 
expecting the same rights and entitlements, and interpreting their religious and 
cultural heritage in hybrid and novel ways, this understanding of integration is 
increasingly archaic. The recognition and respect demanded by Muslims, and by 
a progressive society in general, requires not the assimilation of Muslims who 
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have shed their cultural baggage, but mutual integration that recognises diverse 
cultural rights and accords respect to all. It is this integration, and the attendant 
possibility that ‘we’ may be changed by ‘them,’ that Eurocentric Islamophobia 
fears most. And as a discourse of control it operates to prevent such change, and 
reinstate the dominance and might of the non-Muslim group.  
 
Conclusion 
Recognising Islamophobia as an ideology of dominance that is wasteful of lives, 
talent and resources implies that, despite the scattered privileges associated with 
presenting oneself as a Eurocentric subject and thus laying claim to the benefits 
of Eurocentrism, the vast majority of people in Britain do not benefit from it. 
Sustained by a fear of loss, Islamophobia is an anxiety that saps the energy of 
those subscribing to its tenets as they try to maintain the way things are in the 
face of local, national and global change.  
    Islamophobia depends on the belief that Muslim participation in society is to 
be feared. If we were to remove this pillar and counter this idea, then 
Islamophobia would crumble. This is not an easy task. As an ideology, 
Islamophobia is not merely a collection of erroneous ideas that can be proved 
false, but a social narrative that provides its adherents with an explanation of 
how things are and how they should be. Within the ideology of Islamophobia, 
Muslims are blamed for society’s problems, and the solution is considered to lie in 
the restoration of cultural control to non-Muslim managers whose values are 
considered better. While destabilising these narratives and the assertions on 
which they are based is important, it does little to destabilise the ideological 
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Eurocentric supremacy on which Islamophobia is based and to which its 
adherents constantly turn in seeking justification.  
    How then to challenge Eurocentrism? As discussed above, the hegemonic 
articulation of Eurocentrism in the form of Islamophobia itself suggests that all is 
not well. When the politics of domination expressly articulates itself as such, it 
indicates that the dominated are not content to remain in their place. It is the 
interpretation of Muslim political action as indicative of a general Islamic cultural 
challenge to particular spaces that leads to the articulation of Islamophobia. In 
order to contest this ideologically, first the tendency to culturalize politics must be 
dismantled across society. Not only does this perspective encourage 
Islamophobia, but it also has been shown to be counterproductive and wasteful 
of state resources.  
    Second, the sense of control that Islamophobia seeks to restore should be 
addressed. Islamophobia does not emerge from a vacuum and the need to 
fantasise dominance in order to feel worthy must be addressed. How can 
communities and individuals be empowered so they have no need to fantasise 
dominance in order to feel worthy? 
    Third, Muslim political perspectives must be heard. For too long the 
culturalization of politics has rendered any Muslim political expression potentially 
risky. Controlling the boundaries of valid expression has had real world effects on 
the communities targeted, causing distrust of each other, the government, police 
and security services, and wider society. As Arun Kundnani has discussed, it is 
the possibility rather than the fact of surveillance that is enough to pressure 
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people in to conformity and enforce a culture of self-censorship.508 The anxiety 
generated by state scrutiny and the policing of expression does not make for 
active and articulate Muslim citizens. By the same token, the fear of Muslim 
political activity experienced by the non-Muslim population has similarly erosive 
effects upon communities at all levels.  
    To begin to challenge this state of affairs it is incumbent upon both elites and 
ordinary people to provide alternative conceptualisations to the tendency to 
culturalize politics. Those Muslim activists who operate at the grassroots level to 
provide counter-narratives must be supported, both intellectually and financially, 
and a new narrative that asserts that politics is distinct from culture must be 
taken up by scholars, practitioners and ordinary people. This thesis represents a 
modest step in that direction, and aims to provide conceptual and analytical tools 
with which to challenge Islamophobic discourse and the Eurocentrism on which it 
relies. 
    But most importantly, an anti-Eurocentric policy must be prepared to 
relinquish control of culturally defined spaces. In a multiracial and multicultural 
society it is no longer feasible to assert the superiority of a Western subjectivity 
without those historically and contemporarily objectified by this discourse 
protesting its supposedly unblemished record of progress. If the West has truly 
exported its positive qualities to the world, changing and influencing the cultures 
it came into contact with, it must now be willing to be changed. In Britain, this 
must start by recognising Islamophobia to be an articulation of Western 
supremacy, and admitting Muslims to the position of equal subjects with as 
legitimate a claim on the future of the nation as anyone else. 
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